

PREPARED

Colorado

Division

of

EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT

EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION

Bill OWENS
GOVERNOR

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EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT NEWS

Colorado's EMAC

by Dick Vnuk, EMAC Coordinator, CDEM

Last year about this time I wrote an article for *Prepared* about the 24 emergency management professionals we deployed to Florida and Alabama to support the hurricane response and recovery efforts. It was the first time large numbers of responders were deployed to a disaster through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) Agreement. A year ago, Colorado's emergency response community knew little about the EMAC process, but realized the enormous benefits to be gained by bringing back to Colorado experience only large-scale disasters can offer. EMAC worked extremely well and at the end of my last article, I predicted we would see many more large scale deployments through the process.

In response to the 2005 hurricanes in Louisiana and Mississippi, Colorado deployed 126 emergency managers, law enforcement, firefighters, and EMS personnel. We sent out over 1,000 Air and Army National Guard men and women. In 2004, a little over 800 people deployed through EMAC nationally. Over 60,000 deployed in response to the 2005 hurricanes. As in the past, these people brought back invaluable experience and Colorado is better prepared because of their sacrifices.

Colorado responded instantly when the first requests came in for assistance. The first two teams we dispatched were asked to set up a staging area base camp outside the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center upon arriving in Baton Rouge. At the same time, we had Coloradans working in the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) staffing the EMAC Desk. The infrastructure of the state was so shattered, our people found themselves advising Louisiana personnel on how to establish a National Incident Management System (NIMS) organization in order to deal with the disaster.

The Colorado team who established the base camp worked 24/7 to get it up and running. They did not let the fatigue damage their sense of humor. They jokingly named it "Camp Colorado." Little did they realize it would bear that name throughout the disaster response and become known as Camp Colorado nationwide.

The new MACC / State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated to support the EMAC process. Around the clock, staff rotated in to help satisfy requests coming in from the beleaguered states. Some were sent to Louisiana to staff the EMAC desks there and one individual deployed to FEMA Headquarters in D.C. to staff the national EMAC desk. The MACC also supported a totally different operation while we were running EMAC. In order to deal with the hundreds of evacuees the Governor volunteered to help, an ICS/ NIMS organization (called Operations Safe Haven) was pulled together from state and local agencies to provide support.

EMAC is here to stay. It is an efficient and effective way to respond to disasters. It is a great vehicle to provide our personnel needed experience on large disasters. The first field-deliverable EMAC training course was completed and Colorado was the first state to host the course earlier this year. We plan to use those trained through this course to deliver training throughout the state, further expanding Colorado's position as a key EMAC partner.



END OF AN GREAT AMERICAN ERA

Ever ask yourself “What do I want to do when I grow up?” Well, after working at a weekly newspaper and print shop during high school, and a weekly newspaper during college, it would seem someone with a journalism degree would continue in that field. But when the Army beckons with airplanes and parachutes and helicopters for fun, travel and adventure, it does tend to entice one away from a calmer pursuit. Thirty years later when I was retiring from active duty and still didn’t know what I wanted to do, General France and Governor Romer offered me the opportunity to “soldier on” as commander of the Colorado Army National Guard, and I accepted.

After a year of retirement and being an M-Day (part-time) soldier, Ted Medley and Les Kennedy talked with me about a six month consultant job at then Office of Emergency Management to conduct an operational assessment and participate in a major Rocky Flats exercise. That led to a permanent job and subsequently the director’s position.

What has made this job so enjoyable has been making friends and building partnerships with local, state and federal officials, and first responders from all disciplines; and with business and industry. Together, we have made significant contributions to emergency management in Colorado. We were forward-looking when we requested and funded visits for the team from Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) to conduct an equipment and training needs assessment, and a series of train-the-trainer courses in preparation for the “Denver Summit of the Eight.” The subsequent passage of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation tasked the Department of Defense with conducting a Weapons of Mass Destruction needs assessment in 120 U.S. cities and provided funding for designated cities for planning, training and exercises. The template that SBCCOM used for these assessments was the one they developed based on what they had learned in going through our assessment.

Our local, state and federal partnerships have enabled us to provide timely and effective assistance to Colorado communities during response and recovery operations for six presidential disaster declarations and hundreds of local declarations, and each of them has been unique. And each disaster, special event preparation (Vail ’99) and exercise (TOPOFF 2000, Vail 05) allows us to validate plans and train participants for the next one.

Our new state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center/Multi-Agency Coordination Center provided the facility and tools necessary to efficiently and effectively support the deployment of Coloradans to the Gulf Coast under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and to coordinate the reception, credentialing and housing of hurricane evacuees.

After much soul searching and lengthy discussions with my wife, Jan, I filed a retirement application with PERA to be effective December 1, 2005. It has been a good run! But I have finally decided that I have grown up and want to spend the rest of my life with the lovely Mrs. Grier.



I have had the honor of serving two administrations during my ten years as director, and have acted as the Governor’s Authorized Representative for six of the 15 presidential disaster declarations received by Colorado since 1953, when Congress first gave presidents the authority to decide when federal assistance should be provided. That job was made much easier by each of you professional emergency managers and first responders, elected and appointed public officials, and private sector partners, all of whom I consider friends and colleagues. I owe the success that I have enjoyed in DEM to all of you and I want you to know that I have the utmost respect and admiration for each of you.

—Tommy F. Grier, Jr.

MESSAGE FROM THE CEMA PRESIDENT

By Steve Blois CO-CEM

Paradigm Shift Again

Definition - Paradigm shift: The often radical change of predominantly accepted world view, i.e., Aristotlan versus Copernican astronomy, flat world versus round world perception.

Who would have thought that while we were at last year's Governor's Conference on Emergency Management learning new skills, meeting new people, and renewing old friendships, a history-making storm was on the horizon. We had breathed a sigh of relief on surviving a Colorado summer with a minimum of wildfire events, when an Atlantic Ocean tropical depression earned the name Katrina.

While we should have been enjoying a beautiful Colorado fall, some of our own first responders, National Guard, and emergency managers responded to the crippled Gulf area. We now pause and look at the Gulf Coast and the destruction wrought there and realize that a paradigm shift has occurred again. Emergency managers are used to paradigm shifts.

When the terrorist attacks were perpetrated on September 11, 2001, it became apparent that there existed a group of people who not only hated our society, but were working hard to destroy it. Emergency managers suddenly had to deal with counterterrorism and Homeland Security, as well as other man-made and natural disasters. The emergency manager adapted and met the adjusted reality of a post 9-11 world. The world of emergency management is never static, though.

In a post-Katrina world, the emergency manager is under close scrutiny. Appropriate levels of experience, education, and other background credentials are expected by the public and elected officials. We have all seen what can come to pass when a delayed or inappropriate response by emergency professionals occurs. We, as a group have to come to the realization that our profession is expected to "talk the talk and walk the walk." Continuing education and certification is one way to "walk the walk." I was proud to award additional CEMA Certifications this past year. It is good to know emergency managers across Colorado realize that just because it says Emergency Manager on the office door, it doesn't mean they are professional emergency managers. The profession of emergency management is as much an art as it is a science. Both approaches have to be studied as well as practiced.

As I have said before, there are now five phases to emergency management. Mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and continuing education comprise modern integrated emergency management. In this post-Katrina world, I sincerely hope others in our profession feel the same way. The human pain and suffering, as well as the sheer physical damage produced by disasters like Katrina is horrific enough, but add to the formula an inappropriate response borne from lack of professional preparation and it is not surprising the public demands accountability. Professional emergency managers should never say "why?" to certification but "why not?"

LOCAL TO NATIONAL

By Kerry Kimble, CDEM Operations Manager

Typically, a report of a possible bomb does not draw much attention beyond the local jurisdiction. However, in today's world of telecommunications, a small event can escalate in perceived importance rather quickly. Two such events happened in Colorado on November 10, 2005.

The first was in Arvada where an individual was seen running from a car parked near City Hall. A passerby noticed this suspicious activity and rightfully reported it to the police. This occurred at approximately 7 a.m. A cursory inspection of the vehicle revealed a propane tank, resulting in the precautionary measure of calling in the county bomb squad. As surrounding buildings were being evacuated and the scene secured, local media arrived. By 9:16 a.m., CNN was broadcasting live pictures of the bomb technicians approaching the vehicle. Fortunately, no bomb was discovered.

The second incident occurred in Boulder following a chemical explosion at a local plant at approximately 8:30 a.m. Ten workers were treated at a local hospital and a gas plume forced about 150 workers through decontamination. A state highway was temporarily closed.

But that was not the end of the story. By 9:55 a.m. the Division of Emergency Management received the first call from the US Department of Transportation Crisis Center, followed at 10:45 a.m. by the Homeland Security Operations Center, 11:00 a.m. by the US Postal Service, and finally at 3:50p.m. by the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Center.

The bottom-line: Be prepared. When your agencies respond to any incident, it can attract national attention quickly in this age of "new media."

NORTHEAST COLORADO'S LOSS OF AN EMERGENCY MANAGER

*By Kevin Kuretich,
CDEM Field Manager*

Richard Dean Stevens
(December 5, 1931
- January 12, 2006)



I'd like to say a few words of tribute to this special man, from me and on behalf of other emergency managers close to him.

When we heard the news of Dean's death, a mutual friend and colleague noted poignantly that Dean was a man who was non-judgemental. Dean accepted people largely for what they were and for who they were. Dean was a man without prejudice. His many friendships crossed the barriers of public position and educational background.

His spirit, his generosity, and his warmth reached through barriers of race and cultural background. They reached through the barriers of age and generation. Everyone was welcomed into Dean's circle of friends and what a multi-regional, multi-talented, and multi-generational circle of friends it is.

What's more, Dean worked eagerly to bring these people from different disciplines together. To me, he seemed happiest when he'd organized a gathering of the most diverse first responders one could imagine. If Dean couldn't remake the world outside to his liking, he would make it so in his own backyard.

He was a man without prejudice. This was not just a matter of principle for Dean—not something he merely theorized in his emergency management planning and his ideas. It was his instinct, his very nature. Because when we stop to think about it, Dean's preoccupation in life was people. He was always introducing people to people. Always saying you must meet so and so; and with his extraordinary sense of public responsibility, by and large you did get to meet them. How many people have we met through Dean Stevens efforts to share?

Dean Stevens was among the most experienced emergency managers I have ever known.

He will be greatly missed at the "Round Table" of the Northeast Emergency Managers. However, his legacy stands forever throughout Sedgwick County and the plains of Northeast Colorado.

Thank you, Dean, for your incredible contributions to emergency management and to Colorado.

Richard Dean Stevens of Julesburg, Colorado was born December 5, 1931 to Virgil Fay and Alberta Georgia (Call) Stevens in Benkelman, Nebraska, one of six children. He graduated from Burlington High School in 1950. Dean married Freda Mae Billington on January 5, 1951, in Cheyenne Wells, Colorado. To this union, four children were born.

Being a family and community-minded individual, Dean was always there for his children and grandchildren's events. He announced the Flagler football games and was in charge of the July 4th fireworks display. At various times, he served as Kit Carson County Commissioner, a member of the Flagler Town Council, Mayor of Flagler, and town manager. While in Flagler, he was a member of the Volunteer Fire Department and drove for the Flagler Ambulance Service. Following a move to Julesburg in September 1993, Dean was the Emergency Manager and Useful Public Service Coordinator for Sedgwick County. He played a big role in obtaining many grants and funds for both Kit Carson and Sedgwick counties.

Dean loved restoring antiques in general and collecting old coins but what he enjoyed most was restoring antique cars. He was especially intrigued by the Ford Model A. He, along with his son Randy, owned and operated D&D (later renamed Flagler) Antique Car Restoration from 1974 to 1979. He received several awards for his craftsmanship on restored cars over the years. Dean was co-owner of D&D Cleaners in Burlington with his brother, Dallas, and was later sole owner of D&D Cleaners in Flagler from 1960 to 1975. Dean worked alongside his brother, Norman, in Stevens Construction, building and remodeling many homes in eastern Colorado.

Dean was an avid sports fan who enjoyed playing softball, and was a Golden Gloves boxer during the time he was in the National Guard. He enjoyed hunting, bird watching and shooting blue rock. He has won numerous awards in trapshooting.

Dean is survived by his wife, Freda, and their children, Margie Ann, Randy Dean Stevens, Bart Eugene Stevens, and Kevin Lee Stevens; 10 grandchildren and eight great-grandchildren; one brother, two sisters, numerous nieces, nephews and cousins; and many friends.

Dean will be greatly missed and remembered as a loving husband, father and grandfather, and a helpful friend.

OPERATION METH LAB FTX

2005 *By Chief Paramedic Norm Rooker and LEPC Chair Jack Rowe*

Operation Meth Lab was one of two Field Training Exercises (FTX) in Ouray County planned through a Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) grant funded by the Department of Transportation. (Information on the HMEP program can be found on the Internet at www.hazmat.dot.gov/hmep.html) A second Hazmat FTX will involve a simulated propane tank leak to be scheduled sometime in late September at a site still to be determined.

Operation Meth Lab FTX was completed on Saturday, May 14th. The FTX was designed to test the law enforcement and EMS response for a methamphetamine lab that had generated a toxic gas cloud resulting in three victims.

The setting was in the kitchen area of the abandoned Ouray County Sheriff's Office and involved a chemical apparatus with chemical simulants. The "toxic cloud" was produced with a smoke-generating device. Meth labs involve the use of numerous highly toxic chemicals that can have adverse chemical and physical reactions as well as generate tremendous amounts of hazardous wastes. Over half of all meth labs in the U.S. are discovered because they blow up or have a toxic chemical event.

The scenario: The local 911-dispatch center receives a call reporting an unusual odor and cloud. Ouray PD is dispatched and the first officer on scene notes smoke coming from a doorway and enters to investigate. He is overcome by the toxic fumes and collapses just inside the doorway.

The second OPD officer on scene observes the first officer down inside the doorway and immediately calls for EMS, Hazmat, and begins to secure/cordon off the area.



OC EMS and Ouray VFD arrive on scene and stage upwind from the incident. The OPD Chief also arrives on scene and assumes the role of incident commander (IC). Ouray County Sheriff's Officers respond to provide additional manpower and law enforcement support for this incident.

An OVFD engine is dispatched to the scene and is positioned upwind of the event but not too close to the command post and decon/rehab areas. The engine, once positioned, deploys and charges a hose line upwind of the event but close enough to the door of the incident building for protection of the entry team and to initiate suppression efforts should the lab catch fire or explode. The crew on the line is in full turnout gear with SCBAs on and masks ready to be donned should the need arise for suppression efforts.

The Ouray County Hazardous Materials Medical Response Team is called along with Squad 11. The Hazmat trailer is transported to the scene where the OCEMS/OVFD combined Hazmat team suit up in Level B suits and recon the doorway and extricate the downed officer to a decontamination (decon) area where he is assessed, decontaminated and handed off to a transport ambulance crew for transport to Montrose Memorial Hospital. The officer's weapon(s) badge, radio and other law enforcement gear are secured, double bagged and handed to law enforcement for future decon.

An EMT-I is the medical team leader, and an EMT-P is the incident Safety Officer. They also suit up in level B suits with SCBAs turned on but masks not yet donned. The Decon team doubles as the Haz Mat RIT (Rapid

Intervention Team). If a need for the RIT deployment arises, the EMT-I and the EMT-P will don their masks and step in to relieve the Decon/RIT of their decon duties so they in turn may respond.

OPD details an officer to accompany the downed officer to the hospital.

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OPERATION METH LAB FTX 2005

(Continued from page 5)

Once the downed police officer is brought out and turned over to the decon team, the entry team reenters the building and surveys the fumes with OVFD's 3 gas meter, notes findings and then enters to recon the downstairs only.

They encounter two victims, one outside the kitchen and one on the floor in the kitchen in front of the lab. They assess, triage and extricate both victims outside to decon. The decon team decons both victims and hands them off to transport.

The entry team then decons each other, doffs their suits and then reports their findings to law enforcement, who secure the scene and contact the DEA per their protocol. The entry team then reports to the Rehab unit for evaluation and monitoring before being released to go back in service.

Both victims are deconned, ensuring that their belongings are placed in separate containers. The victims are triaged and one corner of the triage tag is torn off and placed in the corresponding victim's belongings to maintain chain of evidence for law enforcement. The victim found outside the kitchen turns out to be an innocent bystander, but this is not ascertained by law enforcement until the victim regains consciousness at the hospital.

Law enforcement provides officers to accompany each victim to the hospital and to stay with them until they are released or admitted into the hospital.

The FTX concludes when law enforcement is finished with debriefing the entry team, all units are deconned and all patients are "transported." A debriefing is conducted by all participants concluding with a walk through and explanation of the meth lab.

Following the walk through, participating units are released and allowed to take up and restock.

The Ouray PD Chief, as the Public Affairs Officer for the City of Ouray and the IC for this FTX, is the Public Information Officer. He notified the Plaindealer Newspaper of the FTX on Thursday, May 12th and invited them to send a reporter to the event.

The reporter(s) were allowed to observe the FTX from an observation area established for visitors invited from other area public safety agencies as well as Ouray City & County Administrators and staff to observe the FTX.

The observers were allowed to participate in the walk through and explanation.

All questions were directed to or through the Ouray PD Chief.



Some Lessons Learned:

- The need for additional personnel in the rehab unit to assist and speed up the donning, suiting up process and post incident personnel evaluation and record keeping.
- The need to train law enforcement personnel to operate in Level B or C suits in the decon area for chain of custody evidence collection and record keeping.
- Overhead and mid-level management needs additional practice working with each other and learning how to better support each other's efforts.

"The majority of men meet with failure because of their lack of persistence in creating new plans to take the place of those which fail."

—Napoleon Hill

School's Mock Disaster

A SUCCESS

By Jodi Ricker

Baca County, the Town of Walsh, and the Walsh School District held a full-scale exercise last summer with a number of county agencies participating. The exercise provided first responders and public officials first-hand experience in responding to a disaster situation at a school district.

The event was over nine months in the planning with the school district, the Town of Walsh, and Baca County's Office of Emergency Management. Initial preparations began at the end of 2004 with local agencies coming together to discuss emergency planning at the school district. Several planning meetings were held throughout the following months in order to prepare for the May tabletop exercise followed by the full-scale exercise.

The scenario was a school shooting involving disgruntled parents. Two men entered the building about thirty minutes after school started. The two men first opened fire on students in the hallway and eventually worked their way to a classroom where they held hostages. The school district immediately went into lockdown, as did two other facilities within the town of Walsh.

The Walsh Police Department, Springfield Police Department, and the Baca County Sheriff's Office formed a four man team and entered the building. Smoke, lack of lighting, and screaming students intensified the situation causing law enforcement personnel to continually concentrate on the task at hand. Within minutes, law enforcement found the hostage room, and through a small hole in a ventilation grid on the door, they were able to get both shooters under control.

After the building was searched and cleared by law enforcement, first responders were allowed into the building to provide medical care and transportation to the students and staff. While they were in the building, a small pipe bomb exploded in the chemistry lab causing secondary injuries and contamination to some first responders. This allowed for the county to use their newly acquired decontamination trailer and found it to be very adequate to meet the challenge.

Many factors were tested during the exercise, enhancing the experience for the more than 90 participants. With the use of a student actor, the exercise tested the school's lockdown procedure. A student stayed in the hallway and did not enter a classroom during the lockdown.

He then went from room to room begging to be let in. As per the school's emergency plan, no teacher opened the door for the student. A secondary test was done on the city's blockade of the surrounding streets. City crews limited access to the school premises and were tested with another set of parent actors. The actors unsuccessfully tried to talk their way through the blockade. One parent actor was in the building minutes after the shooting and was "hysterical" throughout the event. Law enforcement officials were able to contain the parent and place her out of harm's way.



All students and first responders were accounted for following the evacuation/decontamination procedure. This accountability was greatly enhanced by the school district's system of tracking students during an evacuation. First responders maintained accountability through the Incident Command System with each functional group tracking their staff throughout the exercise.

The exercise had a Senior Controller who guided the events and two Actor Controllers who worked vigorously with the student actors prior to the exercise. Seven evaluators reported on the events to local emergency management for inclusion in the After Action Report and Improvement Plan. There were also a multitude of observers from both Colorado and Kansas that ranged from local superintendents to representatives from surrounding sheriff's departments.

First responders, school, and local government officials took away many lessons from the exercise. These lessons will be used to enhance current capabilities and assess any equipment or training needs. Exercises of this type allow all parties involved to successfully train in disaster situations in an effort to be better prepared for "real" incidents.

The Baca County Office of Emergency Management would like to thank all those who made this exercise a success. Without the continual cooperation of all agencies, both public and private, local first responders would not be getting this much needed training.

TEEN SERT School EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING

*By Jack Rowe, Local
Emergency Planning
Committee Chair*

"I'M READY. ARE YOU?"

For three weeks last November, 16 members of Charles Siefken's Junior Health Class at Ridgway High School trained as Emergency Responders. These very bright and capable young people learned safe and effective responses to fire and medical emergencies in the home, school, and neighborhood. Their mentors were two of the most capable members of the Ridgway Fire Protection District, Randle Gardner and John Young, and the very talented individual who trains basic level EMTs in the county, Stephen Lance.

For the Disaster Preparedness and Fire Safety portions of the curriculum, Gardner and Young discussed the key aspects of home safety and demonstrated procedures for handling all types of utility emergencies. This included safely shutting off gas, water, and electricity in the home and responding to fires inside and outside. Typical electrical panel boxes, water and gas valves were displayed in the classroom and passed around for the students to examine.

Subsequently, students were issued hard hats and gloves and ushered outside to participate in the proper use of portable fire extinguishers on a controlled oil burn. Each student responded in expert fashion.

Students were provided the 2004 Department of Transportation Emergency Response Guidebook and discussed placarding of Hazardous Material shipments. The only hazardous materials legally transported on Highways 550 and 62 are gasoline, propane, diesel and occasionally hot asphalt. Emphasis was placed on recognizing such placarding, and its significance, when traveling on more commercial roadways and when adjacent to railways.

The first Disaster Medical Assistance segment, under the direction of Lance, gave each student the opportunity to learn about and demonstrate

a number of response and possibly life saving techniques. It was a condensed version of a First Responder course.

The initial unit covered the ABCs of medical response: Airway (breathing) control, Bleeding and Circulation (as it relates to shock). Students practiced on the Little Anne CPR mannequin to open an obstructed airway as well as positioning of the extremities and applying pressure to control bleeding. They were introduced to the "Sam" splint and its methods of application to a fractured extremity and were shown how to improvise with the use of cardboard, wood, stiff magazines, etc.

Triage is a French term meaning "to sort." The class was asked to envision a massive disaster at the school during the winter season in which snow collapsed the roofs and 250 of the 300 students present were injured to some degree. The importance of response by the uninjured, and rapid classification of the injured was emphasized.

Students were also taught how to treat burn injuries, address spinal column injuries, and recognize and treat hypothermia, altitude sickness, heat exhaustion and dehydration. Students were able to use all of the tools and techniques available to our first response community.

The class was asked to complete a survey at the end. The results indicated extreme interest in and satisfaction with the presentation. All wished that the presentation could have been expanded over a longer period of time.

It was great to work with Siefken, the instructors, and the students. I was able to secure the equipment utilized in the class with a \$6,000 Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) grant under the Department of Homeland Security.



It is hard to express how rewarding it is to be such a big part of teaching those who may be our future responders, and those who can now make a positive difference in a disaster situation in our county.

The program will be repeated with the full 9 week curriculum in the Ouray Schools in early 2006.

LARIMER COUNTY & Erik Nilsson

By Kevin Kuretich, CDEM

Talking to Larimer County's Emergency Management Director, Erik Nilsson, about doing a profile for this newsletter was, well—a blast of history and spice. Those of you who know Erik will know what I mean. Rather than try to pen his answers as I might, I have left them intact—in Erik's words. This is Erik's response, and here's his story:


Kevin, I'm certain your readers would rather not hear of the relative preponderance of the Morrison sandstone formation or a compendium of facts regarding the uplift of the Rockies (we are on our third trip in the last 200+ million years, by the way); the fact that the lower Big Thompson has Precambrian metamorphic rocks at about one billion years old interfacing with sedimentary sandstones containing shark teeth, and so on. Nor do I suppose anything on the history of the area is that compelling.

I will, however, cooperate with your format to note that Larimer County—which until the turn of the century... the 20th that is—once upon a time included Jackson County. I am pleased we don't still go all the way to the Zirkel Wilderness. Our travel times to forest fires there would be pretty ridiculous.

Currently, without Jackson County, we are at 2,640 square miles, 80% of which is mountainous. Statistically, the greatest threat has been flash flooding, with several events of great magnitude prior to the seminal disaster of our modern times. This, of course, was the Big Thompson Flood of July 31, 1976.

The most likely hazard threat is wildland fire. It is notable that until the 10,665 acre Bobcat Fire of 2000, the largest fire in our recorded history was around 2,500 acres. Since Bobcat, we have had significant forest fires of 4,500 and 9,000 acres.

So that's some of our terrain and history.



Family: I moved to Fort Collins from Omaha in September, 1966 to attend CSU and, with the exception of absences in 1971-73 to teach skiing in Aspen and from 1978-81 to attend Law School, have been in Fort Collins ever since. I married and obtained an instant family of a wife and four stepdaughters in June of 1991, just shy of my 43rd birthday. Why rush? One daughter is married and has three boys.

A favorite family member we lost—a golden retriever by the name of Tuco Benedicto Pacifico Juan Maria Ramirez—was replaced by another golden named Kima. The former name should not be unknown to aficionados of the Spaghetti Westerns of Sergio Leone. Specifically, “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly.”

As a balm to the overwhelmingly female component of the Nilsson family, we also have two Shi Tsu lap dogs named Oscar and Clio. I am responsible for both names; “Oscar,” because it is such an improbable name for a lap dog and “Clio,” in honor of the Muse of History. Which is an excellent segue into a discussion of favorite pastimes and hobbies...I am an obsessive reader of history, particularly the Civil War and World War One. But hiking, gardening, and building “stuff” in my wood shop also rate mention.

And, to conclude this section, I don't have any plans or emergency kits. I don't need them. Nothing bad will ever happen to me as my world is 100% safe. Did I note my excellent sense of humor and gift for satire? Yes, I have family plans which even include a daughter living in New York as well as a Family Emergency Kit which would last well in excess of 72 hours.

Emergency Management Background: I have been the Emergency Manager for Larimer County, officially, since June of '92. I was attracted to it because I had spent several years...all the way back to my first forest fire in 1970, in emergency response as a fire fighter, ambulance/ER employee at Poudre Valley Hospital, and member of the Larimer County Mountain Rescue Team. I practiced law briefly, but this stuff was my first love, albeit somewhat less lucrative. (Did I also mention my keen gift for understatement?)

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LARIMER COUNTY & Erik Nilsson

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My training has included the Integrated Emergency Management Course (IEMC) at EMI as well as just about every course sponsored or given by the Colorado Division of Emergency Management (CDEM), with the exception of Mass Casualty. I also have a good deal of "crossover" training from my days in Emergency Services including multiple Incident Command System (ICS) classes and Command & General Staff training at the Interagency Fire Center in Boise.

My title is Director of Emergency Management and I am full time. I have a staff of 12 people, but being an exceptionally compassionate person, I've arranged they all be on perpetual vacation. Actually, I work alone with borrowed administrative help from the Command Staff at the Sheriff's Office. The occasional emergency sees me charging to an Incident Command Post (ICP), but the job is essentially a planning, facilitating, and logistical support job for the folks in the trenches. I play Solitaire and Free Cell on my computer. I included the last line to make sure readers were actually paying attention. In fact, there is always something to do in emergency management like bringing files up to date, reviewing plans, overseeing the never ending Homeland Security grant and reporting issues, and having meetings for new exercises, new protocols, new ways of doing our jobs.

Emergency Management Questions: "Favorite" (if the word can be used in this context) historical disasters would certainly include the Lolo National Forest fire storm of 1911 which took out about three million acres. The Peshtigo Fire in 1872 in Wisconsin follows closely. This one was as bad or worse since the death toll in the latter was many hundreds. Both of those burned most of the acreage in 36-48 hours. And then there was the Great White Hurricane, featured not long ago in this newsletter's trivia contest – the Blizzard of 1888. For a great fictional description of same, consult Rolvag's "Giants in the Earth." And the Blizzard of 1949 was no slouch either.

If I could eliminate one hazard in my county, it would be flooding. The fact is, fires are beneficial to the forests, but try explaining that to someone who was just burned out of their mountain home. ("What idiot planted a forest right next to our beautiful subdivision??")

Strength in an emergency management program is fundamentally linked to how well one's principal responders get along. A weak program is where turf battles are out of control, egos massive, and distrust of motives rampant.

Any emergency management program must, therefore, assure that (and I hate this phrase, but it does have utility) "consensus building" is high on the list of essentials.

One of the threats to emergency management would be if the program manager was seduced into becoming a drone of national homeland security policy and mandates, with a consequent loss of attention to and emphasis on the clear and present dangers arising from natural hazards. Major, legitimate, and foreseeable target cities for WMD attack are excepted from that general statement.

Citizens of Larimer are best prepared for fire, at least that has been our trend over the last five years or so. They have seen first hand what a major wildfire looks like, what it can do, and what it costs. Floods are more dangerous but, for a variety of reasons and unlike fire, don't usually invoke the fear to get out of the way until it's too late. Strange as it may sound, one of the great tools for the emergency manager is fear. A complacent community is not likely to respond to outreach education, nor repetitive warnings about a hazard. We need to be able to educate the public about the reality of a threat and give them something proactive they can do for themselves.

My most interesting disaster was well before I became an emergency manager. This was working the Big Thompson Flood of 1976. It gave me an invaluable perspective for all my work in Emergency Services and Emergency Management thereafter.

The most instructive of the disasters I've worked since becoming emergency manager was the 1997 Fort Collins Flood. Bad as floods can be, fire causes me to "lose the most sleep."

The greatest threat to Colorado and her citizens? I would say growth: into the urban-wildland interface, growth of traffic, growth of suburbs into our agricultural lands, and consequent eating up of our water resources. Favorite acronym? TANSTAAFL. You'll have to "google" this.

Amusing anecdote while emergency manager: About once every month or two I get someone calling my office and launching into a tirade about how their constitutional rights have been violated...or their landlord is a robber baron...or they were arrested and they're being framed by the cops...and so on. Why? Because my office number is alternatively listed (in addition to "Emergency Management") as "Civil Defense." Civil....defense. Get it? Like in civil cases in courts, like something these people saw on television. Like a store front lawyer or "legal aid." Get it? I still don't, but they keep calling.

SEOP SELF ASSESSMENT

By Kerry Kimble, CDEM

On February 12th, the *New York Times* published a survey conducted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding state and selected cities' opinions regarding their Emergency Operation Plans. The State of Colorado participated, as well as Aurora, Colorado Springs, and Denver.

We had approximately one month to answer a series of questions about whether we felt our plans could handle a Katrina-sized incident. The survey questions were not tailored to the individual state's geography or threats. In our response, the state determined we are ready, but with qualifications. Below is a synopsis of our submission to DHS.

The State of Colorado has never experienced an incident of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina; however, collaborative planning, training, exercises, and experience with smaller-scale events have all improved local and state capacity for dealing with catastrophic incidents.

What level of capability currently exists to conduct Mass evacuations – Evacuation is primarily a local responsibility, but the state would provide assistance in large-scale incidents involving multiple jurisdictions. When needed, the state would coordinate assistance from a variety of state agencies and volunteer organizations. Some mitigating factors of a mass evacuation include the physical location of the incident and the timeframe of the incident. During the winter months, eastern plains and mountain highways may be closed, thus preventing nearby community response and support.

Evacuation plans lend themselves to predictable events having adequate warning time. All other events are situation dependent, requiring evacuation or shelter-in-place decisions based on the type of hazard. Effective evacuation plans should be scaled based on at-risk population. They include trigger points, pre-designated routes, and timelines. Many of Colorado's emergencies are unpredictable with little or no warning time. Special need populations, such as assisted living facilities and nursing homes, still need to be identified.

What actions are being taken to fully address requirements for populations with special needs, particularly persons with disabilities? One of the items that both locals and the State have encouraged is neighbors helping neighbors. Again, as the situation dictates, the State Emergency Operations Center/ MultiAgency Coordination Center (SEOC/MACC) will be activated to support incident command.

As the situation exceeds the capabilities of the local jurisdiction and/or county, requests for additional support will be forwarded to the State Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) and passed to the appropriate state agency for action. If the request cannot be met with State resources, it will be sent to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Revisions to the State Emergency Operations Plan (SEOP) will address measures for assisting local jurisdictions in the care of citizens with special needs.

What actions are being taken to ensure prompt evacuation of patients (ambulatory and non-ambulatory) from health care or other facilities? The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment is capable of accessing bed space available across the state using the EMSsystems computer program.

What actions are being taken to ensure prompt augmentation of response resources (i.e., law enforcement) following a catastrophic event? Following our lessons learned through EMAC support to the Gulf Coast in 2005, we are engaging professional organizations like the County Sheriffs of Colorado, Inc. and Colorado Association of Chiefs of Police to gain quicker access to these resources. An element of this reaching out will take place during the 2006 revision of the SEOP. DEM is also assisting with the implementation of the Resource Ordering and Status System (ROSS).

What actions are being taken to ensure delivery networks for critical services and supplies / products are adequate to meet the increased demand in a catastrophic event? The state and local governments have done a substantial amount of work towards implementing a seamless, interoperable communications system. In addition to requiring regional communications plans, the state, through other state grant programs, has funded most of the infrastructure needed for the Digital Trunked Radio System (800 MHz). However, even with the completion of the infrastructure, substantial needs for subscriber units and system updates at the state and local levels remain. Measures for coordinating other state resources are outlined in the SEOP.

“Being busy does not always mean real work. The object of all work is production or accomplishment and to either of these ends there must be forethought, system, planning, intelligence, and honest purpose, as well as perspiration. Seeming to do is not doing.”
—Thomas Alva Edison

VIRTUAL SNOW DRAWS A CROWD

By Matt Hildner,
Montrose Daily Press

While Montrose awoke to a dusting of snow January 26, local, state, and federal officials were trying to cope with record snowfall in the confines of a Montrose Memorial Hospital conference room.

Nearly 65 people, representing 15 government and volunteer organizations tested their disaster plans against a virtual storm that blanketed the Uncompahgre Valley.

Officials dealt with conditions that included 18 inches of pre-existing snow and a forecast for severe cold, 25 mile per hour winds and two feet more of snow in a 24-hour period.

Representatives from the City of Montrose, Montrose County, the hospital, and other organizations started planning for the exercise in the fall, according to Robyn Funk, the county's emergency management coordinator. Funk said a report summarizing the main lessons learned from the exercise should be completed within a month's time.

Steve Denney of the Colorado Division of Emergency Management who walked the groups through their responses, was pleased with the turnout.

"Everyone we're going to need to coordinate with is in this room," he said.

He said that meeting and hashing out the details of the local response would guard against what happened to emergency officials in the South following Hurricane Katrina.

"You folks should not put yourself in that position," Denney said.

Officials started the exercise with a warning from the National Weather Service about pending conditions and recapped the protocol for getting information from the agency.

The early focus of the exercise centered on the response from the Montrose County Re-1J School District and how its decision to release students on snow days might affect other services.

By the time eight inches of snow had fallen in the mid-afternoon of the imaginary day, Denney asks all the county and municipal officials if anyone is on the verge of declaring an emergency.

"You're declaring an emergency for two reasons: resource support and financial support," Denney said.

Agencies were also trying to get a handle on how they would get staff members in, given the worsening road conditions.

Montrose County Commissioner Allan Belt wanted to make the communication lines a little more open by proposing the establishment of a joint operations center, where agency officials with decision making powers could operate in concert.

"I would be more comfortable if we already had our heads together," he said.

After 16 inches of new snow had fallen by 6 p.m., Denney was searching for new scenarios to throw at the group. He warned that in a 1997 blizzard that struck the Front Range and the eastern plains many local officials got stranded themselves.

"Local government service went down rapidly," he said.

Jeff Precup, an airport operations manager at Montrose Regional Airport, worked at the Jefferson County Airport during the '97 storm and warned officials to keep from overextending their staffs.

"Relay to your staff not to do anything too foolish," he said.

Montrose Police Chief Tom Chinn intervened to remind the group that planning could help them avoid any abandonment issues like the ones suffered by the New Orleans Police Department in the wake of Katrina.

"We all ought to have a plan for our families and our homes," he said.

Bob Pistor, chief of the Montrose Fire Protection District, said firefighters' families would be brought into the station, while the county said it would set up facilities for its employees at the Montrose County Fairgrounds.

At this time officials also started looking at supply logistics. The hospital was looking into extra fuel for its generators, in case its emergency supplier couldn't make deliveries.

As the meeting came to a close, Denney warned the group that they needed to make allowances in their plan for post-disaster work like clean up and dealing with budget impacts.

"Those recovery issues are huge," Denney said. "You don't just disband the group."

BENT COUNTY Full-SCALE EXERCISE

By Chad Ray, CDEM
Field Manager

On December 17, 2005, the Bent County Division of Emergency Management and Corrections Corporation of America conducted a full-scale exercise in the City of Las Animas. The exercise involved a terrorist-driven anhydrous ammonia tanker exploding in front of the gates of the correctional facility.

The exercise kicked off at 4:00 p.m. and went on under the cover of darkness in response to the incident, which involved 19 victims. The scenario not only tested the City of Las Animas and Bent County's response, but also the regional response from first responders and area hospitals. The closest hospital is in La Junta, some 20 miles away. This showed the critical need for triage of the victims and prioritization for transport to the different facilities.




Since the incident involved numerous State and local agencies, a decision was made to use the 800 MHz Southeast Region mutual aid channels M9-M12 to communicate, which helped raise participants' awareness of the capabilities of the system with an expanded dispatch.

As the incident evolved, a Unified Command Structure was established along with an identifiable Command Post to assess the situation. NIMS-ICS protocols were used to identify additional resources needed from both the state and federal agencies. Additional law enforcement security teams and an FBI terrorist task force team were ordered directly from the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) / State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) via 800 MHz radios. The SEOC communications facility monitored the exercise from the Regional Mutual Aid Channels, which provided an opportunity to establish communications from a local command post to the State to order resources and facilitate situational awareness.

9/11 A FINANCIAL BOON TO PUEBLO EMERGENCY OFFICE

By Margie Wood, The Pueblo Chieftain

The Pueblo County Department of Emergency Management, which had its origin in fears of the bomb during the Cold War, has had a big injection of funds in the days since 9/11 because of worries of global terrorism.



Chieftain Photo/Bryan Kelsen

The department stays busy year-round, trying to prepare Pueblos for a full range of hazards that might occur - from fire to flood to hazardous materials and, yes, even acts of terrorism.

Steve Douglas, director of the department since 1988, came to Pueblo as a county planner with some experience as a firefighter and ambulance driver. As a planner, he wrote the county's comments on congressional legislation governing the demilitarization of chemical weapons stored at then-Pueblo Army Depot, plus the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program.

His boss at the time, Jim Spaccamonti, had the vision of putting both the CSEPP program and a Geographical Information System in a single agency with the Civil Defense functions, and to build a county emergency operations center.

"Timing is everything," Douglas said. "If you look at the county budget back in 1990, you'll see \$435,000 to build the emergency operations center in the basement of the Judicial Building. By March 1990, the feds said they would give us \$250,000 to remodel an existing building."

"By May 1990, when I went to the second national conference on CSEPP, the approach had changed entirely and they said, 'Show us your plans.' I came back to Pueblo and completely upgraded our plans.

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9/11 A FINANCIAL BOON TO PUEBLO EMERGENCY OFFICE

(Continued from page 13)

We ended up with \$5.4 million worth of work here, almost entirely paid for by federal funds.”

The space under the Judicial Building had been the county jail, and it still is a secure facility. Also in the basement is the sheriff’s dispatch center, which for a few years also served the Pueblo police in a combined operation.

“Our original idea on the GIS was to have one center that could combine the databases of the assessor, a topographical map and environmental information, and all those tools fit well into emergency management,” Douglas said.

As that program grew, he eventually handed it over to the county’s information technology department, although its physical home remained in the emergency operations center until after 9/11.

“We’ve been locked down here since 9/11, and the GIS needs to be accessible to people,” Douglas explained.

When the Civil Defense agency evolved to include CSEPP and the emergency operations center, the new conglomeration was called Public Safety and Operations.

“That was the wrong name for us,” Douglas said. “People were thinking law enforcement.”

The Department of Emergency Management is divided into two offices. The Office of Emergency Preparedness, headed by Karen Ashcraft, performs the old Civil Defense functions and also directs the Pueblo Emergency Response Team, a group of about 50 volunteers who help with wildland firefighting, search and rescue and medical support.

The firefighting and search/rescue operations are actually statutory responsibilities of the county sheriff, “So we do it at the sheriff’s behest,” Douglas said. “Our volunteers give thousands of hours of service every year to the people of Pueblo County. They do a great job.” A paid staffer is present every time a volunteer team is sent out.

He is proud that the fire departments around the county all practice mutual aid. “In the Mason Gulch fire last summer, we saw every department in Pueblo County helping,” he said.

Carl Ballinger is coordinator of the CSEPP program, which is almost entirely funded by the federal government.

“We have some spikes in our budget, but normally we are funded about 80 percent federal and 20 percent county money,” Douglas said. “The federal money is mostly CSEPP.”

But Douglas said he has insisted throughout the process that CSEPP money and equipment must be available for other purposes as well. It has to have a legitimate CSEPP purpose, but it can be used for other hazards rather than sitting idle awaiting an emergency at the chemical depot.

“I believe firmly that that’s in the taxpayers’ best interest,” Douglas said. “The same is true for Homeland Security funds now. The big buzzword is ‘interoperable communications.’ All that means is, when people from different agencies get on the scene to do a job, they can talk to each other.”

Between two grants recently, the department received about \$3.8 million to improve the emergency radio system - \$2.2 million from CSEPP and \$1.5 million from federal mineral/energy impact funds administered by the State Department of Local Affairs.

Douglas also is the coordinator for grants to a five-county “all hazards” consortium under Homeland Security, which has given the region about \$1 million a year the past two years. Most of that funding has gone to the outlying counties (Huerfano, Las Animas, Custer and Fremont).

“I’m hoping we can get a good amount to help the City of Pueblo move their radio program ahead when they build a new police headquarters. We’re in the process of studying all communications systems in Pueblo County and looking toward that next generation of radios,” Douglas said.

He’s also looking forward to delivery of a 40-foot-long truck carrying a mobile command unit, which is being built now and should be finished early next year. It will be titled to Pueblo County but will be available for all hazards in the five counties - fires, floods or other storms, searches or hazardous material incidents.

Between the actual emergencies and equipment acquisition process, Douglas and his crew try to keep the planning process updated.

“But what makes it interesting is watching how this community responds to real-world events,” he said. “We could have said ‘no’ to Katrina victims, but we didn’t. A lot of different agencies helped, but it was the Posada homeless shelter who raised their hands and said ‘We can take a lead role in that.’

“That’s the piece I love about this job, watching how folks stretch to help each other.”

NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING GUIDELINES

The National Incident management System (NIMS) authorized by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-5) establishes standard incident management processes, protocols, and procedures so all responders can work together more effectively.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita showed how critical it is for all levels of government to come together to achieve a coordinated, consistent, and efficient incident response. This seamless coordination in emergency operations is vital and is based on common incident management doctrine — NIMS.

PERSONNEL	REQUIRED TRAINING
<p><i>Entry level first responders & disaster workers</i></p> <p>Federal/State/Local/Tribal/Private Sector & Non-governmental personnel to include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency Medical Service personnel • Firefighters • Hospital staff • Law Enforcement personnel • Public Health personnel • Public Works/Utility personnel • Skilled Support Personnel • Other emergency management response, support, volunteer personnel at all levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FEMA IS-700: NIMS, An Introduction • ICS-100: Introduction to ICS or equivalent
<p><i>First line supervisors</i></p> <p>Federal/State/Local/Tribal/Private Sector & Non-governmental personnel to include:</p> <p>Single resource leaders, field supervisors, and other emergency management/response personnel that require a higher level of ICS/NIMS Training.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FEMA IS-700: NIMS, An Introduction • ICS-100: Introduction to ICS or equivalent • ICS-200: Basic ICS or equivalent
<p><i>Middle management</i></p> <p>Federal/State/Local/Tribal/Private Sector & Non-governmental personnel to include:</p> <p>Strike team leaders, task force leaders, unit leaders, division/group supervisors, branch directors, and multi-agency coordination system/emergency operations center staff.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FEMA IS-700: NIMS, An Introduction • FEMA IS-800: National Response Plan (NRP), An Introduction* • ICS-100: Introduction to ICS or equivalent • ICS-200: Basic ICS or equivalent • <i>ICS-300: Intermediate ICS or equivalent (FY07 Requirement)</i>
<p><i>Command and general staff</i></p> <p>Federal/State/Local/Tribal/Private Sector & Non-governmental personnel to include:</p> <p>Select department heads with multi-agency coordination system responsibilities, area commanders, emergency managers, and multi-agency coordination system/emergency operations center managers.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FEMA IS-700: NIMS, An Introduction • FEMA IS-800: National Response Plan (NRP), An Introduction • ICS-100: Introduction to ICS or equivalent • ICS-200: Basic ICS or equivalent • <i>ICS-300: Intermediate ICS or equivalent (FY07 Requirement)</i> • <i>ICS-400: Advanced ICS or equivalent (FY07 Requirement)</i>

METH LABS - COLORADO CLEANUP MANDATE

By Timothy R. Gablehouse

Over the past two years the General Assembly has created a detailed statutory framework governing how property owners must deal with even suspected meth labs. Under this statutory authority, the Colorado Board of Health has adopted regulations that set a cleanup standard for meth labs and, more importantly, the process and procedure under which meth labs must be sampled and cleaned. Cities, counties and local health departments have authority to add to these requirements and create permitting and other programs to suit their needs. As many have, it is always critical to check for additional local requirements.

This is a mandatory process and failure to comply can have serious civil and even criminal ramifications. Once a property owner learns that a meth or other drug lab possibly is or was present on their property, several statutory obligations arise:

- The property must be secured against entry by people without hazardous materials training until it's sampled to determine the need for cleanup.
- The property owner or management company must evaluate whether the property exceeds the state cleanup standard and, if so, it must be cleaned or demolished.
- By definition these properties are a public nuisance and are subject to all local requirements for abatement of nuisances.

While these are rigorous requirements, there is a benefit to compliance with the regulatory cleanup process. Once a property owner has an industrial hygienist certify that the cleanup procedures have been met, the property owner is immune from suit by subsequent occupants or neighbors for health problems. Property damage suits and other causes of action would appear still to be available to subsequent occupants.

Property owners and management companies face potential liabilities in these situations from a variety of quarters. Ranging from negligence to property damage, claims may and have been brought by the occupants of neighboring units and the owners of personal property that has been contaminated. As it is not uncommon for public health or building departments to mark neighboring units as unfit for occupancy, property owners and management companies must act quickly to avoid substantial claims from those who allege negligence in allowing the meth lab to exist.

Personal property inside a meth lab is the responsibility of the owner of the personal property. A property owner who is trying to clean the property may dispose of abandoned personal property - a situation that is typical if the meth lab was busted by law enforcement and cooks arrested. In the case where the meth lab is not identified until a new tenant is in the space, the same rule applies. This does not mean, however, that the new tenant is without claims against the landlord for all costs of having the property cleaned.

The public policy behind these strict requirements is based upon the extreme hazard these labs present. Meth labs are simple to create and very dangerous to operate. The equipment necessary is readily available from a variety of locations. The ingredients are also fairly easy to obtain and most are common products. Unfortunately these ingredients are dangerous if not handled properly. These dangerous properties are magnified when the ingredients are combined in the presence of heat and open flame.

The people operating these labs are not typically experts in chemistry. They are neither terribly careful nor precise. Frequently they are using drugs while running their labs. Taken together these factors form a recipe for disaster. Fire and explosion are not an infrequent result. Even if run without a disaster we know from recent studies that these labs will cause very serious contamination where they operate. Recent studies by National Jewish Hospital researchers demonstrate the contamination inside a meth lab is very dangerous and that the occupants of the property and first response agency personnel can easily be exposed to toxic materials. These contaminants are persistent and can be detected months and even years after the fact.

The contamination coming from an operating lab is very complex. We are only now learning about the magnitude of some of these contaminants. Various toxic gases are liberated during reactions and flow throughout the space. Depending upon operations various liquids and solids are spilled or splashed on carpets, floors and walls. Waste products are the classic "witches brew" of toxic materials with a huge variety of chemicals and complex compounds. These wastes frequently are disposed down drains, into the common trash or onto the ground. If septic systems are present, you must assume they are contaminated and will require cleanup.

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METH LABS - COLORADO CLEANUP MANDATE

(Continued from page 16)

The contaminants leave residues on all the surfaces in the area. The ventilation systems will be contaminated. Recent studies show that the contaminants penetrate into porous surfaces of all types and are not readily removed with routine cleaning. Painting over surfaces without cleanup is not acceptable as some of the contaminants will leach through paint.

In the worst cases contaminants will be found inside dry wall, in the boards of cabinets, in the floor boards below carpet and pads. Even cleaning with industrial chemicals is frequently not adequate to remove these contaminants. In these cases the appropriate remedy may be removal of all these porous materials. In milder cases, aggressive cleaning can be successful. It must be noted, however, that the author has never seen successful cleaning of fabrics, carpets and pads.

Extreme caution must be used when contemplating cleaning. This is not a job for normal maintenance and cleaning crews. Protective equipment must be used if for no other reason than the cleaning chemicals themselves pose risks to the users. OSHA 40-hour hazardous materials training is typically the minimum. Keep in mind that if other contaminants such as asbestos are present, different training and certification will be necessary.

Sampling for methamphetamine and the myriad of other contaminants is also a job for experts. The procedures established under the new Board of Health regulations are very detailed. Only industrial hygienists or certified industrial hygienists may conduct the sampling and design the cleanup plans.

The cost of cleanup can be great. Fabrics and highly porous materials will need to be disposed of. Damage to neighboring spaces may be present. For example, if the lab was running in a self-storage unit so that several neighboring units were contaminated through common ventilation, the cleanup cost can be quite large. Cleanup of a two-bedroom apartment heavily used as a meth lab can easily run in excess of \$30,000, and at the end of the process you have a gutted unit requiring new cabinets, carpets and paint.

"Blessed are the young, for they shall inherit the national debt."

—Herbert Hoover (1874-1964) 31st U.S. President

DISASTER TRIVIA



We had three winners for the Disaster Trivia contest in the last newsletter. The winners were **Laura Smith from Meeker Volunteer Fire and Rescue, Betty Crist with the Colorado Department of Personnel & Administration, and Erik Nilsson, Larimer County Emergency Manager.** Each received useful prizes for their correct answers.

The 'hint' for the last contest was: This disaster killed 21 people, crumpled the steel support of an elevated train, and knocked over a fire station.

As described by a witness, "...there was chaos, terror, buildings in ruins, victims to be dug out, trapped survivors to be rescued, rescue workers among the victims, and anguished families rushing to relief centers to find their relatives."

"The wave moved at an estimated 35 miles per hour."

The disaster took place in the United States.




The Answer: The Boston Molasses Disaster (also known as the Great Molasses Flood or The Great Boston Molasses Tragedy) occurred on January 15, 1919, in the North End neighborhood of Boston, Massachusetts. People in Boston's North End were startled by a loud rumbling noise. They watched in horror as a five-story tank broke apart, unleashing a wave of molasses 15 feet high and 160 feet wide. Moving at 35 miles per hour, it traveled over two blocks and engulfed everything in its path.

The disaster occurred at the Purity Distilling Company facility on January 15, 1919, one day before the Eighteenth Amendment enabling Prohibition was ratified.

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DISASTER TRIVIA

(Continued from page 17)



The disaster killed 21 people, injured 150, and caused property damage of more than 100,000,000 in today's dollars. The tank's owners claimed anarchists had dynamited it as a protest against the American government. In fact, the tank had been hastily constructed and overloaded. Years later, the tank's owner was found liable and ordered to pay compensation to the victims.

At lunchtime, on a mild day in January 1919, Boston's Commercial Street wharf, on the edge of the densely populated North End, was bustling. Horse-drawn wagons and motor trucks made deliveries to area businesses and to the ships moored in the harbor. Employees of the Department of Public Works took a break from their jobs at the DPW stables, offices, and workshops to eat lunch outside.

Across Commercial Street from the wharf, 65-year-old Bridget Clougherty enjoyed the warm winter weather as she hung laundry from her porch. Passenger trollies traveled back and forth on the elevated track. Looming over all this activity was a huge dark presence, a 50-foot-tall brown metal tank. It contained 2,300,000 gallons of molasses. No above ground receptacle in Boston had ever held more.

Suddenly there was a loud rumbling sound and then a "rat-a-tat-tat" that witnesses described as sounding like a machine gun. The ground shook as if a train were passing overhead. The awful sound of tearing metal followed. The molasses tank had come apart.

For everyone in the immediate area, the world went black as a monstrous wave of molasses engulfed everything within a two-block area. The devastation was horrific: the buildings on the dock were flattened or swept off their foundations and crushed. Employees of the Public Works department, firemen at duty in a nearby station, children playing in the street, Bridget Clougherty on the porch of her house were knocked over and drowned, or crushed by the sheer force of 26,000,000 pounds of molasses.

The next day, the Boston Post carried a graphic account. "The sight that greeted the first of the rescuers on the scene is almost indescribable in words. Molasses, waist deep, covered the street and swirled and bubbled about the wreckage. Here and there struggled a form — whether it was animal or human being was impossible to tell. Only an upheaval, a thrashing about in the sticky mass, showed where any life was..."

Horses died like so many flies on sticky fly paper. The more they struggled, the deeper in the mess they were ensnared. Human beings — men and women — suffered likewise."

Why had the molasses tank burst? The newspapers reported that the tank had exploded. The tank's owner, U.S. Industrial Alcohol, claimed that anarchists had dynamited it as an act of sabotage. The company had reaped huge profits during World War I from converting molasses into alcohol for use in the making of munitions. After the war, with Prohibition on the horizon, U.S.I.A. was pushing to supply the liquor distilleries. As an enormously rich and powerful corporation, Industrial Alcohol was a logical target for anarchists, who were opposed to all forms of government and advocated the overthrow of the capitalist system. Anarchists had indeed bombed a number of the company's facilities in New York earlier in the decade.

However much the company promoted the sabotage theory, it was soon to be proved false. The families of those killed and injured by the blast — mostly poor Irish and Italian laborers — contended that U.S.I.A. itself was at fault and should compensate them for their loss and suffering.

The tank, they insisted, had leaked or "wept" molasses consistently since its construction in 1915. It had long been emitting strange sounds and vibrated under the immense pressure of its contents. U.S.I.A. had ignored these warning signs, caulking or patching the leaks and finally painting the tank brown in an effort to conceal them.

With largely poor and powerless working people facing off against one of the nation's largest corporations, the Massachusetts Superior Court appointed Col. Hugh Ogden, a respected former military officer, to hold hearings on the matter. After five-and-a-half years, Ogden rendered his decision. There was no evidence that the tank had been sabotaged. Instead he found a history of negligence and mismanagement on the part of U.S.I.A.

The tank's location was chosen because of its proximity to the wharf; the company showed no concern for the safety of the people who lived and worked in the densely populated neighborhood around it.


The man who oversaw construction of the tank had no technical or mechanical training; he was unable to read a blueprint or to determine specifications that would make the steel in the tank safe. No engineers or architects were consulted; nor did an architect or engineer ever inspect it.

(Continued on page 19)

DISASTER TRIVIA

(Continued from page 18)

In the company's rush to finish construction while there was still a demand for industrial molasses, the strength of the tank was not tested before it was filled. To avoid costly interruptions in the molasses distilling process, the manager ignored employees and others who warned that the tank was unsound.



The destruction of the tank was not an act of sabotage, Col. Ogden determined, but the result of structural failure. U.S.I.A. had compromised safety to maximize production and minimize costs. He ordered the company to pay \$1,000,000 in compensation to the victims of the disaster.

Massachusetts and most other states responded to the verdict by passing laws to certify engineers and regulate construction. The molasses case marked the beginning of the end of an era when big business faced no government restrictions on its activities — and no consequences.

To this day, people say that molasses left from this disaster still seeps up from some of the streets on a hot day.

ANOTHER TRIVIA QUIZ

This disaster killed around 1,700 people and received little media attention because other events at the time took precedence.



From a National Geographic news article on the disaster, "In a nation desensitized to death, 1,700 more did not seem such an enormous tragedy that it does today."

The disaster took place in the United States.

If you'd like to take a shot at guessing what this disaster was, you must name all of the following correctly:
 The **type** of disaster.
 The **location** of the disaster.
 The **year** the disaster occurred.

Email your answer to Polly White (polly.white@state.co.us) no later than **July 1, 2006**. Again, three prizes will be awarded for the correct answers. In the event that more than three correct answers are received, a random drawing will be held. Winners will be notified via email.

On the art of being a man of few words According to Anecdote.com, Calvin Coolidge was well-known for being a taciturn man. One night, over dinner, one of his guests who knew his reputation for keeping mum tried to stir up a conversation with him. Trying to draw him out she said, "I have made a bet, Mr. Coolidge, that I can get more than two words out of you."

Coolidge replied coolly, "You lose."

NOTICE ON COST SHARE ADJUSTMENTS FOR DISASTERS

Pursuant to a final rule issued in 1999, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) annually adjusts the statewide per capita threshold used to recommend an increase of the federal cost share from 75 percent to not more than 90 percent of the eligible cost of permanent work under section 406 and emergency work under section 403 and section 407 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). The adjustment to the threshold is based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers published annually by the U.S. Department of Labor. For disasters declared between January 1 and December 31, 2006, the qualifying threshold is \$114 of state population. This means that if a disaster is so extraordinary that actual federal obligations under the Stafford Act, excluding FEMA administrative costs, meet or exceed \$114 per capita, FEMA may recommend a 90 percent federal/10 percent state cost-share arrangement, as opposed to the normal 75 percent/25 percent requirement.

The complete text of the notice is in the January 30, 2006, Federal Register (Vol. 71, No. 19, pp. 4930-4931), which can be found in any federal repository library or online at <http://www.access.gpo.gov/>.

MORE NIMS RESOURCES FROM THE NIC

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration Center (NIC) has released three new NIMS-related resources. Integrating NIMS into State Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Integrating NIMS into Local/Tribal EOPs and SOPs outline ways state and local incident managers can modify emergency operations plans and standard operating procedures to align with NIMS concepts and terminology.

Training Guidelines for ICS Instructors, January 2006 provides direction on training needed by Incident Command System (ICS) instructors and for agencies that offer ICS training programs. These documents and additional information about NIMS are available online at <http://www.fema.gov/nims/>. For more information, contact the NIC at NIMS-Integration-

CDEM Web Address:
<http://www.dola.state.co.us/oem/>



READYColorado is a public awareness campaign supported by public and private partners concerned with homeland security and all-hazards preparedness. Its goal is to raise awareness about the importance of disaster preparedness among Colorado citizens. To achieve this, READYColorado is reaching out to individuals, families, neighborhoods and businesses to provide them with the tools and information they need to respond to and recover from any disaster.

READYColorado is funded by the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), the North Central All Hazards Region of Colorado (which includes Boulder, Gilpin, Clear Creek, Broomfield, Denver, Adams, Jefferson, Douglas, Elbert and Arapahoe counties), the Colorado Department of Local Affairs, and Citizen Corps.

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