

Historical Studies Journal

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
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Introduction

The UCD Historical Studies Journal is a compilation of student papers produced within the History Department of the University of Colorado at Denver. The essays are selected, each year, from dozens of papers nominated by department faculty members, and are chosen based on criteria such as quality of research, originality, readability and historiographical approach. Meant as a showcase for outstanding student work, the journal offers excellent examples of well-researched, well-written history papers. For students, the Historical Studies Journal presents the perfect model of a quality essay. For all readers, the journal is an engaging source of historical scholarship, with topics and thoughts perhaps missed in other publications.

Thanks are due to all faculty members who submitted papers for consideration and who aided students with the research and penning of their work. Special thanks go out to Dr. Tom Noel and Dr. Mike Ducey for their help in the production and publication of this year's journal. Also, thank you to Sue Sethney (as usual) for the help and support, and to the Publications Department (Natasha Andrzejuk, Connie Castle, Micheline Heckler and Jill Hutchison) for aiding in the design and publication of the journal.

Publication in the journal is an honor, and congratulations are in order for the three authors whose papers are printed here. Also, congratulations to all students who had their work nominated for publication. We found it very difficult to choose only a few papers to print in this journal. Each year, the quality of submissions makes for vigorous competition when deciding which papers to print, and we regret that we were able to publish only three out of so many excellent papers.

The UCD Department of History and the Alpha Gamma Gamma Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta are responsible for publishing the journal, each year, and we would like to thank both organizations for their support and for letting us take part in this project. This is the fifteenth edition of the Historical Studies Journal and it is our hope that it continues the tradition of excellence set by our predecessors. Ultimately, though, we hope that it is engaging and informative to all who read it.

Marty Janssen
Steve Hart
Becky Dorward

April 1998

Foreword

by Marty Janssen

The form of any society is cast in the smelter of tradition. Like molten iron, notions of order and convention flow through the channels of history, shaped by the dynamics of vision and power, to cool finally as the structure of a people. Historical precedence, cultural norms, and concepts steeped in divinity temper the foundation and act to solidify the strata of society. Laws are built upon the foundation and the entire structure is reinforced. Power is usually reserved for those who hold it within their grasp and is used to justify and codify each person's station within the realm. A civilization and its people are defined--the structure seemingly as rigid as steel.

Yet as fixed as societies may seem, the history of humanity is the history of social change. The centuries have been marked by the constant upheaval of society, the combative thrashing of two basic human yearnings: the need for security, and the desire to be treated justly. Though the definitions of security and justice vary among disparate peoples, the dynamics of their cause and effect remain the same as power is jealously guarded and justice is ardently sought. The all-too-often bloody course of history has been charted by the push and pull between these two human needs. One group attains its security at the expense of another's justice, and vice versa.

Within the scope of the conflict lies the perception of social class. It is through the stratification of society that power is attained and guarded, that roles are defined, and that the system (be it external or intrinsic) is perpetuated. The tug-of-war between security and justice most often sets itself along dividing lines of class. "The history of all existing society," wrote Marx, "is the history of class struggles." The statement has been reaffirmed, time and again, as horrific chapters in the annals of human history.

Historical discourse on the subject of social disparity is nothing short of staggering. Countless reams of paper are filled with words attempting to explain or understand humanity's inclination toward its own stratification. From the romanticism of Marx to the suggested objectivity of many modern writers, social class--its reasons and pretenses, inequities and injustices--has pervaded the dialogue of the centuries. The words have acted to awaken passions and ignite the flames of conflict; to defend old systems; and to exonerate many appalling acts of humanity. Where different societies are involved, the strata appear in the justification of actions: invariably, each society envisions itself on greater moral or divine ground than its opponent. Ultimately, humanity's inclination toward its own stratification may, indeed, seed its inclination toward its own destruction. What will be the reason for the final massacre?

Certain concepts of social strata hold class as historically predestined: "class in itself, class for itself; class as an object of historical forces external to it, class as the subject of history." By concentrating on the *nature* of power, as opposed to *objective* of power (to ensure security), these notions tend to discount the role of the organization (government, bureaucracy, business groups, etc.) in class perpetuation. Classes exist--that is fact; while stations and belief within the realm are fixed. Regardless of who makes the rules, the workers will always be workers, the aristocracy always aristocratic. Such is a romantic view of power and dominance, wherein a worker's utopia is the fancied result of epic revolution.

Other views of society see the *objective* of power as the reason for class existence. "A state apparatus," writes Goran Therborn, "operates simultaneously as an

expression of class domination and as the execution of the supreme rule-making rule enforcing tasks of society.”² The organization becomes part of the ongoing process of class definition and dominance³ as opposed to being a fact cursory to historical dynamics. When the working class rules, it *becomes* the ruling class, not simply workers making rules. New differences are defined between groups of people—definitions meant to bolster the new order—and a new class structure is created, based on redefined criteria, but with an age-old objective in mind: that of security. In the game of domination, where security is the prize and power the means, class definition is an utterly powerful tool.

Clear truths are hard to find in the historically muddy waters of class definition and struggle. One’s view of society depends, mostly, on one’s station within it, and every perspective is fired in passion as battle lines are drawn. When “class” is not openly the subject of strife, it is usually the foundation of the cause as words like “freedom,” “opportunity,” and “justice” swirl in the debate. Romantic notions spur abject action, while those in power clutch more tightly to the scepter; the pyre being ripe to ignite. Yet, when the flames are doused and new orders arise, old evils often become redefined practice; or old practice becomes sharper in its action. The stratification continues. The human toll is immeasurable; for what value can one place on life and vitality? The cycle is painted, sadly, across the face of human history.

There can be no more important questions to answer than those dealing with human equity. To understand social stratification would be to comprehend reasons behind most of humanity’s man-made suffering. More importantly, it would mean understanding why the battle is joined time and again, why mankind cannot seem to end its own self-immolation. Whether the struggle manifests itself as carnage, as heated debate, or as the simple desire to have the same opportunity as others, a piece of the human spirit is lost with each line that is drawn across

societies. The process of creating social inequity is lengthy and muddled and lessons are forgotten with each new chapter of history, or are too opaque to be seen. Human understanding of class structure does not alter the course of the cause. Power is guarded. Justice is craved.

Perhaps, then, it is more important to recognize steps within the process that lead to stratification, than to understand class as a structure. In every society, images are sketched every day that may lead to the next cause, the next confrontation between power and justice. Law and policy (official or unofficial) are based on those images, opportunity being the cost: the seeds of social stratification are sown. Every day, in every society, reasons are given (divine, economical, historical) for the way things are or why they should remain as they have been: stratification is justified. Every day, one must believe, in every society, some one or some group feels they deserve a greater form of equity or justice. As the belief coalesces, it flames into action: social definition is challenged. The struggles vary in form and grandeur, but each is part of the cause and effect. Ultimately, humanity’s greatest hope for the future may lie in its ability to deal compassionately with each step of the process, before the fluid notions of distinction cool into the steely tradition of law and policy; before the next great or bloody cause is born.

The three essays printed in this journal can be read as steps within the definition, justification, and challenge of social strata. Their subjects are varied. Their breadth stretches across a century; from the halls of Washington D.C. to the streets of Uruguay, from the scientific pretenses of Social Darwinism to the spectacular antics of a band of South American rebels. Yet each, in its own way, is indicative of the process:

Social Disparity is Created

■ In her essay titled, *Are You Now or Have You Ever Been...*, Marcie Morin

examines aspects of anti-Semitism in 20th Century America. By linking racism with vendettas such as union-busting and blacklisting, Morin's work highlights the interplay between organizational structure and social structure. Her study begins, "We look back upon the time that we now call the 'McCarthy Era' with shock and dismay that such an assault on...rights could have happened in America." Officially sanctioned in the name of national security, American law and policy of the early Cold War became an instrument of political oppression—the first step in stratifying society. Communist witch-hunts were the pretext; and Jewish people, as targets of governmental probes and inquiries, found education, employment, and even freedom to be precarious. For decades, anti-Semitism, its roots spreading throughout American society, hindered the processes of freedom and progress for this group of Americans. Writes Morin:

An unsigned article in the first issue of the *Journal of Clinical Psychology* (January 1945) warned against accepting too many graduate students from "one racial group." It was not hard to figure out to which group the article referred. From 1920 to 1940, the percentage of Jews at Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons fell from 46.94 to 6.45....

In a competitive society, education leads to opportunity; opportunity is the door to prosperity; prosperity is, often, the characterization of class. Mix in blacklisting, ostracism, and an occasional jail term, and the concept of equality becomes problematic and abstract. The notion of social impediments, however, solidifies. The lines seem concrete, drawn in terms of "us and them." A class structure is formed.

While Morin's essay comments, largely, on blacklisting and opportunity within the American entertainment industry, its implications run much deeper. *Are You Now or Have You Ever Been...* accents the role any system plays in its own delineation. Class is

defined at a basic level: "What are you?" and perpetuated with the question "Have you ever been?" The group seeking security antes with its power, and law and policy act to structure society. The first step of social definition is quiet and often seems necessary to a larger good. Yet in the end, as Morin's paper shows, justice becomes as stratified as the society that defines it.

The Structure is Justified

Defining justice is the key in maintaining the social status quo. Shackles of any sort will eventually rust and falter; and a dream of change, if allowed to seed, may someday blossom. Ultimately, a notion of equality is the greatest threat to any power structure, for even the mightiest of armies cannot contain an idea. Coloring the perception of truth, then, is the most powerful tool when maintaining class strata. "Whatever is, is right," wrote Pope on the edge of the Enlightenment; and had his "truth" been maintained, Western society might not have changed. The eve of revolution, in the late 18th century, may have been another night in the course of Absolutism, justified by divine right. Yet Western society did change; and by the mid-19th century, science was seen as the cursor of objective truth. Natural laws and social law became entwined in a theory known as "Social Darwinism."

Writing in the voice of a 19th century Denver businessman, Melanie Spatola creates an inviting look at Social Darwinism and its impact on American thought. Titled *Voices From the Past: Social Darwinism and Its Impact on American Society*, Spatola's work is an exercise in historical empathy that speaks to issues much larger than the sum of its parts. On one hand, the paper conveys a sense of arrogance through its speaker. "I have no sympathy for those who claim to be cursed with the plight of poverty," states Spatola's character, "if you are poor, there surely must be good reason." Yet one is left to wonder about the nature of arrogance and teaching: as ideas such as Social Darwinism permeate society, are the new generations—the comers to

it--responsible for their own sense of social equity? At what point does coercion of ideas in the name of power become ingrained social dogma? When coercion becomes dogma, social strata and inequality seem acceptable. Struggles for equality, then, are painted as social disturbances, blights upon healthy society. The class is justified; and whatever is, is right.

In America, Social Darwinism had a tremendous impact on law and accepted practices (both socially and in business). The impact continues in American society, today. Old power structures are difficult to fell. Yet change does occur. The greater meaning of Spatola's work can be found not in the words on paper, but in the feelings they impart. The author admits she had a difficult time creating the voice of her Darwinist character, the ideas he expresses being so different from her own; but the creation can be a lesson in itself, as can a reader's reaction to it. Ideas that once acted in defense of social strata now seem archaic and offensive; but where will the next justification begin? Societies change, yet the cycle continues. Security will always clash with justice. The trick will be understanding coercion for what it is, before it becomes the next social dogma.

The System is Challenged

October 8, 1969, was a day of insurrection in the streets of Pando, Uruguay. Decades of frustration and social despair--the kindling of revolution--flared into action amid the on-lookers and confused authorities of the sleepy city, northwest of Montevideo. In one afternoon, the Police and Fire Stations were commandeered and several banks robbed by an audacious group of rebels known as Tupamaros. Their act rode a wave of revolution in 1960s Latin America, yet fizzled in its intent. An attempt, by the Tupamaros, to foster an atmosphere of revolution across Uruguay, the insurrection in Pando became little more than a vibrant footnote in the history of class rebellion.

Una Acta Tupamara, Scott
Robinson's engrossing look at the Tupamaros,

traces the evolution of rebellion. Woven within a narrative of the Pando incident is Robinson's portrait of the cause and effect of class structuring. The elite class consolidated its power via electoral rules and policy; economic hardship doused opportunity for the workers; promises were made and broken by political redeemers; all the while, frustration mounted until finally, open rebellion ignited. The dynamics that mold social strata work slowly. Robinson's essay reveals ways in which those dynamics are challenged, across generations.

Though *Una Acta Tupamara* is centered around events of a day in 1969, its roots begin at least a century before. Robinson dissects the *lema* system, an 1865 political arrangement, meant to curb social violence, which acted to condense power within an elite core of citizens. Robinson states:

The end result of this arrangement meant that the ruling elite was able to perpetually recycle themselves...and hold onto power indefinitely. Any change was channeled through party machinery the status quo was maintained. Even though Uruguay had a relatively progressive attitude in allowing third parties, the reality of the situation was that change came slowly, and only with the agreement of the two major parties.

Several phrases in the passage are key: "perpetually recycle," "hold onto power indefinitely," "the *reality* of the situation...." The point at which official disparity is created (the *lema* system is forged) stands as key in the process of coercion and retaliation. The system was conceived and justified. Security was guarded via political power. Over the next century, retaliation would take on many forms until, as Robinson shows, violence again became endemic. The cure, in fact, nurtured the very problem it meant to solve.

As the Tupamaros grew increasingly frustrated with their muffled political voice, their actions grew more audacious and violent. They perceived their revolution in Marxist terms--drawing on the images of an epic class

struggle to fuel their cause. Yet such images failed to ignite general social upheaval, for the romantic notion of worker versus aristocrat was inconsistent in a system that *did* attempt to integrate the classes politically. In the end, the Tupamaros methods belied their purpose and became, instead, "actions for the sake of acting." At what point and what measure of a response is necessary to successfully challenge social injustice or to create opportunity within a system? In a tumultuous world, the answer means the difference between definitive change and horrific spectacle.

Today's world is rife with the struggles and despair of social conflict. While the archetypal view of class disparity is one of worker versus ruler, a broader sense of the subject is necessary in a muddled up world: *any* social delineation is a struggle of class. Such is not to suggest that all people must enjoy the same prosperity or that any sense of

nationalism must end in order to achieve fairness throughout the world; but basic human principles need be respected above all else. Steps within the process must be recognized for what they are--the creation and justification of differences in the name of security. Inequity must be challenged, but that challenge will not be successful if induced improperly. McCarthyism and anti-Semitism, the forty-year-old Senate hearings of Jewish Americans, must be acknowledged. Notions of Social Darwinism and its impact on society must be acknowledged. Because for every car bomb or riot, for every lost job opportunity, for every military mobilization, there was a point of trial and a sense of justification; and this is the point at which a challenge must be made. Ultimately, challenge without recognition is futile; for even if successful, the new order often will repeat old sins. Recognition is the key. History is the teacher. The splendor of humanity lies in the balance.

Social Strata are Created

"I would love nothing better than to fire every last one of them and never let them work...again."

Have You Ever Been?

*Anti-Semitism and the Red Scare in Cold War America
1938-1960*

by Marcie Morin

"If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country."¹

We look back upon the time that we now call the "McCarthy Era" with shock and dismay that such an assault on constitutionally guaranteed rights could have happened in America, and happened to so many. What was the Red Scare about? Did it start during the Cold War era and, for that matter, when did the Cold War actually start? Were Communists the real target or was there something more covert--Anti-Semitism? Anti-Unionism? Anti-Radicalism? Why did Americans so fear the "Great Red Menace" while England and Europe organized socialist governments and communist parties? This paper seeks to examine the events and attitudes that led up to the witch hunts of the late 1940s and early 1950s, culminated in the execution of two native-born American citizens in 1953, and subsided, finally, around 1960.

Perhaps the Red Scare started as early as the Gilded Age, even though there was nothing "red" about the world yet. This was the age of Social-Darwinism, and corporate leaders seized on the theory as "scientific" justification for their actions. Turn-of-the-century America was not a friendly place in which to be a poor immigrant. Thousands of immigrants had no alternative but to enter the world of tenements, sweat shops, and child labor mills which were the hallmarks of large industrial cities all over the country.

Americans have a long tradition of conspiratorial thinking. From the freemason

conspiracy in colonial times, to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, to the New World Order today, this paranoid *zeitgeist* has been a cornerstone of public thought. As thousands of Southern and Eastern European Catholics and Jews poured through the gates of Ellis Island, threatening to change the face of America, a xenophobic and racist establishment emerged to protect its interests.

The most imperative interest was capitalism. In an industrial economy with no unemployment insurance, no worker's compensation, no health insurance and no OSHA, workers began to organize in order to survive--an ugly undertaking in a decidedly capitalist, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant paradise. Fiercely protective of America's rags-to-riches heritage, itself a Social Darwinist construct, the establishment fought back. Bloody labor disputes ensued, most notably the Haymarket Square riots (1886) and the Pullman Strike (1894). These incidents were popularly blamed on anarchist conspiracies and undesirable aliens rather than unfair management practices and unsafe working conditions.

The years leading up to the first World War saw a change in union organizing. Many groups, especially the Industrial Workers of the World, built upon a frank acceptance of class conflict to seek more radical changes. Socialism, a minor presence in American life since its introduction by German intellectuals

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in the mid-nineteenth century, suddenly became a mass movement with its greatest strength among Jewish and German immigrants.

Many radical groups and labor unions openly opposed American involvement in World War I. Emma Goldman was born in a Jewish ghetto in Lithuania and immigrated to the United States when she was sixteen. From 1908 to 1917, she spoke throughout the United States on behalf of the anarchist cause. During World War I she was arrested and sent to prison for having organized an anti-conscription campaign. In 1919, along with other anarchists, she was deported to Russia.

Labor organizer William "Big Bill" Haywood, a leader of the Western Federation of Miners, had taken on John D. Rockefeller during the Colorado coal field strikes. As president of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), he directed the organization's activities among western agricultural, timber, and mine workers during World War I. Because strikes in those sectors threatened the war effort, the federal government arrested all the leaders of the IWW in 1917 and charged them with violating espionage and sedition acts. In 1921, after the Supreme Court rejected his appeal, Haywood jumped bond and fled to the Soviet Union, where he died of alcoholism and diabetes.

It was during this period that Judaism, Unionism, Socialism, and Communism—particularly Soviet Communism—became inextricably connected in American thought. That connection was strengthened by the high-profile activities of radicals like Goldman and Haywood.

The social and labor unrest that World War I coincided with the founding of the Communist party and precipitated the first wave of explicit anti-communism, the Red Scare of 1919-1920. Nativist fear of radicalism, anarchism, foreign espionage and subversion, and especially Bolshevism, led to a crackdown, which, like other incidents of

political oppression, focused on foreigners and labor unions. Thousands of foreign-born radicals were rounded up and deported and many employers used red-baiting to break strikes.

A brief history of organized labor in America is straight forward enough, but American anti-Semitism, and its connection to anti-unionism, is a murkier undertaking. Throughout history, Jewish people have been unwelcome visitors in alien lands, often precluded by law from owning property. Forced into urban ghettos, thousands of Jewish immigrants manned the sweatshops and lived in the tenements that the unions raged against. Jewish involvement in labor organizing and socialist causes was often a response to the prevailing conditions of their lives.

Anti-Semitism enjoyed a certain respectability in the 1920s with such vocal advocates as Henry Ford. Ford published many scurrilous anti-Semitic articles and fought unionization with every weapon at his disposal, including a private police force. Ford, it seems, also had difficulty separating Jews from unions. His *Dearborn Independent* introduced Americans to "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion."

This document was a forgery created by Russian royalists shortly before the Russian Revolution. In the "Protocols" the leader of a secret Jewish world government allegedly explains the plot to destroy Christian civilization by controlling the world economy. White Russians gave copies of these documents to their troops and they were translated and carried to outsiders around 1920.

Jewish Americans, therefore, found themselves in a rather unique Catch-22. They were feared as both greedy capitalists determined to take over control of the world economic system or as communists who wanted to undermine American values.

The "Protocols" were conclusively proven to be a hoax by Philip Graves in 1921. Despite Graves' *denouement* of the "Protocols"

however, the damage to the Jewish community was done. The 1924 Johnson Reed Immigration Act further restricted the immigration of southern European Jews and Catholics as well as other non-Protestant nationalities. Less than twenty years later, the Nazis would make the "Protocols" the cornerstone of their extermination program.²

Anxiety over Russia was also rife in the early decades of the twentieth century. With the 1917 triumph of the Bolsheviks, diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were severed. The rivalry turned ideological as well as economic.

The Great Depression, however, spurred the growth of the Communist party in the United States. By toning down its revolutionary rhetoric and supporting President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, the party drew many upper-class intellectuals and middle-class idealists to its cause. Others joined the party to organize labor unions or to fight fascism and Naziism.

Many of the idealists and intellectuals who joined the Party during this period would later find themselves caught in the snare of the Red Scare hysteria, faced with the dreaded question: "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist party?"

Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, though popular with the American people, faced considerable opposition on Capitol Hill. The New Deal smacked of socialism (and by extension Communism) for many senators and congressmen and they were vocal in their opposition. On May 26, 1938, the United States House of Representatives authorized the formation of the Special House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) to be chaired by Martin Dies (D. Texas). HUAC's mission was to detect and root out un-American activities in the United States and un-American and subversive propaganda initiated abroad and at home.³

Martin Dies was a sworn enemy of both Communists and the New Deal. In his

book, *The Trojan Horse in America*, he wrote: "The W.P.A. was the greatest financial boon which ever came to the Communists in the United States... Relief projects swarm with communists."⁴ The allusion to the Trojan Horse itself implies a conspiracy and sums up Dies' thinking about communist infiltration into American government. At any moment, Communists were poised to leap out and sweep the country in a massive *coup d'etat*.

HUAC Begins: 1938

In 1938, Adolph Hitler appointed himself war minister of Germany and met with Benito Mussolini in Rome. Germany was mobilizing for war and France had called up her reservists. Neville Chamberlain followed a policy of appeasement while Roosevelt recalled the American ambassador to Germany and Germany recalled her ambassador to the United States. The time was ripe for a crackdown on real or perceived radicalism in America.

Dies' investigation of the W.P.A.'s Federal Theatre Project in 1938 was the first assault on the entertainment industry by HUAC. The nation's first and only nationally subsidized theater was the Federal Theatre, which survived from 1935 to 1938 under the directorship of Hallie Flanagan. On July 26, 1938, committee member J. Parnell Thomas (R. New Jersey) called Mrs. Flanagan to appear before HUAC. After many preliminary "friendly witnesses" who testified as to the communistic nature of the Theatre, Mrs. Flanagan finally testified on December 26, 1938. Though she supposed she was there to talk about the Federal Theatre, the committee had another agenda. Representative Thomas suggested that the Theatre was actually "a propaganda tool for the New Deal," and Mrs. Flanagan found herself somehow forced to defend not the world of culture, but the world of politics.⁵

The concern of the Dies Committee of HUAC was not the Theatre itself but its connection with labor. It was believed, and friendly witnesses had previously testified, that a person must join the Workers' Alliance

before they could apply for a job with the Federal Theatre. The Workers' Alliance, according to the Dies Committee, was both a communist organization and a part of the New Deal propaganda machine.⁶

For the first time, but certainly not the last, HUAC commanded a media circus. Such notables in the show business and literary worlds as Dashiell Hammett, Frederic March and John Ford wrote letters of protest and demanded that the Dies Committee be disbanded. A group of prominent New Yorkers flew to Washington to present petitions signed by 200,000 persons protesting the dismissal of 1,526 WPA workers on the Federal Arts Project in New York City (many of them came to regret their public support of the liberal causes). Protests, however, were not enough. By an act of Congress on June 30, 1939, the Federal Theatre was ended.⁷ The 1938 Dies Committee was unique in many ways to an American public whose legal education was largely limited to civil and criminal procedures. Witnesses in criminal cases have more rights than those summoned before Congress. For one thing, in criminal proceedings, those making accusations are subject to cross examination. Rules of evidence are followed and due process is observed. As people were soon to discover, those summoned to appear before congressional committees do not enjoy these rights.

The anti-Communist fervor died down somewhat when Hitler invaded Russia in 1941, turning the Soviet Union into an American ally. But the coming of the Cold War at the end of World War II resuscitated anti-communist sentiment and, in fact, made it central to American foreign policy. An American consensus was developed based on several key assumptions: that all Communists owe their allegiance to Moscow; that they unblinkingly follow the party line; and that whenever possible they will work to subvert the American system to the goal of monolithic world communism.

Watershed Years: 1946-1947

Though the war had ended, global politics were hardly stable. In the spring of 1946, Churchill delivered his "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri. Truman created the Atomic Energy Commission, in the wake of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to protect America's atomic development as well as its secrets. The European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) was gearing up in Europe to restore stability and to discourage the communist parties which were springing up all over the continent. To protect and aid Turkey and Greece, the Truman Doctrine was established in 1947. The situation was exacerbated by the Berlin Airlift and the Communist victory in China. When North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel in 1950, the die was cast for American foreign policy: containment of global monolithic communism.

With the onset of the Atomic Age came the onset of the Cold War as we know it—a global conflict between rival imperialisms and ideologies, and a domestic conflict between internal security and individual liberty. President Harry S. Truman faced increasing anti-communist pressures both from within and outside of his administration by the mid 1940s. In 1946, Admiral William D. Leahy, chief of staff, issued a statement of military policy to Truman stating that we "should prevent Communist infiltration into our governmental agencies, our armed forces, and the labor elements upon which our war making capacity depends."⁸ This statement clearly implies that Leahy believed a powerful fifth column was in operation on American soil, and, again, labor unions are mentioned as a main concern.

Also in 1946, Martin Dies sent a letter to Truman urging him to put into effect seven recommendations made by HUAC: 1) deport alien communists; 2) require registration of members of communist organizations; 3) refuse to recognize unions with communist officers; 4) bar alien communists from entering the United States; 5) fire communists holding public jobs;

6) cancel citizenship papers of naturalized communists; and 7) compel the C.I.O. to get rid of communist officers. Dies' recommendations were given short shrift at the time but, within five years, all had been carried out or initiated.⁹

In 1947, Executive Order 9835 established loyalty boards and loyalty oaths for federal employees. Over Truman's veto, the Taft-Hartley Act passed, containing a compendium of restraints on trade unions, including a provision that required union officials to sign oaths swearing they were not Communists. The veto was drafted by Clark Clifford, who opposed Taft-Hartley on the grounds that it was an "infringement of basic civil liberties" and that it constituted "witch-hunting and thought-policing."¹⁰

The 1950 McCarran Act compelled "heretical" organizations to register with the government, to disclose membership lists, to provide financial reports, and to label themselves "subversive" on all printed matter. Finally, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 removed deportation cases from the courts and established the Immigration Service, which would henceforth set up its own boards unhampered by rules of evidence or procedure.¹¹

The anti-communist panic grew during the immediate post-war period. Far from assuaging America's fears, loyalty oaths convinced the public that there was something of which to be afraid. Many organizations outside of the government imposed loyalty oaths as well. It was imperative that anti-communist liberals dissociate themselves from radicals, but that was not so easily accomplished. As mentioned earlier, many idealistic Americans had supported liberal causes during the Depression years. Those unfortunate alliances would now come back to haunt many American citizens in the worlds of labor, show business, and the academic and scientific communities. With paranoia increasing nationwide, the Atomic Age turned into the Age of Informers in America.

Naming Names: The Informers

To the American way of thinking, the United States was the defender rather than the aggressor in the Cold War. To be a member of the Communist party was to be a spy. To be an informer was to be a patriot. According to Victor Navasky, "The Informer Principle" held not only "that there was nothing wrong with naming names, but that it was the litmus test, the ultimate evidence, the guarantor of patriotism."¹² The act of informing became more important than the information itself. This principle may have found its beginnings with Whitaker Chambers and Alger Hiss, the first case to introduce espionage into Cold War America.

In the American character, however, there is a loathing for the informer--the snitch, the squealer, the stool-pigeon, the rat, the tattler, the one who sings like a canary or spills his guts. Even today we find it distasteful that, after years of frustration, the FBI was able to catch the Unabomber, not because of advanced technology, but because his own brother "ratted him out." It is an uneasiness that persists even though we all agree that the brother "did the right thing."

Informing poses a particular dilemma for the Jew. The Aramaic word for informer found in the Book of Daniel is *Akhal Kurtza*, the literal translation of which is "to eat the flesh of someone else." The Menean Curse, which was introduced as the twelfth benediction to the daily Amidah prayer, foretells that "For the informer there be no hope."¹³ When the comic actor Zero Mostel, the son of a rabbi, was notified by his producer that he must clear his name of communist charges if he wanted to continue to work, the actor refused, saying: "as a Jew, if I inform, I can't be buried in sacred ground."¹⁴

The 1940s and 1950s congressional committees saw many kinds of informers. Some, like Whitaker Chambers, Ronald Reagan, and Louis Budenz, believed they were doing their patriotic duty. Some were coerced. Others, like Elizabeth Bentley, cooperated to save their own skins.

Elizabeth Bentley was a self-confessed communist spy--a fact that contributed enormously to her credibility in keeping with the current *zeitgeist*. The New England-born Vassar graduate joined the Communist Party while a student at Columbia University in 1938. She became the lover of one Jacob Golos, who ran World Tourists, a New York City travel agency set up by the American Communist party "...for the dual purpose of making money and encouraging tourists to go to Russia." Through Golos, Bentley alleged that she passed secrets to the Soviets by becoming Golos' espionage courier to a large group of government employees in Washington, D.C.¹⁵ Bentley's career as a spy ended in December, 1944. She went to the FBI with her story in August, 1945, and, in less than a month, implicated over eighty individuals as being connected with the Soviet espionage organization either in Washington or New York.

A grand jury convened to investigate her allegations, but after nearly a year there was not enough evidence produced to result in even one indictment.¹⁶ Unable to get results through normal channels, the FBI next presented its protegee to HUAC, now chaired by J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey. Because of her blond bombshell looks, a media sensation accompanied Bentley's appearance before the committee. This time, scores of individuals publicly accused by Miss Bentley had to endure disgrace and the loss of their jobs without recourse to cross-examination of their accuser. Only very gradually did it become apparent that Miss Bentley had never met most of those she had named.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the damage was done and most of the accused were never reinstated, nor did the flimsiness of her story keep her from being a prime witness in the Rosenberg-Sobell trial, even though she had also never met them.

Books and articles have been, and continue to be, written about the strange case of Elizabeth Bentley. Her story illustrates how very little it took to fan the flames of paranoia in Cold War America. So sure were we that a

conspiracy was afoot that any former communist who now claimed to "see the light" was more credible than any hard-working citizen who denied any involvement.

There are other, more famous, cases of espionage to be analyzed during this period, especially Whitaker Chambers' exposure of Alger Hiss. However, whether their victims were guilty or innocent, Chambers and Bentley changed the face of American politics. Beginning with the hearings to confirm David Lilienthal as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1947, any political appointee or candidate could be accused of being "pink" as a way of blocking confirmation of liberals to public office. Lilienthal's problems stemmed from his casual acquaintance with Dr. Harlow Shipley.

Shipley was the director of the Harvard Observatory, vice chairman of the Progressive Citizens of America, and supported the creation of a federally-funded, national science foundation. These crimes were enough to cause him to be under attack by HUAC and under surveillance by the FBI.¹⁸ Lilienthal eventually overcame the charges of communist sympathies and was confirmed, but his case was indicative of the growing use of "red-baiting" in order to achieve a separate agenda.

The war against organized labor had also escalated by the late 1940s. Under the 1940 Alien Registration Act, deportation hearings were begun in September 1947, aimed at alien, allegedly communist, labor officials. Organizational director of the Transport Workers Union, John Santo; AFL Hotel and Club Employees Union Local 6 president, Michael Obermeier, and former business agent of AFL Upholsterers Local 61, Peter Warhol, were arrested within three days of each other.¹⁹ Obermeier; and Warhol were both Jewish and Santo was Catholic. The proceedings that followed served the dual purpose of removing troublesome leftist leaders from the labor movement and reinforcing the existing image of organized unions being riddled with communist infiltrators and unfriendly aliens.

Anti-Semitism was on the rise in the years from 1920 to 1940, along with anti-unionism. An unsigned article in the first issue of the *Journal of Clinical Psychology* (January 1945) warned against accepting too many graduate students from "one racial group." It was not hard to figure out to which group the article referred. From 1920 to 1940, the percentage of Jews at Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons fell from 46.94 to 6.45; the percentage of Jewish City College of New York graduates admitted to any medical school dropped from 58 to 15; and not one Jewish graduate of either Hunter or Brooklyn College in New York City entered an American medical school until 1946.²⁰

In 1949, a former editor of the *Catholic Worker*, a liberal publication, wrote that he had "...never heard a single sermon on the evil of anti-Semitism, before, during or since the war... When one considers the enormity of the Nazi blood carnival, it never ceases to be amazing that the Christian conscience has been so slightly disturbed."²¹

The Rosenberg Case

Perhaps the saddest result of Cold War hysteria was the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. It is a case that addresses not only the question of anti-Semitism, but also illustrates how paramount the act of informing had become. In the case of the Rosenbergs, informing became, literally, a matter of life and death.

The case involved seven individuals: Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Ethel's brother David Greenglass and his wife, Ruth, and Martin Sobell and his boyhood friend Max Elitcher. The seventh co-defendant, Harry Gold, was the convicted accomplice of the British spy, Klaus Fuchs. He appears to have no concrete connection to the case except in his capacity as a "known communist." Gold and Elizabeth Bentley, who also testified at the Rosenberg trial, had never even met any of those against whom they testified.²²

All seven co-defendants were accused of having been sympathetic to, or active in, radical left-wing politics. All seven were Jews, as were the judge and two of the prosecuting attorneys (no Jews, however, sat on the jury). As a Jew, Judge Irving R. Kaufman was in a precarious position. According to historian and Jewish scholar Paul Jacobs: "It is conceivable that had they [the Rosenbergs] not been Jewish they might not have received the death penalty from the Jewish judge who presided at their trial, perhaps unconsciously demonstrating that a Jewish judge could be as harsh to Jewish traitors as any other judge."²³

Judge Kaufman sentenced the Rosenbergs to death April 5, 1951, with the words: "...by your betrayal you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country."²⁴ The enormity of the betrayal, however, was not as important to the F.B.I. as the naming of names. The day after sentencing, a brief item in a New York Post column suggested that the government was prepared to barter the lives of the condemned couple for information. The Rosenberg's refusal was seen as proof of their Marxist fanaticism and their wish to become martyrs to the cause (the use of the death penalty as a form of coercion was, however, accepted without criticism).

The Post item was true. There was an explicit offer to commute the Rosenberg's sentences if they would name some of their spy friends, but they insisted they had none. According to information that has only recently come to light, this may also have been true. Outcry against the Rosenberg's sentence was global, especially among world religious leaders. The London embassy was besieged by demonstrations for several days before the execution. The demonstrators were told by a third-secretary at the embassy: "They can save their skins if they squeal."²⁵ The American embassy in Paris was also besieged with protesters. In Washington, however, the demonstrations were more mixed. Patriots behind police lines yelled "Fry the Jews, Burn the Rats" at the thousands who demonstrated for clemency.²⁶

Though their alleged crimes were committed in 1944 and 1945, the Rosenbergs were charged under the Atomic Energy Act, which did not come into being until 1947. This alone was grounds enough for appeal. Upon President Dwight D. Eisenhower's urging, however, the eleventh-hour stay of execution was denied—even though several of the Supreme Court Justices thought the attorneys had a valid point.²⁷ Judge William O. Douglas would later say that he wanted to grant the stay because he had, "perhaps unfortunately," read the trial transcripts.²⁸ The other eight justices had not.

In 1997, former KGB agent Alexander Feklisov, now 83 years old, came forward in defense of the Rosenbergs. Of Julius he said: "He didn't understand anything about the atomic bomb and he couldn't help us... And they still killed them. It was a contract murder."²⁹ Feklisov went on to say that the execution of Ethel Rosenberg was particularly unfair since, he insisted, she had not actively spied herself. "I think she knew, but for that you don't kill people."³⁰

However, in 1995, the U.S. intelligence community released documents that showed how a small team of CIA cryptographers, known as the Venona Project, uncovered evidence that led directly to the Rosenbergs, thus contradicting Feklisov. The guilt or innocence of the Rosenbergs has long been a subject of debate. The only certainty is that they took their secrets with them to the grave.

Naming Names in Hollywood: The First Wave, 1947

The House Committee on Un-American Activities formed a sub-committee, Congressman J. Parnell Thomas' 1947 Investigation of Communist Infiltration in the Motion-Picture Industry. It is interesting to note that for every witness from the worlds of labor, science, the armed forces or education, there were a dozen from the world of show business. Politicians, after all, love basking in publicity. The actors, directors, and especially writers, who were called as

witnesses by HUAC had no atomic secrets to sell, no war materials to deliver, and no opportunities to poison young minds in the classroom.³¹

It was in the Hollywood hearings that anti-Semitism reared its ugly head the most prominently. Committee member John Rankin of Mississippi (1945-1948) was openly anti-Semitic. It was Rankin who coined the famous phrase "scratch a Jew, find a Communist." To his mind, to call a Jew a Communist was a tautology. In the halls of Congress, he called Walter Winchell "a slime mongering kike" and he delighted in baiting his Jewish colleagues, especially Emanuel Celler, who he referred to as "the Jewish gentleman from New York" whenever he was forced to recognize him on the floor.³²

According to Rankin, Hollywood was a "Jewish preserve" controlled by Yiddish-speaking moguls--Sam Goldwyn, Louis B. Mayer, William Fox, the Warner Brothers, the Schencks, the Selzmicks, Harry Cohn, Jesse Lasky, and Adolph Zukor--the men who more or less created the studio system.³³

On October 27, 1947, just a few months after Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, HUAC opened its much publicized and controversial hearings in Hollywood. Washington was accusing the motion picture industry of *agitprop*, i.e., infusing movies with liberal and communistic propaganda. Yet another communist conspiracy to get control of American minds was apparently afoot.

It is often forgotten, and, in fact, is generally unknown, that the first question the Committee asked of witnesses was not "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?" It was "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Screen [Actors', Directors', Writers'] Guild?" Once again, the association of Judaism, union membership, and communism was reinforced.³⁴

The first witnesses summoned before the 1947 Thomas Committee were twenty-four

"friendly witnesses"--those who could be relied upon to assert their patriotism and please the committee by indicating their awareness of the Communist menace in the film capital of the world. Among them were studio heads Jack Warner, Louis B. Mayer and Walt Disney. All three had recently been struck by one or more of the Screen Guilds who had sued in the mid-1930s to separate from the Screen Playwrights Association which was studio controlled.

Many actors, including Robert Taylor, Adolphe Menjou, Robert Montgomery, Ronald Reagan and Gary Cooper, also willingly testified. As employees of the studios under the old Hollywood studio system, it was often in their best interest to do so--both for the free publicity it garnered and for reasons of job security.

Besides J. Parnell Thomas, one other notable committee member was Richard M. Nixon (R. California). Rankin, an influential member of HUAC, was not on this committee, largely because of the damage that could be done in light of his earlier anti-Semitic statements.³⁵

Each witness was allowed to read a prepared opening statement before answering the Committee's questions. The testimony of the witnesses was well rehearsed. Spangler Arlington Brough, better known as actor Robert Taylor, stated: "I would love nothing better than to fire every last one of them and never let them work in a studio or in Hollywood again."³⁶ Taylor came pretty close to getting his wish.

Walt Disney's testimony was more bitter than Taylor's. His studio had been struck in 1941 and he was sure the strike was Communist-inspired. He also claimed to have had his reputation smeared by the League of Women Voters, (though he later amended this to read League of Women Shoppers).³⁷ Disney, of all the studio heads and producers, used red-baiting as a union-busting tool. In his case, anyone in the cartoonists' union who defied him was fired on the grounds of violating the

"morals clause" in his contract. In a 1996 *Variety* interview, cartoonist and producer Bill Melendez (creator of the animated *Peanuts* cartoons) still considers Walt Disney the worst of the Blacklist collaborators. "People come up to me and say, 'How dare you say those terrible things about Uncle Walt'.... But he was a real rat. He sold out."³⁸ All of the friendly witnesses called by Thomas' first hearings in 1947 named names, not of those they knew were Communists, but of those they suspected because of the "trouble making" tendencies. The "friendlies" were congratulated by the Committee for their patriotism and were sent home. The "unfriendlies," those who tried to defend themselves, did not fare as well.

Nineteen unfriendlies were subpoenaed by the Committee and announced that they would not cooperate, but only eleven of these were called to testify. This group came to be known as the Hollywood Ten--the eleventh, Bertolt Brecht, fled the country within hours of his appearance. The Hollywood Ten were mostly screenwriters, names not well known to the general public and, therefore, the most "expendable" members of the Hollywood community. They were: producer/director Howard Biberman, director Edward Dmytryk, producer/writer Adrian Scott, and screenwriters Alvah Bessie, Lester Cole, Ring Lardner, Jr., John Howard Lawson, Albert Maltz, Samuel Ornitz, and Dalton Trumbo. Lawson was also notable as the founder of the Screen Writers' Guild.

Unlike the friendlies, the unfriendlies were not allowed to read opening statements to the Committee. Committee Chairman Thomas disallowed them as "not pertinent to the inquiry."³⁹ The first witness called was John Howard Lawson. Incensed that he would not be allowed to read his statement, he proceeded to inject it into his responses to the Committee's questions. Lawson asserted that it was his right under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States to belong to any political party or personal or professional organization he chose. When it became clear to Chairman Thomas that any name-naming or groveling

would not be forthcoming, he had Lawson forcibly removed from the stand by guards. Thomas then had read into the record a nine-page memorandum detailing Lawson's alleged affiliations with the Communist Party.⁴⁰ Lawson was given no opportunity to refute the charges.

Dalton Trumbo was an even more difficult witness than Lawson. His opening statement was also turned down by the Committee and, after five attempts to find out whether the writer was a member of the Screen Writers' Guild, Trumbo asserted the question had a specific design: "to identify me with the Screen Writers' Guild; secondly to seek to identify me with the Communist Party and thereby destroy that guild...."⁴¹ Trumbo was likewise removed from the stand and a memo was read into the record that he, also, was not allowed to refute.

When pressed to answer "yes" or "no" to the two key questions, Ring Lardner, Jr. refused, saying "It depends on the circumstances. I could answer it, but if I did I would hate myself in the morning."⁴² He was also forcibly removed.

The Hollywood Ten did not stand alone before the Committee. A planeload of stars organized under the banner of the Committee for the First Amendment flew to Washington to provide visible and vocal support. Among other notables, this committee included Humphrey Bogart, Lauren Bacall, Groucho Marx and Frank Sinatra. Their presence, however, made no impression on the Thomas Committee. The Ten were cited for contempt of Congress and arrested. The Committee for the First Amendment quietly folded up its tent and went home.

Nor could the Ten expect any support from their respective unions. Rather than backing its membership, the Screen Writers' Guild made it a priority to protect its reputation from charges of Communism, accepting Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which required labor union officers to file affidavits assuring they were non-Communist

or forfeiting protection from the National Labor Relations Board. In the end, all of the unions and guilds acquiesced, either by instituting loyalty oaths of their own or by failing to defend members against HUAC.⁴³

Finally, support from the American Jewish community was not forthcoming either. With a rise in discrimination in employment, academia, and especially the social milieu, Jews could ill afford to associate themselves with pseudo-communist causes and did their best to distance themselves from the controversy. Many justified this on the grounds of German and Russian anti-Semitism. On both coasts, establishment Jewish organizations responded with a double-reflex. They worked with the internal-security establishment even while opposing its values.

All of the Hollywood Ten stood on their First Amendment rights and all were cited for contempt of Congress and given prison sentences from six months to one year. Six of the ten were Jewish and, according to Gordon Kahn (*Hollywood on Trial*, 1976) Edward Dmytryk and Adrian Scott, who were not Jewish, were summoned because they had, respectively, directed and produced "Crossfire," a film attacking anti-Semitism. Gordon Kahn was one of the original nineteen unfriendlies summoned and was subsequently blacklisted--even though he was never called to testify.

Considering the enormous attention given the 1947 Hollywood hearings, the Committee filed a finding of only one sentence: "While the Committee could not within the limits of its time and resources examine every single phase of Communist activity in the industry, the outlines and the pattern of such activity was clearly disclosed."⁴⁴

Blacklisting Begins: 1947

Immediately after the hearings closed, Eric Johnson, president of the Motion Picture Association of America called a meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City. Fifty studio executives attended the November 25, 1947 meeting, where Johnson

announced that the Ten would be suspended without pay and no communists or subversives would "knowingly" be employed in Hollywood.⁴⁵ This was the beginning of the Blacklist which would last for the next thirteen years.

Nine of the ten men who went to prison for contempt were blacklisted upon their release. When the tenth man, director Edward Dmytryk, came out of prison he became a friendly witness at the 1951-1952 hearings, recanting his former testimony and renouncing his former Communist affiliations. He named names and resumed his career.⁴⁶ When Dalton Trumbo was released, he, along with many other blacklisted families, moved to Mexico.

There are differing viewpoints on the Blacklist. Some see it as a rabidly capitalist tool to break unions. While that may have been the agenda for some, the expediency of the Blacklist was more economic than patriotic. Employing known or suspected communists made studios vulnerable to boycotting from civic and religious watchdog groups--of which there were many. Television was making inroads into the movies' territory and, with the end of the war, movie-going audiences were declining.

Deprived of their livelihoods, many writers found covert means to cope with the Blacklist. Many wrote under pseudonyms. Many others found "Fronts" who were willing to risk their own careers by submitting blacklisted writers' works under their own names. Millard Kaufman fronted for Dalton Trumbo on the movie "Bad Day at Black Rock." Interviewed by *Variety* in 1996, Kaufman said: "...I agreed to do it because I had just gotten out of the Marine Corps and I was astonished to find that what was going on with McCarthy was precisely the kind of thing I had fought against in World War II."⁴⁷

Other famous "fronted" movies include "Bridge on the River Kwai," "Lawrence of Arabia," "Born Free," "Roman Holiday," "The Brave One," "Friendly Persuasion," "The Defiant Ones," "The Robe," "El Cid," and "Day of the Triffids."⁴⁸

Particularly difficult for both Fronts and blacklisted writers was the matter of the Academy Award. Fronts were given credit for Oscar winners "Friendly Persuasion," "Roman Holiday," "Lawrence of Arabia," "The Brave One," "The Defiant Ones," and "Bridge on the River Kwai." The "hush-hush" nature of fronting was also the cause of more than a few ironies in filmdom. Charlton Heston, a rabid anti-communist, starred in both "El Cid" and "The Robe." Blacklisted writers Al and Helen Levitt, under the pseudonym Tom and Helen August, wrote such major Disney hits as "The Misadventures of Merlin Jones" and "The Monkey's Uncle." In another ironic twist, "Hellcats of the Navy," the only movie in which Ronald Reagan and wife Nancy Davis appeared together, was written by blacklisted screenwriter Bernard Gordon.⁴⁹

Blacklisted writers, however, fared far better than blacklisted actors. Actress Lee Grant did not work for nearly ten years. Her crime? Being the wife of blacklisted director Arnold Manoff. The winner of the first Academy Award for Best Supporting Actress, Gale Sondergaard, never worked again. Her crime? Being the wife of Hollywood Ten defendant Howard Biberman. As actor Lee J. Cobb put it when forced to testify and to inform, "It's the only face I have." Jewish actor Zero Mostel, who did not inform, said, "I am a man of a thousand faces, all of them blacklisted."⁵⁰

RKO Studios, headed by Howard Hughes, tried to remove writer Paul Jarrico's name from the movie "The Las Vegas Story." Lawsuits and counter lawsuits followed. Says Jarrico: "I sued Hughes and Hughes sued me, claiming that I'd broken the morals clause of my contract by refusing to cooperate with the Un-American Activities Committee. I maintained that it was not immoral to stand on one's constitutional rights, and that a man who'd broken all ten of the Ten Commandments was in no position to talk about morality."⁵¹ The judge held for Hughes. Hollywood made more than thirty-five anti-communist movies from the late 1940s to the mid 1950s. According to film scholar and

critic Dorothy Jones, none of them made money.

Ten-Part 1951-1952 Investigation of Communism in the Entertainment Field

Yet another sub-committee of HUAC was formed in 1951 under the chairmanship of John S. Wood. The global situation exacerbated, further, the fear of communism. America was now engaged in North Korea and China had gone Communist in 1949.

By now, both sides had some experience with how the system was going to work. There were only three options open to those summoned as witnesses: seek protection under the First Amendment and go to jail for contempt; seek protection under the Fifth Amendment and never work again; or name names. So, the dilemma faced by the new witnesses was how to answer the committee's questions without informing on friends while still avoiding the blacklist (or jail). If you refused to answer at all, you went to jail for contempt. If you were (or had been) a Communist and denied it, you went to jail for perjury. If you were (or had been) a Communist and admitted it, you had to inform on your friends.

Taking the Fifth, aside from being a veritable admission of guilt, had other drawbacks as well. Many witnesses were willing to confess, to inform on themselves, if they were spared the humiliation of informing on others. Actor Lloyd Bridges had successfully used this tactic during the 1947 hearings. His testimony was sealed and after a brief period, he quietly resumed his career.

Now wise to the tactic, in the new wave of hearings the Committee quickly implemented "the waiver doctrine" into the House rules. No Fifth Amendment protection would be extended to those making an admission about themselves but refusing to inform on others. The penalty: imprisonment for contempt.⁵² In 1949, the Supreme Court

upheld the waiver doctrine in *Rogers v United States of America*. If you were willing to talk about yourself, you had to talk about others or your Fifth Amendment protection was void.

Many Hollywood stars, caught in this conundrum, did name names. Prominent Hollywood attorney and Jewish activist Martin Gang represented more informers than any other single attorney in Los Angeles. His clients included Lee J. Cobb, Sterling Hayden, Lloyd Bridges, Norman Cousins, Paulette Goddard, Burt Lancaster, and John Houseman. A true pragmatist, Gang saw the issues in terms of tactics rather than ethics. His argument was that, unless some real service could be performed by not cooperating, clients should not sacrifice themselves to no useful end. Gang's job as an attorney was to act in his client's best interest, and the best interest of an actor was not to be blacklisted. He advised his clients to name names--especially of those who had already been named anyway.

Psycho-analyst to the stars and fellow Jewish activist Phil Cohen gave his clients similar advice. "To throw away one's career and risk prison to protect principles one has long ago discarded is a disguised death wish."⁵³

The three main witnesses at the 1951 Wood Committee hearings were director Elia Kazan and playwrights Lillian Hellman and Clifford Odets. Kazan and Odets were friendly. Hellman, most assuredly, was not, and stated: "I cannot and will not cut my conscience to fit this year's fashion."⁵⁴ Kazan is perhaps the most vilified of all the friendly witnesses. Had he simply told his story and named his names he would, like his fellow witnesses, have been denounced on the left, celebrated on the right, and his testimony forgotten. Instead, Kazan appended an apology to his testimony and worse, took out an ad in The New York Times (April 12, 1952) explaining his position and exhorting others to do the same. The ad mentioned such things as communist thought control and support of blacklisting. Kazan will never be forgiven.

Testimony before the Wood Committee was far different than it had been before the Thomas Committee. Witnesses had now exchanged rage for resignation. Those who refused to inform knew what their fates would be and stood on principle regardless. Ultimately, more than twice as many decided against informing as informed.

When asked to identify subversive colleagues, actor Lionel Stander volunteered instead to identify "a group of fanatics who are desperately trying to undermine the Constitution."⁵⁵ He was, of course, referring to the Committee itself, and offered to name names. His request was denied. Folksinger Pete Seeger declined to name names but offered to "sing songs."⁵⁶ Representative Velde, questioning actor Will Geer (Grandpa Walton) asked, "Would it be any crime to admit your membership in a legal party?" Geer replied, "In this day of hysteria, it is, sir."⁵⁷

Virtually all of the unfriendly artists who appeared before John Wood's committee were blacklisted for opinions and positions they had held in the past, notably in the distant past of the prewar social unrest of the 1930s. As in the case of the Hollywood Ten, the majority of the unfriendly witnesses in the early 1950s had long ago become disenchanted with Communists. Still, they refused to prove their reformation by informing on their friends.

Conclusion

Although it was a fact that many Jews were or had been in the Socialist movement, professional patriots were unable or unwilling to distinguish between socialism and communism--a peculiar characteristic of Americans that persists today.

In June, 1958, the Committee closed down its twenty-year investigation of Communism in the entertainment world with an uneventful and hardly publicized examination of a dozen suspects from the New York Theater. HUAC, renamed the House Internal Security Committee, was finally

abolished on the first day of the Ninety-fourth Congress in January of 1975--five months after former committee member Richard Nixon was forced to resign the presidency.⁵⁸ The legacy of the committee, however, had a long-lasting effect on the quality of Hollywood movies. During and after the hearings, an environment of fear arose in Hollywood. The studio censors' job became easier because the writers censored themselves out of fear for their livelihoods. Suddenly the movies changed, sex was okay but politics were not. Socially conscious films like "Gentlemen's Agreement" gave way to puff pieces like "Gentlemen Prefer Blondes." This was a great loss to us all. To some extent, television moved in to fill the gap. The powers-that-be were not paying much attention to the new medium yet, and television provided an outlet for many blacklisted writers. In the closing years of the decade, television studios were able to produce socially relevant pieces such as "The Days of Wine and Roses" and "The Crucible," Arthur Miller's satirical indictment of the Red Scare era.

The Blacklist began to crack in 1960 when Jewish actor/producer Kirk Douglas gave screenwriting credit to Dalton Trumbo for "Spartacus." Otto Preminger followed suit by giving Trumbo credit for "Exodus." Since 1980, the Writers' Guild of America, successor to the Screen Writers' Guild, has been pursuing the goal of restoring proper credits to blacklisted screenwriters who wrote hundreds of pieces under pseudonyms or the names of Fronts. To date, however, only seven have been officially restored: Dalton Trumbo for "Roman Holiday," "The Brave One," and "Gun Crazy," Albert Maltz for "Broken Arrow," Ned Young for "The Defiant Ones," Michael Wilson for co-writing "Lawrence of Arabia" and "Friendly Persuasion," and Michael Wilson and Carl Foreman for "The Bridge on the River Kwai." The Guild has positively identified thirty-one works. Their task has been made possible because many Fronts are now coming forward, and because the Social Security numbers of many fictitious writers match those of blacklisted writers.⁵⁹ So far, four Oscars have been restored to their rightful owners.

Americans may not like Communists but they probably like snitches even less. A reverse blacklist, albeit unofficial, has ostracized those who cooperated with the Committees. Some faced the same employment discrimination as those on the original Blacklist; all were ostracized socially. It is generally accepted that both Ronald Reagan and Elia Kazan have been denied Lifetime Achievement Awards by the MPAA and the American Film Institute because of their collaboration with the Committees.⁶⁰ In 1989, the Robert Taylor Building on the old MGM lot was renamed the George Cukor Building after a group of actors lobbied to have Taylor's name excised. Edward Dmytryk was drummed out of Hollywood and continues to make his living teaching film at UCLA. In 1988, Dmytryk attempted to participate in an industry symposium on "the blacklist era" in Barcelona, Spain. Although he was the only member of the Hollywood Ten in

attendance, he was denied the opportunity to take part in panel discussions when other participants threatened to boycott the event. He was, however, allowed to sit in the audience.⁶¹ This condition is as unfortunate as the situation in the 1950s.

There are a couple of final ironies to this sad chapter in American history. Ring Lardner, Jr., blacklisted in 1948, was able to accept his own Oscar for "M*A*S*H" in 1972. In 1950, Lardner was serving his sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut, working as a stenographer in the Office of Classification and Parole. That same year, one of Lardner's fellow inmates was working as the caretaker of the chicken yard. This inmate was incarcerated for putting non-workers on the government payroll and collecting their salaries himself. The chicken custodian was former HUAC chairman J. Parnell Thomas.

Social Strata are Justified

“Our capacity to maintain our cherished institutions stands diluted by a stream of alien blood, with all its inherited misconceptions.”

Voices From The Past

*Social Darwinism and
Its Impact on American Society*

by **Melanie Spatola**

Editor's note:

Professor Pamela Laird comments on the exercise for which Melanie Spatola has written Voices From the Past...

From whose perspective should we try to understand history? Certainly one important perspective belongs to historical actors themselves. What can be more important than how people explained to themselves what they experienced and what they did? Understanding people and their ideas does not, of course, always mean agreeing with them. However, it is arguably more important to explore the beliefs of those with whom we disagree than of those with whom we agree.

In just such an exercise in historical understanding, Melanie Spatola has taken on the challenge of exploring the beliefs of Social Darwinism as held by a typical late nineteenth-century proponent. She has created a composite identity to represent Social Darwin's non-scholarly advocates, who were largely prosperous, white, usually Protestant males. Philip Cartwright is the name she has given to this hypothetical person, in his mid-life during the 1880s and the president of a successful farmers' mail order catalog which he started in Denver, Colorado, in 1871. By looking at the world through his eyes as best she can, by examining the sources of his ideas, and by taking on his voice, Spatola has explored how and why so many people in his very respectable position and in that historical context believed many of the tenets of Social Darwinism. For instance, Cartwright's peers believed that capital gain provided the strength of civilization and that the industry and material progress were the most important goals of American society; any resulting human or environmental costs were both necessary and acceptable. Social Darwinism gave Cartwright's peers allegedly scientific reasons to support and justify their beliefs, including their equation of virtue with material success and their notions about the proper role of governments. Spatola's forthright analysis may be startling to read, but perhaps its strength as historical interpretation lies in that very achievement.

My name is Philip Cartwright and I am the president of Harness Company.¹ In 1869, I was a traveling salesman who left the advancing life of New York for the exciting Rocky Mountains of Colorado. In my travels I discovered a need for special order items among the farmers and new towns of the West. In 1871, the first Harness Company Farmer's Mail Order Catalog was published and became an overnight success. The current year is 1889 and my ideas and dreams have blossomed into an incredible success.

The current buzz among my colleagues in the business community is the

theory of evolution and its connection with human society. When I was in college I read Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics*; it was an impressive work for me even then. Critics of Spencer's theories claimed that he represented cruel ideas that suggested gross inequalities. However, if you are familiar with Darwin's Theory of Evolution, you learn that there are no real inequalities in society.² Evolution teaches us that only the strongest and most fit species will survive and pass their strengths on to their offspring. This same principle has been apparent through the history of the human race as well. Only the races strong enough

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and intelligent enough will survive and create great civilizations. Other races will be conquered along the way.

Today in America, the new progress of the industrialization of society is creating a new generation of strong individuals. Through hard work, dedication and devotion to good Christian values, rewards in the form of wealth are being enjoyed by the superior classes of America. Too many times, wealth and power in the hands of such individuals are perceived as dangerous. I, on the other hand, understand that economically this is extremely important. Men of true virtue also know that lowering the standards of work to accommodate the weak lowers our standard of living and ultimately hurts our nation as a whole. Spencer eloquently states that accommodating the weak only leads to even lowered performance of duties in work and in life, "it is only by perpetual aspiration after what has been hitherto beyond our reach that advance is made."³ Can you imagine what sort of chaotic civilization we would be in danger of creating by rewarding idleness?

The period directly after the war⁴ brought about concerns for the reconstruction of our society, primarily in the South. There have been continuing concerns about the free colored people polluting our society with their slave culture and mentality. I say, "give them a chance to prove themselves by affording them no special assistance or opportunities society might think they need."⁵ Let them now compete in our society with no outside help. If they can become successful and reach our standard of virtue, then surely they are deserving of their gains. But if they cannot function or even keep up with American standards of progress, education, and morality, then they have proven themselves the weaker race. If this is their fate, then they are subject to the laws of "natural selection." Evolution, not revolution, is the important component of society. Society can never be reconstructed from the bottom, where the weakest of the races exist.⁶

I'm proud that I was among those who attended lectures by William Graham

Sumner at Yale.⁷ I recall his powerful 1879 speech addressing the concerns of some economists about a competitive society. He stated that the only option to a competitive society would be "survival of the unfittest." He claimed that a middle ground, "the socialist desideratum" to help along the weak and still try to progress, can never be achieved.⁸ Another major supporter of a competitive market society is Andrew Carnegie. Why just this year, his article entitled "Wealth" was published in the *North American Review*. He presented his "law of competition" that he felt was an inevitable part of society. Although it seems harsh, it is important, for it "insures survival of the fittest in every department."⁹ Taking resources from the strong to nurse the weak is a waste of those resources. I believe in "the survival of the fittest," a marvelous phrase first introduced by Herbert Spencer. It is the most natural, scientific course for a society that hopes to be great and virtuous.

Debates over industrialization are springing up amongst my colleagues and when I am on business in New York. Of course, we all view our progress in technology as important and essential to society. But several of my associates express some concern over the disintegration of specialized trades. The worlds of steam engines, steel, and competition are new and frightening and many are feeling the tension of the struggle.¹⁰ The working class often speaks out against the rapidly developing factories using machines for faster, more advanced production. I view this as a sign of progress in our society and an important feature for the strength and survival of our nation. It is apparent that industrialization will diminish some trades once done by human hands, but it is also creating new specialized trades. In William Graham Sumner's essay, *Who Win by Progress?*, he states, "the greater the power of the machines, the greater is the abundance of means of subsistence which the machines produce, and the greater, therefore, is the demand for productive services."¹¹ And our roles as the leaders of business are to bring our superior administrative skills to the front to organize and execute such growth, helping the working class adjust.

I don't deny that the struggle for survival in business today is wearing hard on men of high moral character. Quite possibly, my strength may be challenged by competitors as well. I am not trying to claim that our struggles are not very real at the top of the ladder.¹² In fact, I believe that our plights are even more dangerous and distressing than those experienced at the bottom of society's struggle.¹³ For having great power and capital puts one at a higher risk for the attack of competitors. Some men experience a degeneration, both physically and mentally, that could ultimately cause them to lose their status in the struggle for survival. This is a very real consequence for leaders in business and displays the more powerful war of survival at the top of the race. Only the truly virtuous man comes out on top. Darwinist theory is very real in the struggle even for the strongest of the human race.

I was fortunate that I was brought up, not only with family wealth, but also with the necessary economic virtues. My father instilled the importance of hard work and dedication. Darwinian theory favors hereditary wealth because it is a primary mechanism for insuring the "survival of the fittest." My children will undoubtedly surpass me in virtue, for they are the next generation of wealth and progress. Sumner spoke of components to the growth of human betterment in the struggle through generational growth. "Let every man be sober, industrious, prudent, and wise, and bring up his children to be so likewise, and poverty will be abolished in a few generations."¹⁵ This does not just apply for the wealthy, but for all men of good moral character. For if he works hard, even if he does not reach his economic goals in his lifetime, he can instill such virtues in his children, so that they may carry on the family evolution. A race of noble, virtuous, people will result. Spencer commented on this during a visit he made to America in 1882. He hoped for formation of "a finer type of man than has hitherto existed." Our country shows great potential in its dominance of a greater race which could "reasonably look forward to a time when they will have produced a

civilization grander than any the world has known."¹⁶

When I first began to study the theories of Darwin, I was quite uneasy with the whole idea of evolution, for it seemed almost blasphemous. Once I allowed myself to really explore these new ideas, however, all that I had been and believed was clarified and everything seemed to fit into place. Herbert Spencer only challenged my mind further with his insightful connections of Darwin's theory to social structures. It appealed to all that was already germinating within my own beliefs. Spencer brought such enlightenment to so many of my kind that he had a huge following of great men. Spencer's scientific ideas proved what was already becoming very apparent in the United States. Now we could give it a name, for what we had sensed all along now had substance. It is the dawn of Darwinism, and it will reshape the future of the world.

Darwinism is not without its critics. One such critic was the late Louis Agassiz, who firmly opposed the concepts of evolution and its suggestions of humans' ancestry as animal,¹⁷ not to mention its blasphemous implications. As I mentioned earlier, this was a concern of mine, too. But I realized that evolution only complemented the existence of God for me and brought me to a new level of understanding God. Natural selection seems to be the greatest pathway for men to achieve their ultimate connection with God. Through successful natural selection, man might hope to achieve his purest state. Which direction we choose is up to all of us in this race. We cannot afford to allow any weakness to penetrate our descent to becoming the grandest civilization. For poverty and weakness are evil, and to allow them is to allow mankind to crumble. Andrew Carnegie has noted that "Not evil, but good, has come to the race from the accumulation of wealth by those who have had the ability and energy to produce it."¹⁸

I have no sympathy for those who claim to be cursed with the plight of poverty. If one is poor, there surely must be a scientific reason. Usually one's own laziness or weak

mind are to blame. Spencer mentions that the lazy or weak-minded are just as ineffectual and crippled as the handicapped. He states that if "they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die."¹⁹ This shocking outlook may seem cruel and unfair. However if we apply the scientific proof of Darwinism, it follows that this is merely a fact of nature, and man is subject to the same natural laws as other animals. Therefore, what may seem cruel is very appropriate in ensuring the success and progress of the human race. We cannot afford to let ourselves become a nation of inefficient and mentally lame people. The nation can grow and prosper into a powerful force only by the leadership of the individuals who have already proven themselves virtuous.²⁰

I believe that pity for the poor and lesser races can only hurt them, and society as a whole, in the long run. If we extend monetary assistance to them, we are only disabling our nation's progress, and this hurts everyone. Poor laws which try to extend to the poor a free handout instead of encouraging hard work hurts all of society. Sumner makes this point also, saying that by doing this we ultimately increase consumption of capital and reduce the motivation to produce capital.²¹ This will obviously hurt our economy and drastically lower our standard of living.

Sumner perceives labor strikes as a good stimulation for the economy only if they are successful.²² Labor strikes, in general, are a sore spot in the campaign for progress among the business community. For if a strike is unsuccessful, it will have wasted much energy that should have been put into strengthening the economy. Hard work, sacrifice, and education are the tools of growth for weaker people. Strikers need to understand that hard work and dedication are the pathways to virtue. Instant gratification of capital is superfluous and can only lead to a further destruction of the race. I do concede that strikes may be useful in some cases where workers of outstanding moral character are being taken advantage of. These strikes are almost always successful, and the mere success proves their worthiness.

Now I know that compassion for the weaker races is important to consider. And I say in closing that charity, if done voluntarily, can be quite rewarding and even morally elevating for the person who chooses to give. I see nothing wrong with a virtuous person giving to help our fellow human who has come upon hard times or needs help to progress out of poverty. In fact, charity to the poorer class can be in the form of education and motivation. The lower man can look up to the millionaire and know that he wishes to reach such a level, thus motivating him to start his own family on the path to success. Andrew Carnegie makes a simple statement in his article, "Wealth," about this sort of motivation between a hard working "industrious" man to his more idle friend, "If thou dost not sow, thou shalt not reap."²³ It is important to remember that charity must have a motivating factor or it will prove ineffectual to our race as a whole. Even Spencer concedes that charity, if not forced by government action, is allowable, even noble.²⁴ And Carnegie discusses three methods good men of wealth may use to distribute any of their "surplus wealth." The primary method is hereditary passing of such wealth to one's heirs. The second is through donation for "public purposes." And the last is for the wealthy man to distribute his capital throughout his life before death.²⁵ Although these are the accepted ways to distribute such wealth, it is important that the decision be left up to the owner of the capital. There is more and more pressure by our society to tax the wealthy and to distribute those taxes to the poor. This will only hurt the poor in the long run, because it piddles out small sums over years that do nothing but help them in their current situations and does not motivate them toward a productive future. It can only lead to more impoverished communities and the demise of our race. But if funding is filtered through the select group,²⁶ it "can be made a much more potent force for the elevation of our race than if distributed in small sums to the people themselves."²⁷

We must remember that all our actions must have one common goal, to the

upward progress of our race. We can all learn from these social evolution theories.

Philip Cartwright

Epilogue

The strong popularity of Social Darwinism in 19th Century America is not all that surprising. The rugged individualist spirit of Anglo-Saxon Americans already carried the right attitudes for such an ideology. Americans (white Americans) were no strangers to dealing with other races and the strife that followed. A combination of "English nationalism" and "militant Protestantism produced an extreme cultural arrogance."¹ Armed with their claims of superiority and the belief in "Manifest Destiny," American whites dealt accordingly with other races. When trying to justify their treatment of Native Americans, religion coupled with racial superiority was usually present.

Around the time Charles Darwin was carefully compiling his outline for his theories, Americans were applying their own scheme of "racial superiority" to justify the conquest of Mexico. An expansionist who wrote his opinions about the Mexican people claimed superiority to justify their treatment, comparing their conquest to that of the Indians. "The Mexican race now see in the fate of the aborigines of the north, their own inevitable destiny," he claimed, "they must amalgamate or be lost in the superior vigor of the Anglo-Saxon race, or they must utterly perish."² It seems that it was important for a race of people to conform to the American ideal. It was a goal to rid other races of their "pagan" practices and underdeveloped cultures and help them become good Christian Americans. Of course the Native Americans were resistive, and drastic measures were taken to ensure their dependency on American Culture. The slaughter of the American bison, for example, may not have been simply for sport. The bounty paid by the railroad companies for the slaughter of buffalo peaked in 1872. An underlying motive, besides clearing plains for railway construction, was

the idea of turning the Indians into beggars. The Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 was considered a necessary policy of assimilation for Native Americans. Tribal relations had to be broken up to help the Native Americans assimilate better to American culture.

When Darwin's theories of evolution began to be used as scientific evidence of the survival of man, and most importantly races, a new door was opened for the framework of repression. Religious justification was important in America when dealing with "less civilized" races, but scientific evidence of the domination of a fitter race created new frontiers of ideas to explore. Social Darwinism uniquely explained the importance of capital gain and competition in the new industrialized society of America. Herbert Spencer published *Social Statics* in 1850 and he set in motion a large following in America. Wealthy, white, American males who felt a struggle for existence in their social and political lives, adopted the ideas most readily. In the name of Science, the American disciples of "Social Darwinism" could justify the oppression of lower classes and races, as well as promote laissez faire. Herbert Spencer, himself, defined the phrase "survival of the fittest" and thus was the beginning of Social Darwinism, along with new justifications for racial inequality.

Although not everyone claimed an adherence to the doctrines of Social Darwinism, its influence can be seen in American culture around the turn of the century. The self glorification of American ancestry--the successes of conquering nations and races--led, quite often, to a strong confidence in the belief that Americans were among the fittest of humans. Theodore Roosevelt's Chicago speech in 1899 hints at Social Darwinism's successful influence of "penetrating to the highest places in government."³ His speech praises the accomplishments of his culture and glorifies them. He states, "let us, the children of the men who carried the great Civil War to a triumphant conclusion, praise the God of our fathers that the ignoble counsels of peace were

rejected; that the suffering and loss, the blackness of sorrow and despair, were unflinchingly faced, and the years of strife endured; for in the end the slave was freed, the Union restored, and the mighty American republic placed once more as a helmeted queen among nations."⁴

Social Darwinist ideology indirectly affected most Americans, and helped create a general acceptance that white America was somehow superior to other races, because of development or ancestry. In his 1900 lecture, "National Life from the Standpoint of Science," Karl Pearson addressed the social aspects of Darwinism that concluded from science. He vigorously defended the importance of natural selection, and claimed that the inter-communing of races disturbed this process. If they did exist together, he stated that they would, "naturally sink into the position of master and servant."⁵ He justified the evil done to other races by whites as necessary, and that the good that resulted (for whites) outweighed the injustice. The measure of a culture's similarity to Western Civilization seemed to define that culture's place in Pearson's scheme. "How many centuries," he asked, "how many thousand of years, have the Kaffire or the Negro held large districts in Africa undisturbed by white man? Yet their intertribal struggles have not yet produced a civilization in the least comparable with the Aryan." He added, "Educate and nurture them as you will, I do not believe that you will succeed in modifying the stock."⁶

Social Darwinism experienced somewhat of a decline in popularity, although still present, upon the beginning of the First World War. It bore too close a resemblance to German militarism for most Americans to condone it comfortably. Most Anglos seemed to change positions and sharply accuse "the enemy of being the sole advocate of 'racial' aggression."⁷ Critics voiced negative opinions about the motives of Social Darwinism, and the unfavorable ideas behind it became more apparent. But there were opponents of Social Darwinism even before the war, when it was at its peak. Max Nordau commented on how

the supporters of Social Darwinism misused the theories of evolution so that they could "cover their natural barbarism with the name Darwin and proclaim the sanguinary instincts of their inmost hearts as the last word of science."⁸

The 1920s-30s were a quiet period for Social Darwinism, compared to its strong popularity at the turn of the century. Emory Borgardus's *A History of Social Thought* (1928) criticized the Darwinists, saying "according to [the Social Darwinist], the tooth and fang struggle for existence among animals is the normal procedure among human beings."⁹ British scientist J.B.S. Haldane argued that Darwin did not even support the Social Darwinists' views. In fact, his theories would show to support the opposite. Haldane stated that "the actual implication of Darwinism to contemporary capitalist society is quite clear. The poor leave more offspring behind them in each generation than the rich. So they are fitter from a Darwinian point of view."¹⁰

The Stock Market Crash of 1929 brought an end to the economic prosperity experienced in America. The Great Depression prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to introduce new reforms that would reach into free enterprise systems through legislation. The New Deal battles that began to surface brought Darwinism back to the stage, due to the controversial nature of government involvement in the economy and society. Roosevelt received accusations from the political left that he was not taking the opportunity to create an American socialism, and answered them by initiating government intervention and involvement in the economy.

As the New Deal reforms began to revive the economy, Darwinist arguments concerning the evils of government intervention once again surfaced in American thought. Socialist implications of the New Deal were seen as a serious threat to the power structure of American business; and as the New Deal grew in effectiveness, Darwinism, with its defense of a free market and opposition to the interventionist state,

once again became a useful tool in the business community,¹¹ a tool used to justify laissez-faire and the disparity among the financial classes.

Also, although the New Deal legislation introduced economic, political and social reforms for America, it ignored immigration legislation. Legislative concern was for America and Americans (white Americans). The New Deal offered no reform for immigration administration. Nativism tends to increase as job opportunities decrease, and during the Depression, the federally assisted deportation of Mexican "immigrants" included Mexican Americans.¹² Citizenship protection did not exist for Mexican Americans, and many who had lived their entire lives as Americans were considered immigrants and deported "back" to Mexico. This shows a familiar resemblance to Darwinist notions of racial importance and the consideration of those who were considered "American."

Years later, during World War II, another Darwinist theme prevailed in America when Japanese Americans were considered a threat and consigned to concentration camps.¹³ How did the American government rationalize such deplorable actions? Justification of racial injustice, this time, was aided by war hysteria. The roots of Darwinism were apparent in those decisions. Ironically, America was fighting against "totalitarianism and racism" while committing the same injustices on their own soil against the Japanese Americans. At the same time African Americans were legally considered second-class citizens.¹⁴

Social Darwinism had underlying influences in American history and culture. It

has also served as a mechanism for change. The long journey for African Americans to finally take their place as Americans with the same rights as whites finally became a possibility with the 1964 civil rights bill outlawing "racial discrimination in public accommodations and by employers, unions and voting registrars."¹⁵ Not that the battle was over, but the path was being laid for change.

Today the seeds of Darwinism as part of American culture are still present. Social Darwinism served as a basis for laws and reforms legalizing discrimination, and by association has figured into laws preventing discrimination. It has been argued that a step in the opposite direction has now been made. "Affirmative Action" or "reverse discrimination" against white males holds new controversies. The problems of compensation for "past" job discrimination have been debated over the past decade and will continue to be controversial. If one traces the roots of such controversies, Social Darwinism may lie at the seed. The justification of discrimination has taken generations to overcome, and has, perhaps, created new forms of discrimination along the way.

Whatever past wrongs many believe should be righted, today the disproportionate structure of American communities displays a history that might explain the contrast. Minority races in America are slowly building their own livelihood through each new generation, now that the opportunity has been granted by the struggles of their ancestors. Ultimately, Social Darwinism is a part of American cultural history, thus being a part of each American, whatever their color or ancestry may be.

Social Structures are Challenged

*“We must breathe one, two, three—
many vietnams”*

UNA ACTA TUPAMARA

Pando, Uruguay
October 8, 1969

by Scott Robinson

In 1969, 21,000 pesos was a lot of money. The young man paid it without embellishment. The undertaker took it, inwardly pleased at the distinguished manners of the young man. The youth's uncle came from wealth and had spent the majority of his days in Buenos Aires and was now coming home to his final resting place in the cemetery outside Pando.

The name of the deceased was Antunez, which meant that he came from a powerful family in the region. His heirs were fulfilling his last wishes, bringing the body home to the small Pando suburb of Soca, where the uncle had spent his childhood.

In addition to the hearse, six cars were requested. There would be fourteen mourners initially, then more would be picked up at the Olmos crossroads just outside of Pando. The only thing unusual, the undertaker noted, was that the family intended to bring the casket to the funeral themselves.'

The Cuban Revolution of 1959 changed everything for Latin American revolutionaries. The philosopher-warriors, who came down from the Sierra Maestras to oust a dictator who enjoyed the uninhibited support of their North American neighbor, spawned a revolutionary fervor that is comparable only to the early nineteenth-century independence movements throughout Latin America. The theory that came out of the Cuban experiment, structured by revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara and expounded upon by French writer and philosopher Regis Debray, was the accelerated revolution, the *foco* ("focus").

The *foco* theory, in tandem with new interpretations of Latin American reality, dumped the dogma revolutionaries in Latin America had been accepting since the days of Marx and Lenin. The traditional strategy had been to build coalitions or vanguards, or both. This was replaced by immediate action. The hopes of waiting for a movement that would be ready to direct the state when the inevitable working class revolution was to take place were distasteful to those who adopted the "focus" theory, the *foquistas*. They pointed out that waiting for the right moment was creating

an atmosphere of atrophy and complacency that was debilitating revolutionary Latin America. Moreover, who wanted to wait? The solution was obvious: *speed up the revolution*.

Guevara outlined in various publications, including his famous *Manual of Guerilla Warfare*, how to create a revolution. Small, highly trained and dedicated groups of armed guerillas were to make the conditions necessary to create the sort of society-shaking event that would prompt the normally politically quiet masses to take up arms and overthrow the government. The revolutionary-minded were not to await any further invitation, but to create their own *focos* in their respective countries. Needless to say, this caught the imagination of many, particularly the young, who had long tired of earlier methods of coalition building and patient indoctrination. *Focos* sprung up all over Latin America. The foundation for Che's vision of "many Vietnams" in Latin America was firmly in place before the end of the 1960s. In Uruguay, a group of students, intellectuals, semi-professionals and workers adapted the *foco* to their peculiar circumstances and created a small, yet truly distinctive, revolutionary effort.

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It had been cool and moist in the morning, but by noon the sun was high and warm. Like all Latin American cities, the plaza in the city of Pando was its center. Just before one o'clock, even though most people were still at home having lunch, the square was busy. All three of the banks, the phone company, and the fire and police stations faced each other across the plaza.

It was October 8, 1969, the two-year anniversary of the day Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia. Maybe the police were expecting something to happen somewhere, but probably not in Pando. It was a relatively quiet city, population approximately 70,000, located an hour or so south of Montevideo.

Jose Gervasio Artigas, the leader of Uruguayan wars for independence in the early 1800s, was unlike liberator Simon Bolivar on the northern end of the continent. He did not advocate patrician Creole rule following the expulsion of the Iberians. "The most unhappy should be the most attended to," he said, knowing it did not sit well with the Creole elite.² Artigas said that the land should be for "pa' quien la trabaja" ("for those who work it").³

His relative progressivism was more than a minor challenge to the status quo. Despite being the liberator of Uruguay, Artigas was eventually forced to flee the country, and died penniless and unhonored in Paraguay. The gaucho bands that he led as liberator turned their attentions to the postrevolutionary elite, although without much success. During the first few decades after independence, gaucho rebels achieved contentment by traveling the pampas in armed bands and attacking large landowners. The new Creole elite adopted the Spanish habit of derisively referring to them as "little *tupamaros*," a reference to the 1780-81 Inca uprising led by Tupac Amaru.⁴ The gauchos liked the term and it stuck.

In 1969, Eduardo Galeano, Uruguayan author and editor of such influential leftist publications as *Marcha* and *Epoca*, wrote *Open Veins of Latin America*, in which he put on paper the Marxist interpretation of development that had permeated Latin American intellectual thought for several decades. He lectured on the exploitation experienced at the hands of Europe and the United States, and spoke of "entering times of rebellion and change" and "the overthrow of [Latin America's] masters, country by country."⁵ The "heroic years" of 1811-1820, when Artigas led the "masses," were seen as a golden era of Uruguayan history.⁶ The agrarian code of 1815, authored by Artigas and implemented in the region near Paysandu that he controlled, was the "most advanced and glorious of the many constitutions the Uruguayans would have."⁷ According to Galeano, Artigas was Uruguay's first great leftist.

Like any historical icon, whether the new Artigas legend was historically accurate or not was immaterial; the result was that it caught the fancy of politically disaffected Uruguayans, particularly the youth. The revolutionary Uruguayan looked to Artigas as an historical precedent for their own rebellion.

The family of Sr. Antunez, according to the undertakers, were crying silently as they drove down the highway towards Pando. One of the nephews, seated next to him in the hearse, explained that the deceased was a great man, dedicated to charity and good works. At the Olmos crossroads they picked up six or seven more relatives, each carrying a bag. Uncle Pascual, the new arrivals said, needed to be picked up further down the road. Uncle Pascual had been waiting at kilometer 40. When he got out of a van and walked towards the procession, the undertaker began to feel uncomfortable. For an "uncle," Sr. Pascual was much too young.

With the arrival of Uncle Pascual, the mourners identified themselves as Tupamaros and asked the drivers and undertaker to step down from their cars. Without taking out their guns, the Tupamaros searched their new prisoners for weapons, tied their hands with homemade handcuffs and put them in the back of Uncle Pascual's van.

The Tupamaros were running ahead of schedule, so the drivers and undertaker were driven around for about half an hour by three guards. Naturally, the Tupamaros used the time to explain their mission. Later, when a reporter asked the undertaker if he had been nervous, spending all this time driving around with revolutionaries, he replied: "Would you be nervous talking to three lads who could have been your sons? We weren't bothered."

For forty years after the expulsion of Artigas, gaucho *caudillos* ("chieftains") were in a constant struggle for supremacy. Two political parties emerged from these civil wars, dominating the government in Uruguay to the present day. The *Colorados* were led by the urban bourgeoisie and followed the liberal ideology prominent in other Latin American countries. The *Nacional* party, better known by the nickname *Blancos*, was slightly smaller. The *Blancos* were made up primarily of the landed elite who subscribed to a conservative philosophy that aimed to preserve the power of the "*hacienda*" and "*latifundia*" aristocracy.

In 1865, following the costly civil wars, the *Colorados* and *Blancos* worked out a system of power-sharing and accommodation that would avoid the violence that had become endemic since the liberation from Spanish rule. Known as the *lema* system, this arrangement kept potentially divisive *caudillo* factions concentrated within an overall party framework. Strength was preserved by focusing the voting power of competing groups within their respective parties.

Candidates could run as part of the factional *lema* within a party; and whoever got the most votes would win. This meant that there could be multiple candidates from within each party in any given election. The *Blancos* could field a total of four candidates for president, for example, against *Colorado's* six candidates. The *lema* candidate with the most votes would win the overall election. The runners-up, based on their share of the vote, would also get a proportional piece of the political pie. A candidate could run for president, lose, and still gain an influential seat in the Chamber of Deputies.

The end result of this arrangement meant that the ruling elite were able to perpetually recycle themselves in various political positions and hold onto power indefinitely. Any change was channeled through the party machinery; consequently, whether *Blanco* or *Colorado*, the status quo was maintained. Even though Uruguay had a relatively progressive attitude in allowing third parties, the reality of the situation was that change came slowly, and only with the agreement of the two major parties.

The first task was to take control of the Comisaria ("Police Station"). Once the signal was given, the first team of companeros was to neutralize the police and make it impossible for them to come to the aid of their neighbors: the banks, the fire station and the phone company. Another group of companeros would start their mission at the same time and take over the fire station next door. Once the fire and police station were under control, the rest of the operation could begin.

It was one o'clock. The acta should have started by now.

Jose Batlle y Ordóñez (1856-1929) became president with the backing of the *Colorado* party. He would end up serving two terms, first from 1903-1907 and again from

1911-1915. His brand of progressivism, known as *Batllismo*, had several dominant themes:

1. *Install a truly democratic system in Uruguay.* In order to do this, Batlle encouraged introducing a Swiss-style collegial executive. Rather than have one president, Uruguay would be ruled by a council of executives. He also proposed an Uruguayan form of proportional representation and the development and extension of civil liberties.

2. *Ensure the separation of Church and State.* The Church, Batlle felt, should not be able to wield unelected power in the public sector.

3. *Strive for freedom from foreign capital.* This was largely to be accomplished through the nationalization of major industries. The early twentieth century saw a continent-wide preoccupation with foreign imperialism, largely in response to the poor record of U.S. interventionism in Latin America, to Theodore Roosevelt and his ilk who sponsored "Big Stick-ism," and to England's aggressive attempts to exploit the riches in the region.

4. *Adopt improved social legislation.* Like progressives the world over, Batlle saw the need to dispense with economic justice or face the consequences of an angered underclass. Programs to guarantee the rights of labor and the creation of a welfare state were all meant to turn Uruguay into a modern, progressive state.⁸

Batlle achieved varying degrees of success with each of his goals. His executive collegial system never really caught on during his lifetime (although during the 1950s a brief fling at a nine-man executive council--six *Colorados* and three *Blancos*--was attempted). Similarly, proportional representation never happened. He did manage, in a limited way, to guarantee the civil liberties of the

powerless. Unlike many other Latin American countries, Uruguay made a firm break with the church and removed its political influence. State monopolies were created in insurance, electricity and telegraph (largely in reaction to British domination of the industries). Labor was guaranteed an eight-hour workday and legislation protecting child and female labor was put on the books. In addition, old age and retirement pensions, minimum wage laws and accident insurance were all introduced.

What may have allowed *Batllismo* to succeed was that the agricultural sector (from which most Uruguayan wealth continues to be derived) did not challenge Batlle. Agrarian reform, though sorely needed, was never undertaken, and the social legislation came at a time when the agrarian elite was doing relatively well. Batlle used the agrarian abundance to fund his efforts in strengthening the traditional urban *Colorado* power base by improving the lot of the rising petit bourgeoisie. This urban middle class eventually came to "dominate the state apparatus," and the rural aristocracy accepted this in exchange for socio-economic stability.⁹

Despite the fact that, by 1956, *Batllismo* had brought Uruguay the highest per capita income of all Latin America and the lowest illiteracy, birth and infant mortality rates, its relative prosperity began to unravel in the late 1950s. The transformation of Uruguay into the "Little Switzerland of America" had largely been on the back of the agricultural wealth of the country, a source that was now in decline. While there had been warning signs of an underdeveloped economy during the depression of the 1930s, World War II and the Korean War managed to keep the prices for Uruguayan and other Latin American agricultural commodities high. Following the end of the wars and the consequent drop in exports, weaknesses in the Uruguayan economy began to surface. Rural production, despite high prices, had been stagnating for years. The real value received from exports was falling far short of the capital needed for imports. And, like most other Latin American

countries that had tried to build up their local industry with the wealth from agriculture, it was soon discovered that industry could not expand. In fact, a 1963 study in Uruguay showed that industry was operating at 50% of its maximum capacity.¹⁰ The Uruguayan market was simply unable to support local manufacturing. Furthermore, the peasantry, displaced due to agribusiness policies aimed at increasing production, fled to the cities in search of work, only to find that labor was already in a tenuous situation.

Furthermore, inequities in the social structure of the countryside were great. More than half of the land (55.8%) was owned by just 4% of the population. A measly 9.5 % of the land was owned by 75.1% of the population. Half of the ranches over 1000 hectares were run by absentee landlords.¹¹ In a country where 90% of the wealth was coming from the agricultural sector, this sort of mismanagement was irresponsible. By the close of the decade, agriculture and the emerging industrial sector were each in crisis; the combination of these two factors was to be economically catastrophic.

The appropriation of a motorcycle for Balbi, the coordinator of the Pando operation, was assigned to a team that was not involved in the act. This should have been accomplished by 11 a.m. that morning, but the cell had been unable to obtain one. Balbi and another companero, Melio, took matters into their own hands and tried to steal a motorcycle from in front of the College of Orthodontics in downtown Montevideo, but failed.

Having wasted precious time trying to steal the motorcycle, they decided to take control of the first vehicle they could conveniently find. They ended up wandering around looking for possibilities. It was nearly twelve o'clock and they needed to be in Pando by one. Balbi and Melio saw

their chance when a woman pulled up to the nearby Hospital Italiano in a Peugeot.

She was approached and firmly advised of the situation. The lady showed some initial reluctance, but when Balbi politely explained he would rather not have to use force, she handed over her keys. "Be careful when you put the car into gear," she said before she watched Balbi and Melio drive off with her car.

They were running late. Balbi, after getting out of the busy downtown traffic, sped down the highway towards Pando, arriving at the plaza at 1:03. As he swung around the square, he passed several of the teams that were to take part in the day's activities, most notably the group that was to take over the Banco de la Republica. Expecting to find the team who had been assigned to seize the police station, Balbi and Melio were surprised to find them already in action. They soon heard gunshots. Melio lept from the car and headed towards the police station.

"Careful going in! The milicos or some companero who doesn't know you may take a shot at you," Balbi shouted at Melio.¹²

While the 1950s economic imbroglio led to one crisis after another, a similar problem surfaced in the state bureaucracy. *Batllismo* had provided well for the masses in a manner unprecedented in Uruguay, but the system only worked when there were resources to back it up.

Political patronage was very common in Uruguay. Much of *Batllismo's* strength came from the ability to provide work opportunities to loyal followers. By 1961,

193,000 people (21% of the population over ten) were employed by the state. Additionally, in 1961, 278,000 people were receiving state pensions, and by 1969 this number increased to 346,800.¹³ The government was running out of money in its efforts to secure support by subsidizing the workforce. This came at a time when the economy was least able to absorb the cost. People were forced to work multiple jobs and still had difficulty maintaining their standard of living. Many people found themselves unemployed, particularly the young adults entering the work force for the first time. Labor unrest escalated and strikes became commonplace.

A combination detrimental to the *Colorado-Blanco* monopoly on power was that white collar workers, the bulk of the state bureaucracy, were being hit particularly hard as they saw their government subsidies decline while prices began to soar (inflation was 180% in 1967). For the first time, intellectuals, professionals and white collar workers began to see themselves as having something in common with the laborers in the nascent industries and agricultural production. This combination of the petit bourgeoisie and working class interests was the first serious challenge the state had experienced since the civil wars that ended in 1865. The immediate reaction of the political and economic elite amid this unrest was to move farther to the right. Uruguay was becoming a class-polarized country with the middle and working classes united for the first time.

The team in charge of taking control of the Pando police station cased it for days. In groups of twos and threes, companeros entered the station for various fabricated reasons in order to get an understanding of the layout of the building. While one companero would occupy the policeman with his question the others would be memorizing what they saw. More than a few asked to "use the bathroom" and had been able to wander the interior of the

station without being challenged. More than one companero could look over the shoulder of the policeman he or she was talking to and see his or her very own "Wanted" picture on the wall.

Assuming control of the police station was crucial to the Pando acta. It was essential that this operation come off without any problems--the police had to be imprisoned in order for the other teams to accomplish their objectives. Eight companeros made up the team, six male and two female, each carrying heavy fire power weapons. It was determined that despite the fact that Balbi and Melio had yet to show up, the importance of the mission warranted that the others proceed without them. A few minutes before one o'clock, a "psychologist" and a "social worker" for a charitable institution entered the police station and asked to see the director.

"He's not here. Wait here a minute. I'll go look for him...." The guard mumbled as he walked further into the station. A sleepy guard stayed behind in the small radio room.

Just as he left, two other companeros entered the station. They had just been in an "accident" and had come in to fill out a report.

Four more companeros were due soon, sporting Air Force uniforms, at which point the operation would escalate. They were running late: the "soldiers" couldn't find their machine gun and had to double back to their car, where they were still unable to find it. Someone must have forgotten it. When the "soldiers" did arrive, there were only three, the fourth being Melio, still running behind with Balbi in the Peugeot. Once inside, however, the "soldiers"

promptly disarmed the remaining guard and destroyed the radio. The others moved further into the building where they found the empty office of the Comisaria and appropriated the weapons and badge he had left behind. Six more policemen were found in various rooms and were promptly disarmed.

Sargent Olivera, in a dormitory the companeros had not properly taken into account, was surprised by a companero. He turned and ran.

"Halt!" yelled the companero.

Olivera ignored him and kept running.

The companero fired, hitting Olivera in the arm.

Olivera shot back, missed, and broke some outside windows.

The "psychologist," following the sound of the gunshots, crossed onto an interior patio and walked straight into Olivera's sights. Olivera cocked his gun and fired, but it jammed. Injured in one arm, he retreated to the dormitory and locked himself inside. The "psychologist," had he been a religious man, may have crossed himself before he walked to the dormitory door.

"Get out of there!" the companeros shouted.

They were met with silence.

"You want us to throw in a grenade, or what?"

After minimal hesitation, Olivera replied, "I'm surrendering. Don't shoot!"

By now, Melio had joined his friends in the police station and was busy

helping them immobilize the policemen with homemade wire handcuffs. As they tied up the policemen, they explained the reasons behind their actions, the ideology of the Tupamaros and why they were there in Pando that day. "I'm the prisoner," said one as a companero began to tie him up. Surprised, the companero asked, "Ah...Why are you in jail?"

"Um...cutting up a little cow...."

While *Batllismo* held the hearts of most of the working class, revolutionary parties had a long history in Uruguay, dating as far back as 1837 when the first socialist union was formed. In 1865, the now multiple socialist movements were formally integrated into the First International.¹⁴ In the 1960s the two most prominent revolutionary parties were the *Partido Socialista* (PS) and *Partido Comunista* (PC.)

The PS and PC both came from the common ancestry of the *Partido Socialista*. This lasted until 1921, when the debate regarding entry into the Third International split the party over the issue of whether or not to accept the Soviet Comintern's "Twenty-one Conditions." The majority ended up voting for entry, which meant the adoption of Soviet-oriented party structure and dogma, and renamed themselves the *Partido Comunista*. The remaining dissidents kept the *Partido Socialista* name along with a distaste for Moscow-inspired policies.¹⁵ The contentious birth of the two parties and their rocky relationship accompanied by their competition with *Batllismo* came to characterize the Uruguayan Left.

The coming conflict between the proletariat and bourgeoisie was seen as inevitable and an integral part of the Uruguayan PC philosophical framework. However, like other countries in Latin America with an underdeveloped or nonexistent proletariat, the PC felt that revolution, before the urban workers were ready, was doomed to failure. The PC, therefore, adopted a strategy

wherein they allied themselves with the progressive bourgeois segments of Uruguayan society while awaiting the necessary conditions for proletarian revolution. They did, however, continue to practice the ideology and structure of traditional Leninism.

Lenin's vanguard was supposed to bide its time in secret organization until the masses "rose up" and attempted to seize power. The vanguard PC would then come to the forefront to provide leadership and transform and shape the insurrectionary violence into a communist form of government, much like the Bolsheviks had done in Russia. This sort of thinking dominated the doctrine of communist parties across Latin America.

The PC occupied itself with mobilizing the small proletariat and participating in the electoral and political process. However, efforts to form popular fronts in the 1930s were short-lived. A brief cooperative effort with the PS in 1942 in the form of the *Union General de Trabajadores* failed when the PS-controlled unions left a few years later.¹⁶ Despite these setbacks, the PC grew dramatically during the 1940s, reaching its height of power in 1946.¹⁷ Even though Batlle tried to establish strictly *Batllista* unions, the PC continued to dominate the labor movement, although most workers had more than a passing loyalty and admiration for Batlle and his reforms.¹⁸ During the height of the Cold War, membership and influence declined somewhat, but by the beginning of the 1960s the PC had representatives and legislators seated in government, owned a radio station, newspapers and magazines, and enjoyed a fairly dependable backing among the students and workers.¹⁹ The PC, however, never got more than 10% of the vote.²⁰

The *Partido Socialista* did not want to wait for the revolutionary conditions to materialize over the process of history. They felt that cooperation with the bourgeoisie was detrimental to the overall revolutionary process. Emilio Frugoni, an early founder and ideological leader, warned against cooperation

with Batlle and other progressives, because it failed to solve fundamental problems and offered only piecemeal solutions. He also felt that *Batllismo* and progressivism would eventually be impossible to maintain.²¹ For many people, this sort of philosophy was hard to understand during the prosperous 1930s and 1940s in Uruguay. This meant the support behind the PS was less concentrated than the *Batllistas* and PC.

The PS began moving from the social-democracy platform to more radical postures following the 1959 Cuban revolution. The PS had incorporated many non-orthodox (*otras tendencias politicas*) movements into their overall party structure and gave these smaller organizations more autonomy.²² These non-traditional tendencies were, for the most part, more militant than the PS had historically been, the result of which was the radicalization of the party. It was from this fountain that the early *Tupamaros* came forth.

Just as the socialist movements of the nineteenth centuries gave birth to the *Partido Comunista* and *Partido Socialista*, the *Partido Socialista* gave birth to the *Tupamaros*, a bastard child made up largely of disenfranchised members of the PS who wanted more revolutionary and immediate action to take place. Those radicals who stayed with the PS emerged as the lesser of two factions. The party eventually split along these lines. By 1968, most of the remaining radicals were expelled.²³ Along with the PC, the PS remained a political party of tertiary importance in Uruguay.

What this meant to the average Uruguayan suffering from the financial setbacks of the 1950s and with *Batllismo* in decline, was that the two parties most likely to form a serious challenge to the *Colorado-Blanco* hegemony of power were unable to do so. Failure to follow up rhetoric with meaningful action in combination with the restrictive *lema* electoral system left the PC and PS permanently on the sidelines. Since

electoral efforts were not working, the time appeared right for a group like the *Tupamaros* to step in and offer a solution to a moribund political system.

Seconds after the eight captured policemen were put in the cells and locked up, the police chief and sub-chief burst into the station. The gunfire had alerted them to the disturbance inside. Stopping short when he saw the companeros, the police chief quickly assessed the situation and, without saying anything, motioned towards his pocket where the companeros found a gun and promptly relieved him of it. A second gesture towards his chest revealed a .22 revolver. The sub-chief, following the lead of his superior, surrendered a .38 snub-nose pistol. By 1:14 the police station was under complete control of the Tupamaros and the time to evacuate had come. The smaller weapons, some paperwork and other incidentals were taken as the revolutionaries withdrew. Using one of the cars from the funeral procession, the "Comisaria" team fled Pando.

The first generation of *Tupamaros* made the transition from intellectual activists to armed revolutionaries sometime in 1963 under the leadership of Raul Sendic.

Sendic, a 36-year-old law student who had put off his last few tests, left Montevideo for Northern Uruguay in the early sixties to organize the rural workers. He came first to Paysandu to organize the *remolacheros* (beet pickers) and then the *azucareros* (sugar laborers) in Salto. Eventually Sendic had his greatest success in organizing the *azucareros* in the northernmost and most backward province of Artigas. Under his leadership, the Union of Sugar Laborers of Artigas (*Union de Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas*), the UTAA, was the first rural union to be organized in Uruguay.²⁴ Opponents initially

characterized the UTAA and Sendic as "disreputable elements" and petty thieves, but soon learned that they were seriously mistaken.²⁵

"With the Land and with Sendic!" (*Con la Tierra y con Sendic!*) was the rallying cry of the UTAA. One of the most dramatic of the UTAA's early endeavors was to engineer a 600-kilometer march from Artigas to Montevideo to show the entire country the plight of the *azucareros*. For most of the rural workers, it was their first time in the city and the first time they had participated in politics at any level. They camped, thousands of them, around the Legislative Palace in order to make their point. The demonstration ended in violence when a rival syndicate (some say backed by the U.S., but definitely from the right wing) converged on the crowd.²⁶ Shots were fired and innocents were killed.

This demonstration, and subsequent marches in 1963, 1964 and 1968, did not achieve many of the UTAA's immediate goals. What gains were achieved, however, were largely in the form of organizational experience and the radicalization of the workers. The marches showed the urban worker he had something in common with the rural laborer. There were those that claimed the UTAA was symbolic of things to come, comparing it to "the adventure of the *Granma*" (*la aventura del Granma*).²⁷ Drawing upon both positive and negative experiences with the UTAA, Sendic and those around him left the union and, although they still enjoyed its moral support, formed the core of the *Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional-Tupamaro* sometime in early 1963.²⁸ The *Tupamaros* ended up leaving their rural roots in the UTAA, and due to Uruguayan demographics, soon became a strictly urban movement.

The fire station, separated from the police station by a short wall, was to be attacked as soon as the "soldiers" entered the police station. The "fire station" team, made up of four male companeros, waited at the bus station, from which they could

monitor activities in the square. Dilo and Eno had come individually, and Roli and Mocho had come by car, parking it a block or so away from the bus station.

The companeros began walking towards the fire station, two by two, at one o'clock, waiting for the signal. They heard a shot from within the police station, evidence enough that the acta had begun. The guard at the fire station stood outside and sleepily turned his head towards the sound of gunshots coming from next door. With detached interest he assessed the situation, and without moving his body he turned his head in time to see Mocho walking towards him with a weapon in plain view. The guard, his curiosity now piqued, looked at Mocho and the three men behind him. Several more shots from the police station, followed by glass crashing to the sidewalk, turned his attention back towards his neighbors. With movements reminiscent of a tennis match, the guard looked back and forth from the Comisaria to the companeros. Mocho accosted him, and without any struggle, took him into the fire station.

Once inside, Mocho went through the building to ward off any chances of escape. The others, finding the offices and dining area empty, ended up meeting at the dormitory, where they found six or seven men in varying states of dress. Immobilized by surprise, the firemen stared vacantly at the three young men in front of them.

"Move it!" the companeros yelled.

There was no movement.

They had to physically remove the zombie-like firemen from the room.

Roli, searching for others, checked the bathroom. A heavysset man, his back to the door, was urinating. "Hands up!" Roli shouted.

The man, having at least one of his hands occupied, continued his activity without saying anything. "Hands up! Carajo! Get out of there!"

Ignoring Roli, the man waited until, with a casual flourish, he finished up. Turned around, he saw Roli pointing a gun at him for the first time. Unsurprised and with a heavy sigh, he lifted his arms above his head.

The entire group of firemen were soon in the back, hands up and against the wall. Dilo guarded the prisoners and exchanged pleasantries with the companeros on the other side of the wall at the police station.

Uruguay is an urban country. Throughout its history, almost half of Uruguay's population has lived in Montevideo. Most figures put about 80% of the country's population in urban centers, with no city other than Montevideo having a population of over 100,000 until after 1973.²⁹

This urban lifestyle in Uruguay has many implications. It meant that the traditional leftist and progressive political parties concentrated their efforts in the population centers and in keeping the working and middle classes in the cities pacified. Agricultural interests were not as labor heavy, and consequently, were often ignored. For rural laborers there was little chance for change in the oppressive system of exploitation in the countryside.

When the traditional parties did venture into the interior, it was usually on a limited basis. The *Colorado Batllistas*, in order to pass their legislation and implement their programs, rarely challenged the authority of the *Blanco* landowning elite opposition. The

PC, with their emphasis on the proletariat, had no interest in organizing the rural workers. At most, the PC spent some time organizing the *trabajadores de tambos* (workers centered around the milk producing centers outside of Montevideo). The Socialists, less dedicated to traditional Marxism, took it upon themselves to organize the seasonal workers, the *remolacheros*, *caneros*, *azucareros* and *arroceros*. Most of this organizing was minimal and occurred after the financial crisis of the 1950s had begun.³⁰

Eno and Roli, by now out in front of the fire station, soon encountered a problem. A police agent was crossing the street, heading for the Comisaria on his way back from lunch. He was promptly captured and taken inside, but not before two more agents, hands on their holsters, were seen running towards the Comisaria from the direction of the bus station. Seeing the companeros, who at this point were joined by Mocho, the agents changed their direction and headed to the sidewalk in front of the fire station.

Roli and Eno, starting from behind columns near the entrance of the fire station, moved towards the agents, shouting and pointing their guns. Mocho stayed close to the columns in order to assist Dilo if it became necessary.

As Roli and Eno approached, the policemen stopped short. "Come closer!" They motioned towards the companeros.

"No....You come here!" Roli responded.

The two parties exchanged "come hithers" for a few tense moments, their guns pointed at each other. Things were further complicated by the crowd of people who gathered to see what was going on, having heard

the shots fired within the police station and seeing the two companeros standing in the street, guns drawn in a standoff with the police. Some were standing directly in the line of fire. Eventually, the crowd in front of the bus station would become so large it would block the passage of a full bus of passengers trying to get through the street. The companeros yelled at them to get out of the way, but were largely ignored. The two policemen eventually darted away, undoubtedly seeing the situation as only having a harmful resolution.

In plain sight of Roli, Eno and Mocho, the Police Chief and Sub-Chief looked at the companeros with their weapons drawn, and ran into the police station.

Another policeman headed towards the police station and was stopped by Roli and Mocho. He showed them his I.D. (he was a traffic cop who didn't carry a weapon) and was taken inside the fire station. The crowd continued to grow and get in the way. Several people, including a teenage girl and an elderly man and woman, got in the way, but were frightened into retreat by the companeros.

At 1:18, with a signal from the team from the Comisaria, the four companeros got into their car and retreated, leaving their prisoners behind in the fire station. The crowd silently opened a path for the car.

In 1966, while the newly formed *Tupamaros* were building their strength and having some initial successes in Montevideo, Jorge Pacheco Areco was elected vice-president as part of a conservative *lema* within the *Colorado* party. When the president died the next year, Pacheco became the new executive. Pacheco's first order of business

was to remove from his cabinet the traditional professional politicians that ran the state since the days of Batlle and to replace them with bankers and financiers.³¹ Pacheco appeared to want to make a firm break with the progressive *Batllista* past of which the *Colorado* party had historically been a part. In 1968, Pacheco instituted an IMF-constructed wage and price freeze of which at least one opposition voice melodramatically claimed: "Uruguay was no longer a new U.S. Latin American foothold but a soon-to-be raped bedpartner."³² In a society that had become accustomed to a state-guaranteed security and economic prosperity, Pacheco's tactics seemed to be overly heavy-handed. The 1968 "New Security Measures" law (*Medidas Prontas de Seguridad*) allowed Pacheco to censor the press, subject strikers to military discipline and curtail civil liberties. Uruguay seemed destined for a showdown.

The Central Telefonica de UTE of Pando, the state-run telecommunications company, was selected for attack to avoid any chances of communicating the acts to reinforcements in Montevideo or elsewhere.³³ Six men and one woman made up the team that would take control of the UTE, disrupt its communications ability and withdraw. They would leave a fake bomb behind to confuse the police and add needed time to the retreat.

One of the participants in the UTE project was parked in front of the Comisaria, and following the entrance of the "soldiers" into the station, he pulled forward, his lights on, signaling the team waiting near the UTE. Four companeros entered the building from the front and two more from the side. Two of the companeros took center stage.

"We're from the Policia de Investigaciones. We're here to investigate a bomb threat," the

companeros announced. "Furthermore, it is going to be necessary to cut all lines of communication to and from the building."

The employees quickly explained to the "policemen" that they did not have the authorization or the know-how to cut the lines. "If the two gentlemen would care to wait," they said, "We could get in contact with our supervisor." Six employees appeared out of nowhere and began to offer their disparate opinions.

Lucco, the leader of the UTE team of Tupamaros, probably hearkening back to some experience with this type of bureaucratic joyride in the past, gave the order to take everyone prisoner. A total of eleven people were taken to a back room. One companero kept watch over the captives while others began ripping out whatever important-looking wires they could find. None of the UTE team had the experience or knowledge necessary to determine the intricacies of the telecommunications system. It had been decided that they would simply do as much damage as possible in hopes of disrupting communications. Two more companeros went to the roof and cut all the wires going to and from the building.

The others continued to move throughout the building in search of employees and customers. The operators were so surprised they had to be lifted from their seats, their headphones removed, and led to the room with all other prisoners. Lucco continued to watch the door while the companero in the car in front kept track of the activities going on around the square. Lucco took this chance to converse with some of the employees, explaining the purpose

and ideology of the Tupamaros. He was told which cables to cut to disable the power in the building.

It soon became apparent that once communication to the building was cut, customers began to accumulate as they came to complain that their conversation had been disrupted. Two policemen rushed into the building, apparently unaware of the Tupamaro activities within, but were quickly disarmed and taken inside with the other prisoners. Once the evacuation began, the prisoners, now numbering 40 to 45, were locked up and the companeros headed towards the vehicle to make their escape.

Before the last of the companeros got in the car, an old man came up, limping and walking with a cane. Angry at having had his phone conversation cut off, he approached one of the companeros, perhaps assuming he was an employee of UTE, and voiced his complaints. The companero, in a hurry, gave the old man directions to the room holding the prisoners. "Yes. Yes sir, go this way, there, towards the end, take a left..." The old man, satisfied, left the companeros behind, and entered the building to give some poor employee of UTE a piece of his mind.

Abraham Guillen was one of the authors whose writing President Pacheco ordered suppressed. Guillen was cited by the *Tupamaros* as an important strategical influence.³⁴ Guillen's books dealt with a variety of political issues, but his writings on guerilla warfare had the most relevance for the *Tupamaros*. His theories had roots in Marx, Bakunin's "direct action," Auguste Blanqui's prescription for professional guerillas to seize power, and aspects of Che Guevara's and Regis Debray's *foco* theory.³⁵

Guillen was a bit of an intellectual maverick when compared to the Soviet-style

antics of communist parties in Latin America and the Euro-style socialist-democratic alternatives. He called for immediate revolution and provided the framework for its implementation. Using a Marxist analysis of history, Guillen felt that the time was at hand when the proletariat would rise up and seize control. Unlike traditional Leninists, however, he did not feel it necessary for the revolutionary vanguard to wait for this time to come. Like Guevara and Debray, Guillen felt that a guerilla *foco* could install itself with a dozen or so men, with the intention of generating consciousness, organization and revolutionary conditions. This would culminate in a socialist revolution. Instead of waiting for the Marxist-Leninist prescribed revolutionary catalyst to come, this new revolutionary vanguard would create one. In Cuba, this strategy of accelerated revolution had worked perfectly. While Guillen gave the Cuban experience its due, he differed from Che and Debray in that he felt the *foco* should be placed in the city rather than in rural areas like the Sierra Maestras in Cuba. In reference to Che's failed revolution in Bolivia, Guillen said: "If he had operated in the cement jungles of the Argentine cities and at the moment of a military dictatorship, with his great personality he would have moved the Argentine masses to revolt."³⁶ Guillen recognized that Latin America was a rapidly urbanizing continent, and that taking to the mountains would be less effective than waging meaningful warfare in the cities where the majority of the population was concentrated. This idea would be even more appropriate in a country like Uruguay with no real wilderness areas.

Additionally, Guillen probably gained an appreciation of the use of specific revolutionary "actions" in his youth by witnessing the successful implementation of Bakunin's "direct action" philosophy by the anarchosindicalist *Congreso Nacional de Trabajo* (CNT) when he participated in the Spanish Civil War. For Guillen, a well organized minority could make dramatic revolutionary strides if it properly implemented a program of meaningful revolutionary "actions." Guillen went a step further by

explaining how these ideas could be put into a concrete political methodology. Since it would be impossible to seize control of the state by urban guerillas, "catastrophic conditions" must be developed to cause the chaos necessary for seizure of power. He outlined four stages to create these conditions:

1. There must exist some sort of economic exploitation by the state.
2. The guerillas must confront the state with "revolutionary violence."
3. The state, in reaction to the guerilla actions, would engage in "manifest violence" by attacking the populace in an attempt to curb the revolution.
4. The populace would react to the "manifest violence" of the state with their own "popular violence," which would culminate in the seizure of power from the state.³⁷

Needless to say, Guillen's ideas found resonance with the group that would lead the *Tupamaros*. People like Carlos Marighela in Brazil coincided with Guillen's ideas in his publication of the *Minimanual of Urban Guerilla Warfare*. The Revolutionary Popular Vanguard (VPR) in Brazil were mirroring *Tupamaro* actions in their own cities with the ideas of "armed propaganda" and "action builds organization."³⁸ The *Tupamaros* set out on a course to accelerate the revolution. By putting in motion a series of events that would bring the defining moment that would cause the masses to rise up and seize control of the state, they could then assume leadership of the government.

Nine companeros, one of whom was a woman, were in charge of the Banco de Pando. The bank, broken up into various rooms and registers, required a complex synchronization of assignments on the part of the robbers.

The team entered the bank discreetly ahead of the designated start time.

Two companeros asked an employee about possible places to rent in the locality when the announcement "this is an assault, we're Tupamaros" sent each team member into action. The employee ended up looking, mouth agape, at the barrel of a gun. Another employee, whom one could graciously describe as corpulent, made a dash from behind the counter where he was pursued by the other companero. The man, as fat as he was unrealistic, had chosen a small door to hide behind. The registers, the manager's office and the rest of the building were soon under Tupamaro control.

While some companeros kept watch and others passed out flyers, the bank was relieved of its wealth by the remainder of the team. Ricardo Zabalza, a companero and son of a prominent conservative politician, challenged the manager when the amount of money that was expected was not forthcoming. The manager began to explain that a transfer was sent to the Banco de la Republica, but was cut short by Nilco, the companero guarding the door.

A policeman was coming their way full steam and waving a revolver. While the inhabitants of the bank sought cover, Nilco leaned against the doorway as the milico shot out the window next to him. A brief firefight ensued where Nilco shot the hat off the policeman, who hid behind a car.

The companeros, seeing the policeman laid out between the street and the curb, thought he was wounded, and began to evacuate. Nilco headed towards the cop, perhaps to finish him off, but was restrained by another companero. "The poor guy is wounded and he won't give us any more trouble."

However, once the getaway car was started up, the "poor guy" jumped up and ran into a nearby bar where he shot out a tire as the car pulled out. The car, loaded down with all of the companeros and on a flat tire, turned the wrong way down a one-way street. They were met by a policeman standing in the middle of the road who motioned for them to stop. Naturally feeling uncooperative as possible, the driver sped up and forced the policeman to jump out of the way. The policeman pulled out his gun and shot at the fleeing vehicle. The companeros returned fire and the policeman was forced to find cover in another bar.

The only person wounded in this exchange was an innocent bystander who was shot by the policeman in the crossfire. Mistaken for a Tupamaro, the man was arrested and left bleeding and without medical attention in a jail cell until it was determined he had nothing to do with the robbery.

Despite the shaky condition of the car, it made it to the reunion point at the cemetery without any further complications.

Guillen's theories made sense in Montevideo. The structure of the *Tupamaros*, in keeping with its revolutionary nature, was by necessity clandestine, and due to Uruguayan peculiarities, urban. The combination of an urban and clandestine movement created a political machinery that was both distinctive and well-organized. Although not the first urban guerillas in history, the *Tupamaros*, at the height of their power in the late 1960's, were probably the best organized movement that had ever undertaken such a revolutionary project.

The basic unit of the *tupamaro* structure was the cell. Each cell comprised at least two individuals, but rarely more than

seven or eight. These cells could either be for general purpose or specialized. The *tupamaro* hospitals, for example, were specialized cells known for their efficiency. Members of the *tupamaro* movement only knew other members of their cell, and often only by a pseudonym or on an impersonal basis. Some cell leaders knew each other, but were often limited to a single human contact within the *tupamaro* organization. All decisions were made by a central committee and directives were handed down to the concerned cell.

The use of this method assured the secrecy and safety of the entire organization. Even if a member of a cell was captured by the police and forced to give away the identities of others within the movement, at best he or she could only betray the immediate members of his or her cell. Because of this, the police were unable to capture significant numbers of *Tupamaros* for most of the period of *tupamaro* activity.

Rarely were more than a few cells united in a particular task. If they were, it was often on a very limited basis. For example, one cell would steal a car for a bank robbery, a second would conduct the robbery itself and a third cell would meet up with the second and make away with the money. The acta in Pando was an exception to this unofficial rule. It was the first and only time that so many cells were involved in one operation on such a close basis. *Tupamaro* sources put the participants at around 100 (probably taking into account all the peripheral and support groups); other opinions range from 40 to 70. This would mean that anywhere from 7 to 14 cells were involved.

About thirty-five yards away from the Banco de Pando is the Banco Pan de Azucar. A team of six companeros had been assigned to this robbery. Having originally been given one of the funerary cars to complete their task, they had to abandon it due to mechanical difficulties. Ten minutes before one o'clock, they were seated i

n the cafe in front of the bank wondering where they could obtain a getaway vehicle. At the appropriate moment, the bank manager (having been identified from earlier scouting of the bank) drove up in his Citroen and parked in easy reach of the team.

Once the signal was given to start the act, three, and then two more of the men entered the bank and awaited the oral signal of the sixth companero to start the robbery. Outside, the sixth companero noticed a person expressing undue interest in the events across the street in the Banco de Pando and, accosting the individual, he took him across the street to the Banco de Pando and delivered him into the hands of the team in charge of that robbery. Returning quickly to the Banco Pan de Azucar, he signaled his team to begin. Three of the bank robbers took control of the main room while two others took the inhabitants of the manager's office captive, for a total of 11 prisoners. While some men watched the prisoners, the others monitored events on the street and still others took charge of the money. The manager was forced to give up a gun and his car keys.

The companero in charge of watching the street soon encountered a problem. On both corners, crowds of people had gathered to watch the events unfold in the banks. From one of these groups, a policeman walked out slowly, probably ordered to the bank by some superior. He was trembling and it was obvious he was scared of the Tupamaros. The companero in the doorway began to walk towards the policeman nonchalantly, acting like an ordinary person on the street. Once past the policeman, the

companero wheeled around and disarmed the policeman, taking him captive into the Banco de Pando.

Returning to his post at the entrance of the bank, he found a woman, child in hand, who had come to cash a check. After explaining that she would have to wait a minute, he took her inside and turned her over to one of the companeros in the hall.

By now all the money had been appropriated and the prisoners were properly occupied. The team from the Banco Pan de Azucar left the scene in the bank manager's borrowed Citroen.

While having a deep ideological base in Guevara and Debray's *foco* theory, the writings of Guillen and Lenin's vanguardism, the MLN-Tupamaros offered their own prescription for revolution in Uruguay, and by inference, all of Latin America.³⁹ The Tupamaros correctly assessed that political and economic power would not be given up peacefully by the governing elite in a dependent state like Uruguay. Throw the forces of countries like the U.S. (whom the Latin American Left saw as protecting their interests with continent-wide repression) into the equation and one comes up with some formidable foes. The conclusion reached was that the seizure of the state by revolutionary violence was deemed necessary. The responsibility of creating the political vehicle to implement armed rebellion was then assumed by the Tupamaros. They would accelerate it with a two-pronged approach: First, by pointing out corruption and immorality of the state and its ineffectual governing of the country. Second, by creating a separate *tupamaro* state structure with its own moral authority as an alternative to the Uruguayan government. The chief manner in which they would accomplish these approaches was the use of armed engagements where they would expose the imperfection of the state and impress the masses with a combination of showmanship, moral supremacy and impressive political abilities.

If the basic unit of the *tupamaro* organization was the revolutionary cell, then the basic unit of its ideology was the *acta*. Translated as "act" or more properly "action," the purpose of the *acta* was to draw attention to the mission of the *tupamaro* guerillas and show the moral weakness of the Uruguayan state. Whether it was the Robin Hood antics of the "appropriation and distribution" of foodstuffs during the Christmas season of 1963 or the publishing of photos of President Jorge Pacheco shaving in the nude, each *acta* was a strictly calculated event whose overall purpose transcended the event itself. The events on October 8, 1969 in Pando were the biggest and most grandiose of all *actas* up to that point. Taking control of a city of 70,000 not only displayed the strength of the *Tupamaros* but showed the inability of the government to act authoritatively.

Their unique strategies and innovative approaches to revolution overshadowed the ideological framework the MLN came from. Despite contributions from figures like Marx, Lenin, Guevara and Guillen, there is no one comprehensive document outlining the MLN ideology. At best, the repetitious phrases that appeared in their many press releases and communiques can give some indication of the actual political ideology the MLN espoused. It appears that the two "ideological pillars of the MLN" were anti-imperialist (aimed at the USA) and anti-oligarchical (aimed at those who had "sold out" Uruguay's independence).⁴⁰ The MLN were socialists, and they borrowed heavily from socialist thinkers; but it was evident that they owed their loyalty to no one particular ideological block. The *Tupamaros* have been incorrectly labeled as being part of the camp of a variety of socialist governments, probably because they were so silent on the subject. Perhaps this was intentional on the part of the leadership, since the implementation of their *actas* made it very clear whom they considered an enemy. Perhaps that was enough. The audacity and success of their acts attracted admirers, and that appeared to be sufficient for the MLN for the time being.

The Pando branch of the Banco de la Republica is right on the corner, with two entrances open to the public and a third interior door leading to the manager's house next door. A team of fourteen Tupamaros, one of whom was female, was in charge of robbing the bank. The team was divided into three groups. The first entered the bank and awaited the appointed time and arrival of the other two groups, who entered the bank from the public and employee entrances. Companeros waited across the street in the van still holding the seven mortuary employees.

A "policeman" carrying a machine gun, "a high-ranking bank executive" and his "secretary" all got out of a car and entered the bank. The guard, sleepy and comfortable in the routine of his chair, was awakened by the brusque voice of his colleagues."

"Accompany us to the treasury. We're bringing a transfer."

"Yes, of course..."

Once inside the treasury, the Tupamaros shed their characters.

"What's going on? You're not one of us?" the guard said incredulously.

While the guard was being disarmed, the other companeros accomplished their assigned tasks. Four of them entered the manager's house and took him and three other employees captive. The companeros inside the bank jumped over the counter and moved the employees and customers to the wall. Another went through the back rooms, where he found another employee. In less than a minute, the bank was occupied and twenty-seven people

were standing against the wall with their hands over their heads.

While the majority of the companeros kept watch, three others, with the help of the manager and another employee, began the task of appropriating the money. The false policeman stayed out front, walking back and forth across the sidewalk, encouraging people to stay clear of the bank. He did take the time, however, to help two old ladies cross the street, along with a group of children on their way to the school across from the bank.

Two transit cops showed up, parking their car in front of the manager's house. One of them tried to enter the house, but was stopped by the "policeman."

"Move your car. We need to keep this road open." He said. "Get to the other side of the street." Reluctantly, the transit cops did as they were told by the "policeman."

The crowd that had gathered at this point was fully aware of what was going on inside the bank. They figured out who the "policeman" really was, and began to laugh at the transit cops. The transit police climbed into their car, and after going only a few yards, one of them got out, stopped a passing car and got inside. The "policeman" stopped the car as it passed in front of him.

"Where do you think you're going?" He asked.

"To sound the alert."

"Don't worry about it. Everything has already been taken care of. Get down."

The crowd laughed as the transit cop got out of the car and it was waved on by the "policeman."

"Get going, get going," said the companero as he pointed the way for the transit cop with his machine gun.

The "policeman" turned to find a woman, fifty-something, walking towards him. Despite having been warned away from the sidewalk, she still seemed to want to get close to the "policeman." She walked hesitantly, one foot on the curb, the other in the street as if trying to comply at least partially with the "policeman's" orders. Once she got close enough she said, pointing at the bank, "How good, how fantastic!"

No sooner had the woman walked away than a shot was heard from inside the bank, from the direction of the manager's house. A companero named Fernan, whose white handkerchief had fallen from his arm, was accidentally shot by the companero, who mistook him for a foe. Helped by other companeros, he was taken to a car where he would later be driven to an underground hospital.

The time had arrived to evacuate, and with only half the money, some 40 million pesos, the Tupamaros withdrew in overloaded cars. One of their number was left behind in the manager's office where he was guarding some captives. Unfortunately for him, those who knew about him had left with the injured Fernan. Once he realized his situation, the companero managed to escape to the street, but was soon apprehended when someone from the crowd identified him.

Typical *tupamaro actas* were varied. A favorite was appropriating and redistributing foodstuffs. On one occasion, the entire sewage plans for the city of Montevideo were stolen in broad daylight from off the desk of a government employee. Illegal and secret accounting books, belonging to friends of highly-placed government leaders, were stolen and placed on the doorsteps of Uruguay's leading newspapers and an influential judge. President Pacheco's personal friend and political confidante, Pereyra Reverbel, was kidnapped and held for ransom not once, but twice. The early morning robbery of the San Rafael, the nation's biggest casino, in the extravagant summer town of Punta Del Este was distinguished by the return of some of the money when it was discovered the *Tupamaros* had made off with the employee's wages. The significance of each of these *actas* was not lost on the public. Their meaning was engineered to be obvious to the masses. In the words of Guillen: "In a revolution, every guerilla action that has to be explained to the people is wrong: actions should be evident and convincing in themselves."⁴¹

The *Tupamaros* took their role as directors of revolutionary *actas* seriously, although it is evident they enjoyed the reaction when they pulled off a particularly ingenious caper. There was more than a little pleasure in making the police look foolish. In the early days, prior to the Pando event, before they escalated their kidnappings and executions, many of the *actas* had the air of a sophisticated prank. Their self-published accounts of their *actas* were often filled with humor and sarcastic references to the ruling elite. Their audacious and irreverent attitude was refreshing to some, especially those who felt powerless in the face of an increasingly oppressive government and a declining economy.

Later, particularly when news of torture and murder of leftist prisoners became common knowledge, the *Tupamaros* began escalating their violence. Security forces found themselves the target of attack. Although not done indiscriminately nor at random,

assassinations of soldiers and policemen created an atmosphere of increased tension and fear. The state responded with increased repression and, although there is no proof of innocents being physically harmed by *Tupamaros*, people began to feel less secure and more apprehensive of *tupamaro actas*.

Once at the cemetery, the inoperable vehicle was left behind and the companeros were divided up among the remaining cars. Due to the secret nature of the cell structures, the companeros were separated from the people they knew, and nobody knew who was in charge. Escape routes, consequently, got muddled.

The funeral cortege took off, with the Banco de la Republica team in the lead car, the driver having more knowledge of the area. About 10 kilometers from the cemetery, the protesting undertaker and his fellow employees were dropped off; the extra room was needed by the overcrowded companeros and the wounded Fernan.

Passing through the small town of Suarez, 15 kilometers from the cemetery, it was apparent that the alarm had yet to reach that far, but just beyond the town they encountered some policemen. While one highway patrolman leaned against his car, machine gun in hand, the other waved to what appeared to be a funeral procession to pull over. It seemed that he did not suspect the funeral procession, but was making his inspection just in case. The cars slowed down, pretending to obey the officer as he walked towards them. Once the distance was shortened, the companeros cars sped up and left the policeman behind, racing towards his car.

At a pre-determined point, 24 kilometers from the cemetery, the caravan divided. The hearse and two other cars, with Fernan and the money from the Banco de Pando and Banco Pan de Azucar, made it to Montevideo without further incident. The three others headed the other direction, the team in charge of the assault on the fire station doing so accidentally. A few kilometers away, a Gutbrod was parked, up on a jack. The van pulled over and two companeros, the weapons and all the money from the Banco de la Republica were transferred to the new vehicle.

The remaining cars and the recently acquired Gutbrod soon ran into two patrol cars parked on a bridge, blocking their way. The first car to see the police pulled over to the side of the road. Five companeros ran for a nearby grove of trees and two stayed in the car. The other cars screeched to a halt, the van hitting a ditch on the side of the road. Approximately 20 companeros took positions as the patrol cars began to move towards them. At about seventy yards, the Tupamaros opened fire and, hitting the lead patrol car, temporarily halted the advance. While some companeros headed for the woods, others tried to get the van in a position to retreat. At about this time, the Gutbrod arrived, bringing up the rear; its occupants jumped out and headed across the field. The companeros working on the van, realizing that it was probably a lost cause, got into the Gutbrod and retreated (it was later rumored that Sendic himself was the driver). After hiding the money (which was later found by the authorities) and their weapons, the companeros divided up, abandoned the truck and made their individual ways back to Montevideo.

In the publication, "Thirty Questions Asked of a Tupamaro Guerilla," the *Tupamaros* were queried: "What is the fundamental difference between your organization and other organizations of the Left?"

They replied: "The majority of the latter appear to trust more in manifestos, in emissions of theories about revolution, to prepare militants and revolutionary conditions, without understanding that fundamentally it is revolutionary actions that precipitate revolutionary situations."⁴²

This criticism was aimed at the traditional Left in Uruguay, chief among which was the *Partido Comunista*. For its part, the PC was highly critical of the *tupamaro* endeavors. Referring to the young movement as "revolutionary adventurism" (*aventurismo revolucionario*), the PC dismissed them as impatient and philosophically flawed.⁴³

Although some of this conflict was due to semantic Marxist turf wars, the truth is that the MLN-*Tupamaros* were outside of the PC experience. The genealogy of the MLN was in the *Partido Socialista*. Sendic and many of those closest to him had come from a different paradigm. Having long abandoned the radicalism of the PS, the PC was used to conducting politics in a more traditional, bourgeois manner. For example, the organization of the rural *caneros* and *azucareros* was outside of PC theory. The revolution was to come from the proletariat, they maintained, not from the workers in the sparsely populated countryside. The efforts of Sendic and others were entirely misdirected in their eyes.

It is more than a little ironic that the early power base of one of the most effective urban guerrilla movements in history came from the countryside. Even though the MLN-*Tupamaros* later concentrated solely on their efforts in and around Montevideo, it was their non-Marxist and consequently, non-traditional, analysis of revolution that thrust them into the forefront of the popular consciousness of the Uruguayan people. The PC complaints may

have sounded like sour grapes to the *tupamaro* supporters. For many radicals (and these were increasing in numbers), the PC had become "a collaborator with the system."⁴⁴ The *Tupamaros* were acting where the *Partido Comunista* and the radical (but weaker) *Partido Socialista*, were not.

The portion of the original group that had left their vehicles behind at the roadblock now numbered about seventeen men and three women. They passed through the trees and across the small river, Toledo Chico. The group divided into two, each taking a different route, hoping to reach a main road where they could catch a bus or otherwise flee from the area. It was not quite two o'clock.

*Soon, the distinct sound of a low-flying helicopter was heard, which in turn was joined by the sound of sirens. Running blindly over unfamiliar territory, the *Tupamaros* began to break into smaller groups, perhaps due to strategy, but probably due to self-preservation. In the backs of their minds was the knowledge that the longer they took to get away, the closer the police would be. Some of the *companeros* hid and some took up positions, but most kept running.*

One group, congregated in a field, were trying to determine the best route for escape when they were fired on by some soldiers or policemen. They fled and were not pursued.

Jorge Salerno (who participated in the seizure of the police station) and Arapey Cabrera were cut off by a patrol car. Hiding in a grove of eucalyptus, Arapey's right arm was destroyed by two shots from the police. Salerno traded fire with the policemen until his clip was empty.

*Exiting the grove of trees, in plain sight of the *milicos*, he threw down his empty weapon and lifted his arms. He was torn apart by a shotgun blast.*

*Another small group of *companeros* managed to get away amid the small farms and wilderness areas, with directions from some of the people in the area. Alfredo Cultelli had wounds from front and behind, whose pattern would lead one to believe that his arms were in the air when he was killed.*

*A group of about eight *companeros*, the largest at this point, after a twenty minute walk, hid in the sparse foliage behind a small farm. The Metropolitan police soon arrived, a clique particularly known for their viciousness and hatred of the revolutionaries. The *Metros* shot randomly throughout the area while six of the *companeros* hid inside the house. Enrique Osano and another unidentified *companero*, took their chances outside. Enrique was shot in the heel, and he surrendered. As he stood there with his arms over his head the police continued to fire. He avoided being murdered due only to the policemen's poor aim. The police beat Enrique to the ground.*

Due to accounts of torture of prisoners at the hands of the state and police, the Uruguayan Senate created, on December 10, 1969 (almost exactly two months after the Pando act) a commission to investigate the subject. The following selection comes from the *Hechos Probados* ("Proven Acts") section of that document:

Examination of the declarations of the detained, witnesses, professionals (lawyers and doctors) and documents compiled by this commission proves that the most habitual regimen of bad treatment and torture that are

inflicted on the apprehended are: Verbal abuse; ...Privation of water and food; Prohibition of taking care of their physical needs in adequate forms and places; Imprisonment in cells with excrement; Beatings while under police custody, without reasonable need to use them to control the apprehended...;Electrical currents applied to different parts of the body, especially: joints, sexual organs and in one concrete case...the eyes...; Cigarette burns in the genitalia and anus...; ... the everyday use of psychological torture and...physical torture that takes diverse forms and means and in some concrete cases...the intention of violation and fondling of women prisoners and...the forced nakedness of youth, including those under age, in public places...; Pregnant women submitted to inhuman treatment, privation of water and food...;⁴⁵

Zabalza, who figured in the Banco de Pando assault, was wounded with machine gun fire from the Guardia de la Republica. He surrendered and was escorted to a police car. His captor noticed Zabalza's grenade. "Why didn't you use your grenade?"

Zabalza was not so wounded that he could not do a little preaching. "The objective of the MLN isn't to kill policemen. Rather, it's to finish off the capitalist system, seize power and construct a better society, equally and fraternally."

Once at the vehicle, Zabalza was taken by other policeman who threatened to kill him upon the internal orders of President Pacheco himself. The agent who took Zabalza tried to calm the others, but left Zabalza there and returned to the field to look for other companeros.

The official report of Zabalza's death would later read "he was killed in the process of a firefight with the police," despite the fact that his skull was crushed by a blow from behind and a bullet hole was on the small of his neck and the front of his face had been blown off.⁴⁶ He was probably shot while lying face down.

In retrospect, the MLN-*Tupamaros* were an impressive, albeit short-lived, movement. In just a few years from their birth, they rose to prominence as one of the most effective and dramatic urban guerilla movements in Latin America. The reasons for their downfall in 1973 were myriad, but chief among them were the increased effectiveness of the military forces and the *Tupamaros* own flawed strategies and incorrect ideological assumptions.

The leading factor in the demise of the *Tupamaros* was the steady improvement of the Uruguayan security apparatus. Each branch of the military perfected their intelligence groups over time and became more indiscriminate in their methods. It seemed the government was willing to imprison innocents for every revolutionary they caught. Up until 1969, very few guerillas had been taken captive or forced into hiding. In 1968, according to a *tupamaro* source, the police had only 15 detainees and 25 *companeros* had been correctly identified by government forces. By 1970, there were 150 prisoners and close to 100 *Tupamaros* identified on police lists. The number of dead in 1970 was still low, however--only 17 for both sides.⁴⁷

The *Tupamaros* had counted on the state to exhibit "manifest violence," which they felt would lead the masses to respond with so-called "popular violence." Rather than responding with violence, however, the populace withdrew in fear. The defining catalyst never came. One of the key tenets of their revolutionary convictions did not occur, and subsequent plans fell into disarray. The *Tupamaros* suffered the limitations of an urban

guerilla movement: "it is cut off from the masses by its clandestinity."⁴⁸

The public had also tired of the upheaval and discord. Some of the later *tupamaro* *actas* were less readily identifiable as meaningful events and seemed unnecessarily brutal. Increased governmental security meant more firefights with the military and police, a factor that injected even more violence into the country. Like the VPR in Brazil, the *Tupamaro* ideology was suffering due to "a sort of cult of action for action's sake, in which the most blind 'activism' was passed off as 'political theory.'"⁴⁹ After Pando, the *Tupamaros* increased their kidnappings, the two most famous being U.S. diplomat Dan Mittrione (suspected of being a CIA agent) and Britain's ambassador, Geoffrey Jackson. When Mittrione, a family man, was found executed several days after his "People's Trial," the public reacted with shock.

Another strategical flaw, perhaps unavoidable, involved two spectacular prison breaks in late 1970, where first 38 women and then 106 men were freed. This *acta* served to complicate the *tupamaro* military cell structure. Not only did they have to expend more resources to hide and support these escapees, but ex-prisoners inadvertently broke down the walls of clandestinity central to their organization. Their time in prison gave them a greater knowledge of *Tupamaro* secrets as well as widening the number of *companeros* they could identify and could consequently betray. Because their identities were known at this point, the rescued *companeros* had to be hidden, causing a strain on resources. Guillen himself pointed out that the dangers of a "reliance on rented houses or hideouts...[is] a major strategical error."⁵⁰ Because the *companeros* were concentrated in groups rather than as individuals, subsequent engagements were doubly risky because they simply had much more to lose. Recaptured prisoners, some of whom were highly ranked leaders, provided invaluable information (under torture) to security forces. The *Tupamaro* cells responsible for the printing

house and the "People's Prison" were betrayed.⁵¹ In 1972, Sendic was imprisoned.

An expansion of other ideological mistakes came in 1971, when the MLN-*Tupamaro* officially declared a cease-fire in order to participate in the national and presidential elections as part of the *Frente Amplio* ("Wide Front") coalition. Their revolutionary program was temporarily halted and they lent what support they could to the democratic process. It is unclear what benefits they hoped to gain from electoral efforts or even if they were serious about it. The *Frente Amplio* received only 30% of the vote in Montevideo and 18% nationally. There are those who felt that the decision to support the *Frente Amplio* and stop their activities was a "fatal mistake." The *Tupamaros* lost momentum, the military took the opportunity to build itself up, and the government further consolidated its power. As MLN strength declined, three tendencies surfaced within the organization: the reformist Sendic-led faction; another that advocated abandoning violence and joining the *Frente Amplio* and provoking change through party politics; and the pro-Soviet, Cuba-supported group that eventually found itself lamely fomenting revolution from exile.⁵³ These divisions crippled what strategical and ideological unity the MLN had enjoyed up to that point.

Some scholars theorize that the *Tupamaros* caused the eventual military coup in 1974. Their *actas* prompted a normally lifeless and politically unengaged military into the forefront of Uruguayan society. The military and police began to request more constitutional leeway of the politicians in dealing with the *Tupamaros* until they finally took it extralegally. The *Tupamaros* exposed the weakness of the government to the masses and also revealed it to the military. The corruption of the system was laid bare and the military elite began to see themselves as the only solution to a society rapidly degenerating into anarchy. In reference to the preferred *acta* of kidnappings, Eleuterio Fernandez Huidobro, an ex-*Tupamaro*, said: "we were no longer arranging anything with little kidnappings...this

had come to form a part of the Uruguayan routine. The MLN kidnaps when it wants; when it wants, it liberates....This didn't move anyone for anything."⁵⁴ Uruguayans had become used to it, and maybe a little tired of it.

By the time the military dictatorship was put in place, the MLN was, by most standards, extinct. Libertad prison held 2000 Tupamaros and sympathizers, and anyone who had not been caught had left the country or was in permanent hiding.⁵⁵ Freedom of expression was limited, the unions and universities were taken over by the military and neoliberalism was on the rise.

Many factors contributed to the appearance of the MLN-*Tupamaros* on the Uruguayan stage. The historic tradition of political hegemony by the *Colorado-Blanco* political elite meant that change would come slowly and only with the approval of the ruling elite. The industrial and agricultural financial crises of the 1950s were a shock to a culture accustomed to a relatively prosperous standard of living. Earlier attempts at change, in the

form of *Batllismo*, failed to solve the fundamental problems and injustices in Uruguayan society and may have caused the economy to stagnate. The traditional revolutionary parties, in the form of the *Partido Comunista* and *Partido Socialista*, for whatever reason, were unable to cause any meaningful change. The organizing of the UTAA by Sendic and others gave practical experience in mass movements to the future leaders of MLN. Guillen's ideas on the importance of the *acta*, as well as the Cuban *foco* example, also came at a time when radicals were becoming disillusioned with the slow pace of the traditional left. The intellectual foundation was laid where the impatient vanguard could accelerate the conditions necessary for revolution. The *Tupamaros* became proficient in the use and significance of *actas* like the one that occurred in Pando. In the end, however, this was not enough. The *actas* of the MLN-*Tupamaros* were remembered only for their audacity and style, and not as the events that prompted the Uruguayan socialist revolution they desired.

Endnotes

Foreword

(pages 1-5)

- ¹ Calhoun, Craig. *The Question of Class Struggle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. p. 206. Calhoun commenting on Marxism.
- ² Therborn, Goran. *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?*. London: Lowe and Brydone, 1978. p. 47.
- ³Ibid. p. 37.

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- ¹ Forster, E.M. "What I Believe," *Two Cheers For Democracy*. London: Edward Arnold, 1972. p. 60.
- ² Ribuffo, Leo P. "Henry Ford and The International Jew," *American Jewish History*. Vol. LXIX, No. 4, June, 1980. p. 441.
- ³ Vaughn, Robert. *Only Victims: A Study of Show Business Blacklisting*. New York: Putnam, 1972. p. 36.
- ⁴ Quoted in *Only Victims*, p. 37, from *The Trojan Horse in America* by Martin Dies (New York: Dodd Mead & Co., 1940), p. 298.
- ⁵ Vaughn, *Only Victims*, pp. 62-64.
- ⁶ Ibid. p. 49.
- ⁷ Ibid. p. 66.
- ⁸ Steinberg, Peter L. *The Great "Red Menace." United States Prosecution of American Communists, 1947-1952*. Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1984. p. 8.
- ⁹ Ibid. p. x.
- ¹⁰ Ibid. p. 45.
- ¹¹ Belfrage, Cedric. *The American Inquisition 1945-1960*. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973. pp. xiii-xiv.

¹² Navasky, Victor S. *Naming Names*. New York: The Viking Press, 1980. p. 28.

¹³ Ibid. p. xii.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Schneir, Walter and Miriam. *Invitation to an Inquest*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965. pp. 309-310.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 313.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Steinberg, *The Great "Red Menace,"* p. 35.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 47.

²⁰ Dinnerstein, Leonard. "Anti-Semitism Exposed and Attacked, 1945-1950." *American Jewish History*, Vol. 71, September 1981. p. 135.

²¹ Ibid., p. 147.

²² Schneir. *Invitation to an Inquest*, p. 2.

²³ Quoted in Navasky, *Naming Names*, p. 114.

²⁴ Schneir, *Invitation to an Inquest*, p. 1.

²⁵ Belfrage, *American Inquisition*, p. 192.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *Time Magazine*, June 29, 1953. p. 26.

²⁸ Belfrage, *American Inquisition*, p. 192.

²⁹ Stanley, Alessandra. "Ex-KGB agent defends U.S. pair. Rosenberg execution unjust, colonel says." Report from *The New York Times*, reprinted in *The Denver Post*, February 18, 1997. p. 8A.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ An argument can be made that the communist agenda could well be advanced through the medium of motion pictures. However, in 1947 there were far more movies made with a military (World War II) agenda than with a social agenda. It must be also be kept in mind that, in 1947, television was not yet a part of the formula.

³² Goodman, Walter. *The Committee*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1964. p. 215.

- ³³ Navasky, *Naming Names*, p. 109.
- ³⁴ The Screen Writers' Guild (SWG) was founded by John Howard Lawson in 1933. In a 1938 California Supreme Court case, the SWG successfully established that screenwriters were labor and had a right to unionize. After winning their case, they petitioned the National Labor Relations Board to allow them to vote to leave the Screen Playwrights association, which was studio controlled. The membership vote passed 265 to 57. Screen actors and directors followed suite.
- ³⁵ Vaughn, *Only Victims*, p. 111.
- ³⁶ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings Regarding the Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry, Eightieth Congress, First Session, 1947. pp. 167-168. (Hereinafter referred to as Motion Picture Hearings).
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 262.
- ³⁸ Johnson, Ted. "Little union unity on subject of Commies," *Variety*, September 9-15, 1996. p. 124.
- ³⁹ Motion Picture Hearings, p. 290.
- ⁴⁰ Vaughn, *Only Victims*, p. 95.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 96.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- ⁴³ *Variety*, September 9-15, 1996, p. 24.
- ⁴⁴ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Un-American Activities, Eightieth Congress, Second Session, Report. December 31, 1948. p. 9.
- ⁴⁵ Navasky, *Naming Names*, p. 83.
- ⁴⁶ Vaughn, *Only Victims*, pp. 108-109.
- ⁴⁷ Klady, Leonard. "Pinko stinko, 50 years later." *Variety*, September 9-15, 1996. p. 122.
- ⁴⁸ List compiled from various articles published in *Variety* and *Cineaste*.
- ⁴⁹ Robb, David. "Naming the Right Names: Amending the Hollywood Blacklist." *Cineaste*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1996. p. 28.

⁵⁰ Lampell, Millard. "I think I should mention I was Blacklisted." *The New York Times*, August 21, 1966. D13.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁵² Navasky, *Naming Names*, p. 34.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 143.

⁵⁴ Vaughn, *Only Victims*, p. 277.

⁵⁵ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Un-American Activities, Communist Infiltration of Hollywood Motion-Picture Industry, Hearings Eighty-second Congress, First Session, 1951, Part I. p. 55.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Vaughn, *Only Victims*, pp. 271-275.

⁵⁹ *Cineaste*, pp. 24-26.

⁶⁰ Farah, Joseph. "The Hollywood 10: The Real Blacklist." *National Review*, October 27, 1989. p. 42.

⁶¹ *National Review*, p. 43.

Voices From the Past

(pages 23-31)

PHILIP CARTWRIGHT

¹ Wealthy, white, usually Protestant, males made up the majority of the large following of Social Darwinism in America. Philip Cartwright, a successful white male in his early midlife during the 1880s, is a fictional character representing this majority.

² The character is referring to American society.

³ Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics* (New York: Robert Schalkenback Foundation, 1954) 416. First published in 1850.

⁴ This is a reference to the Civil War.

⁵ He is referring to people who were sympathetic to the disadvantages black people had.

⁶ William Graham Sumner, *Social Darwinism: Selected Essays of William Graham Sumner* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963) 163.

⁷ The character is referring to a session that he sat in on when he was a young man. At the time, Sumner's lectures were quite popular.

⁸ Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Boston: Beacon Press, (1955) 57.

⁹ Hofstadter 46.

¹⁰ This refers to failed businesses or businesses in danger of failing.

¹¹ Sumner 160.

¹² Cartwright is assuming that he is among the fittest.

¹³ ie. working class, blacks, etc.

¹⁴ Hofstadter 58.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁸ Andrew Carnegie, *The Gospel of Wealth* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1962) 18.

¹⁹ Hofstadter 41.

²⁰ He is referring to wealthy, white males.

²¹ Hofstadter 62.

²² Ibid., p. 62.

²³ Carnegie 18.

²⁴ Hofstadter 41.

²⁵ Carnegie 19-23.

²⁶ He is referring to the select group as wealthy businesses.

²⁷ Carnegie 23.

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¹ Roger Daniels, *Coming To America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990) 108.

² Hofstadter 171-72.

³ Brian Tierney, Donald Kagan and L. Pearce Williams, eds., *Social Darwinism:*

Law of Nature or Justification of Repression? (New York: Random House, Inc., 1977) 22.

⁴ Ibid., p. 23.

⁵ Ibid., p. 29.

⁶ Ibid., p. 28.

⁷ Hofstadter 203.

⁸ Ibid., p. 171.

⁹ Robert C. Bannister, *Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought* (Philadelphia: Temple Press, 1979) 246-47.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 250.

¹¹ *Encarta*, computer software, Microsoft Corporation, 1997, Windows 95, CD-ROM.

¹² Daniels 295.

¹³ Ibid., p. 302.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 302.

¹⁵ *Encarta*.

Una Acta Tupamara

pages 35-58

The narrative of the events in Pando, Uruguay on October 8, 1969 illustrates the nature, ideology and structure of the *Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional-Tupamaro*. The account has been injected with discussion of the various factors that contributed to the rise and fall of the *Tupamaros*. The Pando story has been gathered from a variety of sources, the two most notable being *Actas Tupamaras* by the MLN-*Tupamaros* themselves and *The Tupamaro Guerrillas* by Maria Esther Gilio, an Uruguayan journalist and contemporary of the movement.

² Mauricio Rosencof, *La rebellion de los caneros* (Montevideo: Ed. Aportes, 1969) 94.

³ Ibid., 95.

⁴ In 1780-1781, a descendent of the Incan royalty named Tupac Amaru staged a rebellion against Spanish rule of his native Peru. Despite some initial success, Tupac Amaru was defeated, captured and ceremoniously dismembered by the Spaniards.

- ¹ Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America; Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent* (New York/London: Monthly Review Press) 283.
- ² *Ibid.*, 131.
- ³ *Ibid.*, 132.
- ⁴ Michael Perl, *Guide to the Political Parties of South America* (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1973) 474. Any work on Batllismo will emphasize similar characteristics. These particular points were largely gleaned from the chapter on Uruguay consisting of pp. 469-516.
- Jenny Pearce, *Latin American Bureau Special Brief; Uruguay: General Rules* (Great Britain: Latin American Bureau, 1980) 20.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 23, 26.
- ⁷ *Milico* is a derisive term for police or military. It loosely translates as "cop" or "copper," but may have a more malicious connotation.
- ⁸ Jenny Pearce, 25.
- ⁹ Michael Perl, 497.
- ¹⁰ Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1957) 136-137.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 143-144.
- ¹² Michael Perl, 502-503.
- ¹³ Jenny Pearce, 21.
- ¹⁴ Major Carlos Wilson, *The Tupamaros; The Unmentionables* (Boston: Branden Press, 1974) 90.
- ¹⁵ Robert J. Alexander, 147.
- ¹⁶ Sheldon B. Liss, *Marxist Thought in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 192.
- ¹⁷ From Puno Final, Santiago de Chile, June 2, 1968. Document appears in Omar Costa, *Los Tupamaros* (Mexico: Coleccion Ancho Mundo 34, Ediciones Era, 1971) 66.
- ¹⁸ Omar Costa, *Los Tupamaros* (Mexico: Coleccion Ancho Mundo 34, Ediciones Era, 1971) 65-66.
- ¹⁹ Major Carlos Wilson, 62-63.
- ²⁰ Max Alphonse, *Tupamaros; A Pattern for Urban Guerilla Warfare in Latin America* (The Hague, Netherlands: International Documentation and Information Centre, 1970) 1.
- ²¹ Omar Costa, 63.
- ²² The *Granma* was the name of the ship that carried Fidel Castro and his revolutionary compatriots from Mexico to Cuba in 1957. Quoted from Punta Final, Omar Costa, 66.
- ²³ Although known mainly as *los Tupamaros*, the official name of the revolutionary group is the National Liberation Movement-Tupamaro.
- ²⁴ Arturo C. Porzecanski, Introduction, *Uruguay's Tupamaros; The Urban Guerilla* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1973) x.
- ²⁵ Omar Costa, 62.
- ²⁶ Jenny Pearce, 29.
- ²⁷ Major Carlos Wilson, 29.
- ²⁸ Due to the fact that very few people in Uruguay could afford the costs of a telephone, the UTE played an important role. It was the center from which anyone who needed to use a telephone could come and use one of the various pay phones in the lobby. Most of the communications to and from the city probably came through the UTE at some point in time. Rendering the UTE inoperable could cut Pando off from the outside world.
- ²⁹ Entrevista a Abraham Guillen originally appeared in *Tupamaros; Fracaso del Che?* by Carlos Anzares and Jaime E. Canas. Omar Costa, 149.
- ³⁰ Shelton B. Liss, 201.
- ³¹ Donald C. Hodges, ed. and trans., *Philosophy of the Urban Guerilla; The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen* (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1973) 257.

³⁷ Guillen's theories appear in many sources. However, the stages used here were summarized by Edy Kaufman, *Uruguay in Transition; From Civilian to Military Rule* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979) 36.

³⁸ Luis E. Aguilar, ed., *Marxism in Latin America*, Revised Edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978) 279-280.

³⁹ There are a variety of sources that deal with *Tupamaro* ideology and strategies. This is a brief summary of information found in *The Tupamaro Guerillas* by Maria Esther Gilio, original MLN documents reprinted in *Los Tupamaros* by Omar Costa, *Uruguay's Tupamaros; The Urban Guerilla* by Arturo C. Porzecanski and Martin Weinstein's *Uruguay; The Politics of Failure*.

⁴⁰ Luis Costa Bonino, *Crisis de los Partidos Tradicionales y Movimiento Revolucionario en el Uruguay* (Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Temas de Siglo XX #2, 1985) 56.

⁴¹ Sheldon B. Liss, 204.

⁴² This document appears in many forms in many different publications. It appears to have root in some sort of interview, although it may be Socratic fabrication by the *Tupamaros* themselves. This particular version and translation comes from Major Carlos Wilson, *The Tupamaros; The Unmentionables*, 127.

⁴³ This phrase appears repeatedly in the literature disseminated by the PC about the MLN-*Tupamaros*.

⁴⁴ Major Carlos Wilson, 89.

⁴⁵ Document appears in Omar Costa, 202-203.

⁴⁶ ". . . fue muerto al tirotearse con la policia." This phrase was used so often by police that it achieved absurd proportions. Most assumed the prisoner had probably been murdered after surrendering.

⁴⁷ Maria Esther Gilio, *The Tupamaro Guerillas* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973) 150.

⁴⁸ Luis E. Aguilar, 278.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 279.

⁵⁰ Donald C. Hodges, 264.

⁵¹ Edy Kaufman, 35.

⁵² Martin Weinstein, *Uruguay; Democracy at the Crossroads* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988) 127.

⁵³ Ronaldo Munck, *Latin America; The Transition to Democracy* (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1989) 170.

⁵⁴ Marta Harnecker, *Frente Amplio; Los Desafios de una Izquierda Legal* (Montevideo: La Republica, 1991) 21.

⁵⁵ Edy Kaufman, 36.

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